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Abstract 
Abstract 
This research is carried out to improve Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) in oil tanker 
operations in general, to extend and enhance in specific Cognitive Reliability and Error 
Analysis Method (CREAM), with the aim of reducing human error and thus 
subsequently preventing oil tanker spills. It is concentrated on oil tanker operations to 
address the limitation of availability of human reliability data in the maritime domain. 
The continual occurrence of oil tanker spills, which was substantiated with analysis of 
historical data of oil tanker incidents/accidents from 1970 to 2008, provides a judicious 
reason to conduct this research. The critical review of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
and HRA results in the development of a conceptual framework of HRA facilitating 
FSA and incorporating Human Organisational Factors (HOF), which addresses the 
shortcomings of the generic HRA and FSA methodologies that exist independently in 
the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. 
The CREAM is reviewed due to its prominent use in identifying the root causes of 
human error. However, its inability of providing solutions to an incident/accident 
investigation and robust quantification of human reliability features stimulates the 
development of an advanced CREAM and a human reliability quantification model 
using a combined Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) and fuzzy logic approach in this 
research. In addition to facilitating identification of the root causes of human error, the 
advanced CREAM also provides the solutions to a quantification model, which enables 
the development of HRA data in the maritime domain. 
Furthermore, lack of CREAM studies on relationships among Common Performance 
Conditions (CPCs) is addressed by proposing a Decision Making Trial and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMATEL) model, which allows for a comprehensive understanding of 
relationships and interdependencies among the CPCs. The model could also be used to 
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appreciate and assimilate the relationships and interdependencies among human factor 
variables involved in other transportation systems and industrial fields. Finally, the 
research is concluded with an integrated AHP and fuzzy Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) model for determining the 
selection of an appropriate risk control option (RCO) while performing an 
incident/accident investigation by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into 
consideration. 
This research as a pioneer work in developing and applying advanced techniques to 
improve the generic CREAM in oil tanker operations establishes a foundation for future 
effort to improve the use of CREAM in other industries. The techniques developed can 
also be tailored to investigate and deal with an incident/accident effectively, resulting in 
the reduction of human error within the system management of any organisation. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Summary 
This chapter presents an introduction to the research theme, including a brief review of 
the history and development of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), an outline of the 
objectives and a statement of problems that this thesis will aim to solve. These are 
followed by an overview of the research methodology, elicitation of expert judgment 
and utilisation of case studies. Subsequently, the layout, scope and structure of the thesis 
are outlined and described. Finally, the chapter is concluded with remarks on the 
integration of chapters within the thesis. 
1.1 Introduction 
Human reliability refers to the probability that a person correctly carries out an action 
required by a system in a requisite time without performing any redundant activity, 
which can reduce the system performance (Pyy, 2000). Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) is defined as the utilisation of system engineering and human factor methods to 
describe the human contribution to risk, which includes a series of methods to identify 
sources of human errors and to predict the likelihood of their occurrence (Boring, 2008). 
The purpose of HRA is to provide a complete representation of the human contribution 
to risk and to establish ways to reduce that risk (Gertman and Blackman, 1994). The 
assessment of human reliability could represent the human contribution to the total risk 
in any system leading to a reduction in and prevention of human errors within that 
system (Kariuki and Lowe, 2006). The HRA can be employed as a tool to reduce human 
error probabilities (HEPs) to some acceptable minimum standards as determined by the 
maritime stakeholders. It is composed of quantitative and qualitative features, where 
quantitatively it facilitates to obtain HEPs, and qualitatively it identifies potential human 
errors in an incident/accident investigation. The growing need for the employment of 
HRA in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills is substantiated by the 
occurrences of oil tanker incidents/accidents, which are analysed in detail in Chapter 2. 
1 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
The advancement and modernisation of the shipping industry has resulted in equipment 
becoming more reliable however, contribution of human errors towards the cause of an 
incident/accident tends to surface due to organisational system problems. Hence, it is of 
paramount importance that the aspect of human errors is incorporated in any effort of 
quantification of risk within a system. The HRA could provide a realistic assessment of 
the risks involved in the management of oil tankers, thus assisting stakeholders to 
reduce spills from oil tankers. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The principal aim of this thesis is to improve HRA in oil tanker operations in general, to 
extend and enhance in specific Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM), with the aim of reducing human error and thus subsequently preventing oil 
tanker spills. The research concentrates on maritime operations due to lack of human 
reliability data in the maritime domain. The secondary aim of this research is to 
examine and critically evaluate the applicability of HRA to Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) incorporating Human Organisational Factors (HOF) in the management of oil 
tankers to prevent oil spills. To achieve these aims, the measurable objectives are 
outlined as follows: 
a). To carry out a critical review of FSA and HRA. 
b). To analyse and present a generic oil tanker to provide means of risk factors that need 
to be considered while carrying out risk assessment for an oil tanker. 
c). To develop a conceptual framework of HRA facilitating FSA incorporating HOF in 
the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. 
d). To improve the generic CREAM by constructing a novel advanced CREAM 
framework addressing the human errors and reliability associated with maritime 
operations taking into account risk control options (RCOs) and cost benefit assessment 
(CBA) elements while performing an incident/accident investigation. 
e). To develop an innovative approach using a Decision Making Trial and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMATEL) technique to reprioritise Common Performance Conditions 
(CPCs) in CREAM. 
f). To establish an innovative human reliability quantification model using a combined 
Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) and fuzzy logic approach, capable of 
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quantitatively evaluating human reliability probabilities in CREAM in maritime 
operations. 
g). To generate an integrated AHP and fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) model to determine the selection of an 
appropriate RCO by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into consideration. 
1.3 The Statement of Problems 
The problems that this research tries to solve can be identified and described as follows: 
a). The HRA element has not been assimilated well into FSA, even though the 
importance of including human factors in FSA has been reiterated for some time. The 
thesis attempts to develop a better framework that is capable of incorporating the 
element of human factors more effectively into FSA concentrating on oil tanker 
operations. 
b). The existing generic CREAM mainly target on the root causes of an 
incident/accident, in its qualitative analysis. An enhanced novel advanced CREAM 
framework would be developed to address the human errors and reliability associated 
with maritime operations, which provides, in addition to the root causes of the 
incident/accident, corresponding solutions in order to overcome the root causes 
effectively. 
c). Qualitative analysis is used to describe linguistic terms of CPCs in CREAM. Each 
linguistic term of CPCs is related to a particular contextual effect on the performance 
reliability. The resultant number of effects of CPCs will provide the state of the 
Contextual Control Model (COCOM) of CREAM. The interdependencies of CPCs are 
taken into consideration when the effects of principal CPCs in designated CPC groups 
fall into neutral. Currently the generic CREAM utilises CPC groupings to determine the 
outcome of the linguistic term of each CPC in the qualitative analysis of CREAM. 
Hence, CPCs, being a core component of CREAM, play an important role in CREAM 
analysis however, there is no systematic method available to illustrate the relationships 
between the CPCs. An attempt to develop a technique that allows better illustration of 
CPCs' relationships and interdependencies will be carried out. 
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d). One of the problems of the generic CREAM is the fallacy of making an assumption 
that all the CPCs had an equal influence in causing an incident/accident. In real life, the 
CPCs are not all of equal influence and importance but are interrelated with reference to 
the incident/accident that may occur. An attempt to quantify human performance failure 
probabilities in CREAM is carried out to overcome the above fallacy in performing 
quantification in CREAM. 
e). Currently, the selection of RCO deduced from an assessment of an incident/accident 
to prevent a similar situation from its reoccurrence is often conducted by the expert 
judgment. An alternative method is developed to perform the RCO selection 
systematically and effectively to facilitate the establishment of an appropriate RCO for 
stakeholders with different perspectives. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Quantitative and qualitative assessment approaches are utilised to conduct this research. 
The research will begin by analysing and synthesising historical oil tanker 
incident/accident statistics from reliable organisations to establish the need of carrying 
out HRA research in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. The 
quantitative assessment would be employed in examining historical oil tanker 
incident/accident statistics to construct bar and pie charts to illustrate the trends of the 
past oil tanker incidents/accidents. This is followed by scrutinising the present FSA 
framework and HRA methods. Various technical models are developed using well- 
established Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques to address the 
problems raised in Section 1.3. All the proposed technical models are substantiated with 
case studies and validated using sensitivity analyses. 
1.4.1 Elicitation of Expert Judgment in Research 
Experts from classification societies and flag state administrations, including personnel 
specialising in human reliability and a master mariner with more than ten years of oil 
tanker sailing experience, were used to evaluate data required for various technical 
models. Members of the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) 
including the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Bureau Veritas (BV), Det Norske 
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Veritas (DNV), Germanischer Lloyds (GL), Korean Register of Shipping (KR), Lloyds 
Register (LR), Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK) and Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) were 
requested to participate and share their expertise in evaluating data for technical models 
in the research. DNV and LR classification society officials responded promisingly to 
provide evaluation feedback within the permitted time period. Meanwhile, as for the 
flag state administration officials, the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), 
Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD), Malaysian Marine Department (MMD) and 
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) were approached. Finally, a DNV 
human reliability specialist and two anonymous flag state administration officials with 
accident investigation backgrounds provided the evaluated data for the technical 
models. The flag state administration officials are selected to provide expert judgments 
because flag states set, monitor and enforce standards of safety and pollution prevention 
on local vessels and, enforce international standards of safety and pollution prevention 
on foreign vessels calling ports under their jurisdictions. The classification societies, on 
the other hand, are involved in setting technical standards for ships and, provide 
inspection and assistance to enable the shipping industry to meet these standards, 
including quality system accreditation. Hence, these two types of organisations' 
perspectives carry considerable weight for maritime research. All the experts were 
provided with an Excel spreadsheet that contains the evaluation tables of various case 
studies presented throughout the thesis. A copy of the spreadsheet is provided in 
Appendix I and their responses are provided in the corresponding chapters. Lastly all 
the experts were provided with a final copy of the spreadsheet, which contains various 
evaluation tables that are used in the thesis, to have their concurrence in the data 
analysis of this research. 
1.4.2 Utilisation of Case Studies 
This research employs two types of case studies to cater for the two analysis methods in 
CREAM. CREAM consists of retrospective and prospective analyses. The retrospective 
analysis enables the past incident/accident to be reviewed and the root causes of the 
incident/accident to be determined. It also facilitates review of the likelihood of the 
incident/accident and ways to prevent reoccurrence. Meanwhile, the prospective 
analysis can be used to identify possible sources of human errors for an 
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incident/accident that has not been encountered. A case study of the `Prestige' accident, 
which occurred while she was sailing off the West Coast of Galicia on November 13, 
2002, is presented to illustrate the retrospective analysis use of CREAM, and a case 
study of the `Carina' incident is presented to illustrate the application of prospective 
analysis of CREAM. It is a simulation of an incident that occurred while an oil tanker 
was discharging crude oil at one of the US Gulf of Mexico ports. All the technical case 
studies are substantiated using sensitivity analyses. 
1.5 Layout, Scope and Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised and presented in eight chapters. The general framework along 
with a graphical flowchart of the thesis is illustrated in Figure 1.1, which shows the 
layout and scope of the chapters. The contents of each chapter are detailed in the 
following subsections. 
Chapter 1I ýI Chapter 2I _I Chapter 3 Introduction I'I Literature Review I'I HRA to FSA 
CREAM 
Chapter 4 
Use of CREAM in Oil Tanker Operations 
Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 
DEMATEL AHP & Fuzzy AHP & Fuzzy 
Logic TOPSIS 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions & Future Research 
Figure 1.1 The Structure of the Thesis 
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1.5.1 Chapter 2- Literature Review 
This chapter examines the historical data relating to oil tanker incidents/accidents from 
1970 to 2008. A bar chart and three pie charts are constructed and presented to illustrate 
the trends of the causes of oil tanker spills. Past oil tanker spill statistics are analysed to 
establish and substantiate the need of carrying out the research on HRA incorporating 
HOF in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. This is followed by critical 
reviews of FSA. The chapter is concluded with review of first and second generations of 
HRA and MCDM methods. 
1.5.2 Chapter 3- Use of HRA to Facilitate FSA: An Oil Tanker Case 
This chapter addresses the application of HRA to facilitate the FSA framework, which 
incorporates HOF in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. The application 
of HRA to facilitate FSA onboard oil tankers is examined and critically evaluated. A 
new framework of an application of HRA to facilitate FSA, which has integrated human 
factor elements substantially into FSA, is developed. RCOs for HOF of various 
networks within the management of an oil tanker are analysed and presented to provide 
means of risk controls. The proposed framework is demonstrated with a case study. A 
hierarchical task analysis (HTA) on the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves during 
discharging operations onboard an oil tanker is presented. Finally, a series of 
recommendations that should be adopted by tanker owners to reduce the risk of oil spills 
are presented. 
1.5.3 Chapter 4- Use of CREAM to Facilitate HRA in Oil Tanker 
Operations 
This chapter presents a CREAM tailored for its application to a maritime context. A 
new advanced CREAM framework is developed and presented to address the human 
errors and reliability associated with maritime operations. The significance of 
addressing human cognitive functions and context in human error analysis (HEA) 
stimulates the creation and development of the advanced CREAM. The CREAM 
framework provides a practical approach in performing an incident/accident 
investigation through its prospective and retrospective analyses. The successful 
application of CREAM principles in the analysis of aviation and nuclear power plant 
7 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
incidents/accidents triggers its use in the maritime domain. In addition to applying the 
methodology, two new phases of RCOs and CBA are added to a novel advanced 
CREAM framework. Hence, the innovative advanced CREAM, besides finding the root 
causes of an incident/accident, also provides the corresponding solutions in order to 
overcome the root causes effectively. Furthermore, changes in the classification 
schemes, including the renaming of five CPCs, introduction of a CBA matrix and 
adding of new classification categories, have been made to allow CREAM to be more 
adaptable in the maritime domain. Case studies of the `Carina' and `Prestige' accidents 
are used to demonstrate that the new advanced CREAM could be applied to deal with 
human error analysis related to maritime incidents/accidents. Thus, this research could 
facilitate the development of HRA in the maritime field and enhance the HRA research 
in the maritime industry. 
1.5.4 Chapter 5- Reprioritisation of CPCs in CREAM Using a 
DEMATEL Technique 
This chapter produces a novel approach using a DEMATEL technique to reprioritise 
CPCs in CREAM. Presently CPC groupings are used to determine the outcome of 
linguistic terms of CPCs in the qualitative analysis of CREAM. However no 
prioritisation of CPCs exists within the designated CPC groups. This results in the 
assumption that all the CPCs are of equal weights of importance however, this is not the 
case in reality. This innovative approach of using a DEMATEL model in CREAM 
could provide an alternative for decision makers to analyse scientifically an appropriate 
CPC that needs to be emphasised to reduce human errors and prevent a similar 
incident/accident to the one investigated from reoccurring. The model is developed to 
reprioritise CPCs by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into consideration. 
The proposed model has been demonstrated with a case study and substantiated using a 
sensitivity analysis. The model is a supplement to the new advanced CREAM 
framework that has been developed and can assist HRA analysts to perform better 
qualitative analysis. Finally, the newly developed approach using a DEMATEL model 
can be used in other HRA methods and can be adapted and utilised in other 
transportation systems and industrial fields, such as the chemical, gas and oil industries, 
resulting in the reduction of human errors. 
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1.5.5 Chapter 6- Combined AHP and Fuzzy Approach to Facilitate the 
Quantification Analysis of CREAM in Oil Tanker Operations 
In this part of research an innovative human reliability quantification model has been 
developed using a combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach, which is capable of 
quantitatively evaluating human reliability probabilities in CREAM in maritime 
operations. This methodology is found to be particularly useful in dealing with the 
limitation of availability of data in the maritime domain and, the uncertainty and 
complexity that exist in the quantitative analysis of human reliability. The proposed 
model is demonstrated with a case study and validated using a sensitivity analysis. 
Thus, this research can facilitate the development of HRA quantification in the maritime 
field and subsequently assist in reducing human errors in maritime operations. 
1.5.6 Chapter 7- RCO Selection in CREAM Using Integrated AHP and 
Fuzzy TOPSIS Model 
This chapter presents an integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model to determine the 
selection of an appropriate RCO by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into 
consideration in CREAM. The AHP method is used to determine the relative 
importance of weights within the established criteria of CBA elements from the selected 
RCOs. This is followed by ranking of the RCOs determined by the fuzzy TOPSIS. The 
proposed model has been demonstrated with a case study and validated using a 
sensitivity analysis. Similar to the DEMATEL model, the integrated model is used as a 
supplement to the advanced CREAM that has been developed with a promising HRA 
model for identifying and providing solutions for the root causes of an 
incident/accident. Furthermore, the proposed integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model 
can be adapted and used in other transportation systems and industrial fields. 
1.5.7 Chapter 8- Conclusions and Further Research 
Finally, conclusions and further research are presented in Chapter 8. 
1.6 Integration of Chapters within the Research 
The integration of the whole research begins with the construction of a framework for 
the application of HRA to facilitate FSA that leads to the review of one of the selected 
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second generation HRA methods. Initially CREAM is reviewed due to its prominent use 
for identifying root causes of human errors. Its lack of providing solutions to an 
incident/accident investigation and a robust quantification of human reliability feature 
led to the development of a new advanced CREAM framework. The innovative 
advanced CREAM framework is developed to address the human errors and reliability 
in maritime applications with an emphasis on oil tanker operations. The lack of research 
studies on relationships and interdependencies of CPCs, which play a significant role in 
CREAM, resulted in this research introducing a novel approach using a DEMATEL 
model to allow decision makers to have better understanding of CPCs. To address 
CREAM's lack of quantification of human reliability feature, a new human reliability 
quantification model is proposed using a combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach 
dealing with the limitation of availability of data in the maritime domain and, the 
uncertainty and complexity that exist in the quantitative analysis of human reliabilities. 
The continuity of integration of the research ends with an integrated AHP and fuzzy 
TOPSIS model to determine the selection of an appropriate RCO by taking subjective 
judgments of decision makers into account, which enhances the applicability of the new 
advanced CREAM framework. Thereby all the chapters are effectively interwoven with 
a close relationship between chapters within this research. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the principal aim and objectives of the research. The scope, 
research methodology and elicitation of expert judgement are briefly described followed 
by the layout of the thesis. Additionally, the integration of chapters within the thesis is 
provided. Most of the HRA previously studies have been carried out in the nuclear, 
chemical, oil, gas and aviation industries. This research has added to the frontier of 
knowledge in a way that has not been done before because of the limited nature of 
similar research in the maritime domain. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Summary 
This chapter presents a literature review on the significance of and need of carrying out 
research on HRA incorporating HOF in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil 
spills. Historical oil tanker accident data is analysed to emphasise and substantiate the 
need for this research. Other aspects relating to FSA, HRA and MCDM studies used in 
the research are also described. 
2.1. Introduction 
The majority of maritime accidents have been caused by human errors (DNV, 2002). 
Recent views on the development of human error studies indicated that human error is a 
symptom of deeper fault within a management system and is an instigating theme for an 
investigation of an accident (Dekker, 2006). The term `human error' has many 
denotations including human error as a cause, human error as an event and human error 
as a consequence (Hollnagel and Amalberti, 2001). Reason (Reason, 1990) viewed 
human error as "a generic term to include all those occasions in which a planned 
sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and 
when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency". He 
also perceived that human error problems can be divided into person and system 
approaches. The person approach focused on individual errors, whereas the system 
approach concentrated on the environment in which an individual works (Reason, 
2000). Human error can also be caused by failure of operation, poor management and 
lack of maintenance or faulty design within a system. It could even be the result of some 
latent failures left within a management system. Another tendency for the occurrence of 
human error is during human's departure from routine procedures while performing a 
task (Rasmussen, 2003). Some research studies on HRA used the term `human failure 
event' instead of `human error' to avoid blame implication while performing an 
incident/accident investigation. Diversity in human error classification, including error 
of commission (EOC) and error of omission aggravates in determining which human 
error has occurred. Another expression used in human error terminology is human 
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factors. Human factors can be defined as "a discipline concerned with the design and 
operation of technological and organisational systems to achieve proper adaptation of 
human tasks" (IMO, 2002a). Additionally, human factors are dealt with through 
ergonomic principles that relate to the study of efficiency of persons in their working 
environment. For the purpose of this research, human error refers to larger terms that 
incorporate all of the above mentioned features. The introduction of automation and 
advancement in shipping management provide many defensive levels similar to 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model of system accidents such as warning alarms, physical 
barriers and automatic shutdowns (Reason, 2000). Even though rules, regulations and 
procedures have been assimilated in the operation of shipboard management systems, 
oil tanker incidents/accidents still occur (Hollnagel, 2005). These have prompted the 
formulation of this research. The historical data of oil tanker incidents/accidents from 
1970 to 2008 is analysed in the following section to establish and substantiate the need 
of carrying out research on HRA incorporating HOF in the management of oil tankers in 
order to prevent oil spills. 
2.2 Historical Data of Oil Tanker Incidents/Accidents 
Some of the organisations that maintain reliable data in the maritime industry include 
classification societies, which mainly operate from the viewpoint of compliance with 
various sets of rules and regulations being in force, and Protection and Indemnity 
Associations (P & I), which tend to collect data from the viewpoint of financial losses 
due to lack of safety. Meanwhile, the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
Ltd. (ITOPF) concentrates on maintaining good failure data records on tanker 
incidents/accidents. Furthermore, the implementation of the International Safety 
Management Code (ISM), which demands the maintenance of proper systematic 
documentation as one of the required criteria in implementing the code, results in 
shipping companies keeping and maintaining well documented failure data on their 
fleets. The ITOPF statistics have been selected for this research because their failure 
data is more related to oil tankers. 
2.2.1 ITOPF Statistics 
The data collected by the ITOPF covers all incident/accident spillages except those 
resulting from acts of war. It is also noted that the figure for the amount of oil spilt in an 
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incident/accident includes all oil lost to the environment, including that which is burnt 
or remains in a sunken vessel. Table 2.1 shows the annual quantity of oil spilt from 
1970 to 2008. Similar annual quantity oil spilt is illustrated in Figure 2.1 for easier 
comprehension. 
Table 2.1 The Annual Quantity of Oil Spilt from 1970 to 2008 (ITOPF, 2008) 
Year Quantity 
('000 tonnes) 
Year Quantity 
('000 tonnes) 
Year Quantity 
('000 tonnes) 
1970 330 1983 384 1996 80 
1971 138 1984 28 1997 72 
1972 297 1985 85 1998 13 
1973 164 1986 19 1999 29 
1974 175 1987 30 2000 14 
1975 357 1988 190 2001 8 
1976 364 1989 174 2002 67 
1977 291 1990 61 2003 42 
1978 386 1991 430 2004 15 
1979 640 1992 172 2005 17 
1980 206 1993 139 2006 13 
1981 48 1994 130 2007 18 
1982 12 1995 12 2008 2 
Figure 2.1 The Annual Quantities of Oil Spilt from 1970 to 2008 (ITOPF, 2008) 
A few very large spills are accountable for a high percentage of the oil spilt. The figure 
for a particular year is severely distorted by a single large incident/accident. It is clearly 
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illustrated by those in 1979 (Atlantic Empress-287 000 tonnes), 1983 (Castillo de 
Bellver-252 000 tonnes), 1988 (Odyssey-132 000 tonnes), 1989 (Exxon Valdez-37 000 
tonnes and Khark V-80 000 tonnes), 1991 (ABT Summer-260 000 tonnes), 1999 (Erika- 
20 000 tonnes) and 2002 (Prestige-63 000 tonnes). Furthermore, it is apparent that the 
quantity of oil spills has decreased significantly during the last thirty eight years. The 
average annual quantity of oil spills during the 1990's was about a third of that during 
the 1970's. One of the reasons could be due to the implementation of international and 
national regulations listed as follows: 
a). International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973 as 
amended by the protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73 / 78). 
b). Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90). 
c). ISM Code which has been incorporated in International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974). 
However the average annual quantity of oil spilt during the 1990's is almost the same as 
that during the 1980's. The average annual quantity of oil spilt in the 2000's was about 
one sixth of that during the 1980's. Table 2.2 and Figures 2.2,2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the 
causes of oil spills for incidents/accidents for the amount of less than 7 tonnes, 7 to 700 
tonnes and more than 700 tonnes respectively for the period of 1974 to 2008. 
Table 2.2 The Frequency of Incidents/Accidents of Oil Spills by Cause (ITOPF, 2008) 
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Figure 2.2 The Frequency of Incidents/Accidents Involving 
Oil Spills <7 tonnes by Cause (ITOPF, 2008) 
Figure 2.3 The Frequency of Incidents/Accidents Involving 
Oil Spills 7- 700 tonnes by Cause (ITOPF, 2008), 
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Figure 2.4 The Frequency of Incidents/Accidents Involving 
Oil Spills > 700 tonnes by Cause (ITOPF, 2008) 
By analysing Figures 2.2,2.3 and 2.4, the following conclusions can be made: 
a). Most spills from oil tankers result from routine operations such as loading, 
discharging and bunkering operations, which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals. 
All these operations are associated with human interaction, thus substantiating the need 
for research into HRA incorporating HOF in the management of oil tankers in order to 
prevent oil spills. Detailed descriptions of oil tanker operations relating to loading, 
discharging and bunkering operations are provided in the ensuing section. 
b). The majority of these operational spills are small, with 91% involving quantities of 
less than 7 tonnes. 
c). Accidents involving collisions and groundings generally result in much larger spills, 
with almost half and a fifth involving accidents of oil spills of 7-700 tonnes and more 
than 700 tonnes respectively. 
d). Oil spill incidents due to hull failures are less common for accidents involving less 
than 7 tonnes of spill and more prevalent for accidents involving spills of more than 700 
tonnes. Similar trends are observed for the accident categories of fires and explosions. 
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2.3 Oil Tanker Operations 
Some of the oil tanker routine operations that involve human interaction, including 
loading, discharging and hunkering operations, are illustrated in this section. 
2.3.1 Loading Operations 
Prior to a loading operation, the voyage order that includes loading orders will provide 
the quantity of cargo to he loaded. The designated person in charge onboard the vessel 
will plan the loading operation, such as the allocation of cargo tanks for various parcels 
of cargoes and the loading sequences, taking into consideration the vessel's stresses 
throughout the loading operation. The loading operation can be carried out via loading 
arms or flexible cargo hoses whilst the vessel is safely moored alongside a pier, while 
the vessel is moored to an offshore buoy, or by ship to ship transfer, when two vessels 
are moored to each other in open seas. Cargo can he loaded into cargo tanks via cargo 
valves, which are operated by designated crew members. Even for vessels equipped 
with highly automated valve operations, it is still necessary for a crew member to 
operate the valves. Some modern vessels are equipped with automated cargo tank 
gauging equipment. However, at the final stages of the loading operation, crew 
members are required to monitor the cargo levels in the cargo tanks by means of manual 
gauging (Huber and Marion 2001 ; Hayler and Keever, 2003; IMO, 2006h). 
2.3.2 Discharging Operations 
The discharging operation, like the loading operation, also has a designated person in 
charge onboard to monitor the overall discharging operation. Similar procedures to the 
loading operation take place, which involve the vessel's crew members. Additionally, 
cargo pumps are used to pump cargoes from the vessel, resulting in more manpower 
being required from the deck and engine department to monitor the operation of cargo 
pumps in the cargo pump room and in the engine room respectively. In the case of a 
crude oil tanker, an additional operation of crude oil washing will he carried out whilst 
the vessel is discharging the cargo (Huber and Marton 2001; IMO, 2006h). 
2.3.3 Bunkering Operations 
Human interactions involved in bunkering operations are similar to the loading 
operations of oil cargo. If the hunkering operations are performed by two vessels, the 
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two designated persons in charge will be monitoring the bunkering operations on their 
respective vessels. On receiving a bunkering order, which states the quantity of bunkers 
to be loaded, the designated person in charge onboard the vessel will plan the bunkering 
operations. These include allocation of bunker tanks and the bunkering sequences, 
taking into account the vessel's stresses throughout the bunkering operations. Bunkering 
operations can be carried out via bunkering arms while the vessel is safely fast on the 
berth, by flexible cargo hoses whilst the vessel is safely moored alongside a pier, or by 
ship to ship transfer, when two vessels are moored to each other while the vessels are in 
open seas. Bunkers will be loaded into bunker tanks via bunker valves, which are 
operated by designated crew members. The bunker valves and bunker level in the 
bunker tanks will be monitored strictly by the crew members to prevent an oil spill. In 
addition to the automatic gauging system installed onboard, manual gauging is 
employed throughout the bunkering operations. Extra precautions are taken when 
bunkering operations are carried out at the same time as loading operations (Veentjer, 
2009). 
2.4 FSA 
FSA is a formal, structured and systematic risk based methodology for assessing risk 
factors associated with an activity by evaluating the costs and benefits of different 
options for reducing those risks (IMO, 2002b). The FSA is proposed to enhance 
maritime safety in many aspects, including the marine environment and property. The 
FSA process can assist in determining when the worst consequences of human failure 
and relevant risks reach acceptable levels, or when certain operative or mitigation 
measures are to be adopted (IMO, 2002b). Hence, FSA can be used as a tool in the 
evaluation of new safety regulations or making a comparison between existing and 
possibly improved regulations, with a view of achieving a balance between the various 
technical and operational issues, including the human element, and between safety and 
costs (IMO, 1997b). 
The FSA methodology was developed partly as a response to the disaster of a capsized 
ship, Herald of Free Enterprise, on March 06,1987. The outcome of the investigation 
was the Carver Report, which recommended that FSA should be used to prepare safety 
cases for UK shipping. This led to the UK Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) to 
18 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
submit a proposal of a FSA approach in formulating rules and regulations for the 
maritime industry to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1993. 
Consequently, an interim Guidelines for the Application of FSA to the INTO Rule- 
Making Process was adopted by the IMO in 1997 (Kuo, 1998). Some of the benefits 
that can be achieved by adopting FSA as a regulatory tool are as follows (Wang, 2001): 
a). An integrated way of addressing all safety aspects using a consistent regulatory 
regime. 
b). Safety investment is aimed at achieving the greatest benefit, resulting in cost 
effectiveness. 
c). Using a proactive approach that allows hazards that have not yet given rise to 
accidents to be appropriately considered. 
2.4.1 FSA and Its Current Status 
Although the emphasis to include human factors in FSA has been echoing for some 
time, HRA has not been well incorporated into FSA. FSA can also be used as a tool to 
assist in the evaluation of new marine safety regulations whereby, it provides a 
consistent regulatory regime which deals with all aspects of safety incorporating cost 
effectiveness. Furthermore, it uses a proactive approach that addresses new risks posed 
in the future. Among the few efforts where FSA was applied in the maritime industry 
was its application to offshore support vessels (Sii, 2001), containerships (Wang and 
Foinikis, 2001), fishing vessels (Loughran et al., 2003), cruise ships (Lois, 2004; Lois et 
al., 2004), oil tankers (Subramaniam, 2003), ship navigation (Hu et al., 2007), a trial 
study on the safety of bulk carriers (IMO, 1998; 2002a), trial study on high-speed 
catamaran ferries (IMO, 1997a) and trial study on helicopter landing areas (HLAs) in 
passenger ships (Skjong et al., 1997). A generic vessel is required for the application of 
FSA. Many generic models describing vessels have been constructed, such as those for 
containerships (Wang and Foinikis, 2001), for fishing vessels (Loughran et al., 2003) 
and for oil tankers (Subramaniam, 2003). The use of FSA helps to identify the 
stakeholders to whom risks, costs and benefits may occur. A trial application of FSA of 
HLA on passenger ships as a safety measure carried out by DNV for Norway and the 
International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) showed that it could not be justified in 
terms of cost effectiveness and resulted in a decision to repeal the IMO's requirement of 
having HLAs on all passenger ships prior to the relevant regulations coming into effect 
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(Skjong et al., 1997). This was the initial sign of approval of FSA by the IMO. This was 
followed by the acceptance of FSA by the maritime community as an effective approach 
to having a safer shipping environment which was further proven by the fact that the 
IMO had approved the application of FSA for supporting the rule-making process in 
2002 (IMO, 2002b; Wang, 2006). 
Some of the recent critical reviews on FSA were carried out by Soares and Teixeira 
(2001), Wang (2001; 2006), Rosqvist and Tuominen (2004), Mennis et al. (2005) and, 
Kontovas and Psaraftis (2006; 2009). Soares and Teixeira (2001) reviewed a few 
applications of quantified risk assessment using reliability theories within the scope of 
maritime transportation. They agreed that the IMO had recognised the need for a 
formalised approach to safety assessment. Additionally, they drew attention to the 
slower phase of acceptance of risk-based decisions making. Wang (2001) emphasised 
the need for further development of FSA and suggested various safety assessment 
methods based on the situation to assess risks at different phases of a ship's life cycle. 
He (2006) also suggested the need of taking into account the problems of human errors 
in FSA. Furthermore, Wang added that application of FSA could facilitate collection of 
failure data thus leading to better credibility attained by the FSA. The call to incorporate 
human factor element into FSA has been in the research domain for some time however 
no framework has been developed to cater to its needs. This chapter will address the 
aspect of assimilating human error element in FSA by the proposal of application of 
HRA to FSA incorporating HOF in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. 
Meanwhile Rosqvist and Tuominen (2004) proposed a new approach of FSA 
quantification criteria to be used as a safety test to guide the peer review process to 
establish the qualification of FSA to determine its acceptance. Mennis et al. (2005) used 
an application of Markov theory, which relates to the stochastic process, in second and 
third steps of FSA. The theory is used to identify probabilities for the different 
conditions a ship can be with the application of RCOs and proposed cost models and 
process modelling to examine the FSA methodology reliability. One of the important 
aspects raised by Kontovas and Psaraftis (2006; 2009) was suggestions to derive more 
than one RCO instead of the present FSA culture tendency of selecting one optimum 
RCO. In addition they have called for more transparency of the FSA process which 
could strengthen the FSA's position in the IMO's decision making process. The 
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effectiveness of FSA was raised when the IMO decided not to implement mandatory 
double hulls and double side skins on bulk carrier regulations (IMO, 2004). In addition, 
utilisation of expert judgments in deriving and selecting RCOs taking into account the 
CBA raised more questions on the reliability of FSA. All these resulted in the IMO 
forming a FSA expert group to cater for the need of reviewing various FSA studies 
submitted judiciously, including those on cruise ships, Ro-Ro passenger ferries, 
liquefied natural gas carriers and containerships (IMO, 2009). Furthermore a new 
element of environment criteria was added to the generic FSA (IMO, 2008; LR, 2008). 
Hence, the FSA is going through a reasonable review continuously to ensure that it 
remains as one of the maritime safety policy decision making instruments in the 
maritime industry. 
2.5 HRA 
Human factors are the most important contributors to the causation and avoidance of 
accidents, leading to the identification of human elements, which is to be achieved 
through the HRA (IMO, 2002b). The HRA provides a good collection, interpretation 
and application approach to human failure data, resulting in improving human error and 
human factors within an organisation, including in the maritime industry, in a shipping 
company or onboard a ship (Cepin, 2008a). It can be used to estimate the quantitative 
and qualitative contributions of human performance to a system (Swain, 1990). 
Furthermore, prevention and reduction of human error is vital for the improvement of 
safety in shipboard management. The evidence from many incident/accident inquiries 
shows that events leading to an incident/accident are more often subject to error prone 
situations and error prone activities (Hollnagel, 2005). Hence, a second generation HRA 
method, CREAM was selected because it incorporates core elements of CPCs that take 
into account situations and activities relating to an incident/accident, to facilitate the 
finding of the root causes of the incident/accident. The assessment of CPCs can provide 
a better understanding of which aspects of human error caused an incident/accident. 
Some of the human error could be due to performance failure by crew, or the working 
situation in which the crew reacted, or could even be due to the lack of training 
provided to the crew. 
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2.5.1 HRA History 
An independent discipline related to human factors concerned with the design of 
machines, operations and working environments to match human capabilities and 
limitations was established in the 1950s. The discipline is meant to reduce the frequency 
of unwanted consequences of human errors in the operation of a complex system, thus 
the research on human errors began in order to improve performance of the system. 
Researchers in this field came to recognise that the old approaches of designing a 
system primarily focused on hardware efficiency and effectiveness did not provide good 
system performance. Furthermore, they also realised the need for identification and 
quantification of human errors to verify various risks within a system. One of the ways 
to improve a system is by incorporating human elements, which can be achieved by 
carrying out HRA and mitigating potential human errors within the system. Once that 
has been achieved, the human errors element within the system can be reduced at the 
initial design stage itself by including new features to remove the human errors 
altogether within the system or by adding some new aspects within the existing system 
that reduce the human errors. The first attempt to estimate human error probabilities in a 
risk analysis of a complex system was carried out in 1952. One of the first HRA 
methods developed and used was the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP), in 1961. The first symposium on HRA was held in 1964. The first large scale 
application of HRA was carried out in 1972, when THERP was used to assess the 
impact of estimated human errors in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of two 
nuclear power plants, referred to as the WASH-1400 reactor safety study. A handbook 
of THERP HRA and companion workbook, which are most commonly used in 
commercial and military systems, were produced on the outcomes of the WASH-1400 
reactor safety study (Swain, 1990). 
2.5.2 Development of HRA 
Development in HRA has experienced two generations. The first generation HRA 
methods use a simple error taxonomy and "fits/doesn't fit" dichotomy to correspond 
error state to error identification and quantification (Boring, 2005). There are two types 
of HRA which include retrospective HRA and prospective HRA. The retrospective 
HRA deals with review of past incidents/accidents and determines the root causes of the 
incident/accident , whereas the prospective HRA deals with identifying possible sources 
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of human error in a system that has not been implemented or for an incident/accident 
that has not been encountered (Boring, 2008). These two types of HRA will be 
elaborated in detail from an improved advanced CREAM perspective in Chapters 4 and 
5. Some classical first generation HRA methods are reviewed as follows. 
2.5.2.1 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
The THERP applies a schematic representation of human actions and relevant system 
events such as the HRA event tree. Its methodology includes defining the systems 
failures, listing and analysing the related human operations and identification of human 
errors that might occur, and relevant human error recovery modes. It also allows for 
estimation of relevant HEPs and the effects of human error in system failure events. 
Lastly the methodology provides recommendations for change to the system and 
recalculates the system failure probabilities. The prominent features of THERP are that 
it has been well validated by its use for the past five decade's in the various industries 
and its use of Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) to complement the task analysis. 
Furthermore its capability in modelling the recovery of errors of a system which allows 
for the use of checklists and subsequently, provides verifications that increase the 
system's reliability attracts the use of THERP. It can also be easily integrated with fault 
tree reliability methodologies. The criticisms of THERP are on its assumption that 
human errors can be accurately quantified and predicted. In addition it requires an 
enormous effort to obtain reliable HEPs and provides no guidance in modelling of 
scenarios and impacts of PSFs on human errors (Kirwan, 1994; 1996,1997a; 1997b; 
Hollnagel, 1996; 1998). 
2.5.2.2 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
HEART is used to evaluate the probability of human error occurring throughout the 
completion of a specific task. On obtaining the human error, error reduction can be 
performed to prevent similar human error from reoccurring within a management 
system. The HEART begins by classifying the task under analysis into the HEART 
generic categories, which have an associated human error probability (HEP). This is 
followed by identifying and determining the assessed proportion effects of the Error 
Producing Conditions (EPCs) associated with the task. Finally, a formula is used to 
compute the established proportion effects of the EPCs (Salmon et al., 2003). 
23 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
Some of the advantages of using HEART are that it is simple to use, it takes into 
account the reduction of the occurrence of errors, it is flexible resulting in its application 
in wider domains and the EPCs and their multipliers are based on experimental data on 
human performance, meaning that HEART comes with everything required to perform 
an HRA (Kirwan, 1994; Salmon et al., 2003; Sandom and Harvey, 2004). However, one 
of the criticisms of using HEART is that it relies heavily on expert judgment to obtain 
HEPs and the assessed proportion of EPC effects. Furthermore, the interdependence of 
EPCs, which is not modelled in the methodology, is not taken into consideration, and 
guidelines on performing task classification and determining the assessed proportion of 
EPC effects are not provided. Furthermore, the EPCs are concentrated on individual 
performance, despite the fact that many incident/accident situations are the result of 
team performance, and it also pays limited attention to the factors influencing cognitive 
performance (Kirwan, 1994; Salmon et al., 2003; Sandom and Harvey, 2004). 
2.5.2.3 Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) 
HCR model was developed to a specific operator model on the basis of the skill-based, 
rule-based and knowledge-based characteristics. This model is used to classify the 
cognitive processing required by operators' actions. Its methodology includes 
identifying actions that need to be analysed, and classifying type of cognitive processing 
required by the actions such as skill based, rule based and knowledge based. It also 
provides the determination of the median response time to perform the required task, by 
adjustment of median response times to allow for performance influencing factors. The 
methodology also supports determining the system time window in which action must 
be taken and obtaining of a normalised time value by computation of dividing the 
system time window by median response time. It makes use of the correlation of human 
reliability versus time availability to provide a HER The HEP calculation is taken as a 
product of cognitive and manual error probabilities. The cognitive error probability is 
inversely proportionate to nominal experience and training, stress level and man 
machine interface. The HCR model can assist identify actions that need to be analysed 
and can classify the types of cognitive processes that are required by the actions 
(Antolin, 2001; Collier, 2001). 
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The main advantages of using the HCR are that the approach can be easily assimilated 
with modelling assessment and that it takes into account cognitive and environmental 
PSFs. In addition, this approach can be substantiated continuously by using the HCR 
correlation curves, which can be developed from the results of simulator experiments. 
However, one of the criticisms of using the HCR is that the applicability of the HCR is 
currently limited to the nuclear industry. The HCR correlation was originally developed 
for use within the nuclear industry. The HCR model's use for all human activities is not 
verified, and the relationships of PSFs and non-response probabilities are not well 
addressed. It also does not comprehensibly address the details of cognitive processes 
resulting in information about intentional failures not being obtained (Kirwan, 1994; 
Hollnagel, 1996; Modarres, 2006). The HCR model has already been updated to a 
Probabilistic Human Reliability Assessment (PHRA) and subsequently the PHRA has 
been superseded by the Methode d'Evaluation de la Realisation des Missions Operateur 
pour la Sürete (MERMOS), which is categorised as a second generation HRA method 
(Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
2.5.2.4 Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach 
(SHERPA) 
SHERPA was developed by Embrey (Embrey, 1986) to predict human error. It uses 
taxonomy of human error by applying a psychological mechanism. SHERPA has been 
applied in nuclear power generation, the petrochemical industry, oil and gas extraction, 
and the power distribution industries. It uses a computerised question and answer 
formation to identify likely errors of steps in the task analysis. The error modes 
identified are based on the skill, risk, knowledge model produced by Rasmussen et al. 
(1987) and Reason's (1990) generic error modelling system. The approach allows for 
ascertaining whether errors can be recovered immediately, at later phase or not at all. 
The SHERPA procedure begins with the construction of a Hierarchical Task Analysis 
(HTA), followed by the classification of the tasks that need to be performed. Then, a 
Human Error Identification (HEI) step is carried out in relation to the activity that needs 
to be performed. This is followed by consequence analysis, where the consequence of 
each error on a system is considered, and recovery analysis, where recovery potential is 
determined from the recognised error. Subsequently, an ordinal probability analysis can 
be carried out to rate the probability of the error occurring. If the consequence of the 
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error is deemed to be critical, then a critical analysis is performed. Finally, an error 
reduction process is carried out to prevent a similar error from its reoccurrence (Salmon 
et al., 2003). 
The advantages of applying SHERPA are that it provides well structured and 
comprehensive procedures that prompt analysts for identifying potential errors, it 
involves error prediction along with error reductions, novice analysts are able to acquire 
the approaches with relative ease, and it uses a generic error taxonomy, allowing for 
easy adaptation to other domains. The major criticisms of using SHERPA are that it 
may be time consuming for complex tasks, the construction of HTA can be an 
additional workload if not available, and it does not model cognitive components of 
error mechanisms (Stanton and Barber, 2002; Salmon et al., 2003). Recently some 
research efforts have been made to utilise SHERPA in health care by Lane et al. (2006) 
and Lyons et al. (2006) and in aviation by Harris et al. (2005) and Stanton et al. (2009). 
2.5.2.5 Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM) 
SLIM is a structured expert judgement based method. It is also known as Failure 
Likelihood Index Methodology (FLIM). The methodology begins by selecting tasks that 
have similar task characteristics, such as a similar set of Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs), to form a single category. This is followed by assigning the relative importance 
among the PSFs and determining the rating of PSFs for the tasks assessed. Then, the 
Success Likelihood Index (SLI) is obtained by multiplication of the relative importance 
weight and the rating of PSFs for each task. Finally, the SLI value is converted into 
HEPs using a logarithm. The SLIM comprises two techniques, which are Multi-attribute 
Utility Decomposition (MAUD) and Systematic Approach to the Reliability Assessment 
of Humans (SARAH). MAUD provides PSFs probabilities affecting human 
performance on scaling the relative success likelihood in performing a range of tasks, 
while SARAH calibrates the success likelihood values with known HEP values to 
provide a final HEP value. The recent studies on SLIM include those by Khan et al. 
(2006), where SLIM was used to develop a HEP index (HEPI) for the offshore muster 
process, and Park and Lee (2008), where an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method 
was used to estimate HEP, known as AHP-SLIM. 
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The benefits of using SLIM are that it is a flexible technique and that it enables gross 
cost benefit evaluations to take place. It is found that the major criticisms of SLIM are 
that it requires an expert panel to perform an assessment, its methods are poorly 
structured resulting in various results for different analysts, it is resource intensive, and 
there is a lack of theoretical foundation on its quantification procedures (Mosleh and 
Chang, 2004; Kim, 2008; Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
In general, the criticisms of the first generation HRA approaches are described as 
follows (Kristiansen, 2005): 
a). Mechanical view of humans where the HRA approaches only consider human 
actions being observed and neglect to contemplate the hidden and obvious features of 
human actions. 
b). Insufficient treatment of PSFs such as those on safety culture and management 
attitudes, etc. 
c). Inadequate error reduction strategies revealed in the HRA whereas the purpose of 
performing HRA is to reduce the estimated human error probabilities resulting in the 
improvement of safety within any system. 
d). Lack of consistency in treating EOC where well intended actions with undesired 
consequences are not taken into consideration in HRA. 
e). High level of uncertainty is reflected by varying human error probability values 
produced using different quantitative methods for the same task. 
f). Inadequate treatment of dynamic situations where the HRA approach does not take 
into account the dynamic situations surrounding the tasks being performed. 
g). Their inability to deal with scarcity of data where the majority of data used for HRA 
were taken from simulator studies. 
h). Inadequate psychological pragmatism where dubious assumptions were made on 
human behaviour while conducting HRA. 
i). Lack of systematic task analysis structure disclosed whereas judgment of HRA was 
made on the information basis on task analysis. 
j). Inadequate proof of accuracy with reference to HRA on non-routine tasks. 
These led to the birth of second generation HRA methods. In addition to providing 
detailed theory based taxonomies and analysis processes for error prediction and 
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quantification based on a cognitive model, the second generation HRA methods also 
provide detailed types of error and performance influencing factors which enable HRA 
analysts to identify types of error and their causes more accurately (Boring, 2005; Jung 
et al., 2001). Recent research studies on HRA were carried out by Hollnagel and 
Amalberti (2001), Hollnagel (2005) and Kristiansen (2005). Hollnagel and Amalberti 
argued on the existence of fundamental ambiguity in using human error term itself due 
to doubts that are present in differentiating between error as action and error as cause. 
They suggested using performance variability instead of human error in analysing 
causes or events. Hollnagel (2005) had drawn attention to HRA of being of partial value 
as an input for probabilistic safety assessment due to its conception of human 
performance. Kristiansen (2005) had provided a good comparison of first and second 
generation HRA methods. 
Some well-known second generation HRA methods are described as follows. 
2.5.2.6 Cognitive Environment Simulator (CES) 
CES is a computerised tool that is used to simulate how an operator would respond to a 
given situation. CES makes use of a detailed artificial intelligence model of problem 
solving. The CES generates, using an analytical approach, the actions that an operator is 
likely to perform under different operating conditions. Activities performed by the CES 
include monitoring the state of a system via a virtual display monitor, generating an 
explanation to account for observation when something goes wrong within the system, 
and selecting appropriate responses to cope with the system abnormality. In terms of its 
advantages, the CES produces a time reliability curve for specific events. It detects the 
presence of systematic errors by operators, taking into account the effects of the man 
machine interface, procedures and training changes on time reliability curves. It 
indicates the probabilities of crew recovery from an error. It accounts for the impact of 
time and equipment failures on error probabilities. The disadvantages of CES are that it 
is unable to provide accurate data on operator errors, it is unable to take into 
consideration the impact of one human failure upon another human interference, its use 
is limited to the nuclear industry, and there is no evidence of development of CES 
(Gertman and Blackman, 1994; Hollnagel, 1996; Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
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2.5.2.7 Methode d'Evaluation de la Realisation des Missions Operateur 
pour la Sürete (MERMOS) 
MERMOS which refers to in English as assessment method for the performance of 
safety operation, was developed for the probabilistic safety assessment of reactors in 
nuclear power plants. It is utilised to assess the performance of safety operations, 
particularly for the probabilistic safety assessment of reactors in nuclear power plants. It 
provides a systemic accident model and a qualitative description of the system failure. It 
takes into consideration ergonomics, psychology and accidentology in modelling 
management system behaviour and safe system failure in the operation of nuclear power 
plants. It utilises consistent configurations/orientations (CICA) of the system. The 
quantitative features of MERMOS include predominantly using expert judgment based 
on full scale simulators' test knowledge. The quantification of errors of commission 
within a system is computed by quantifying the sum of probabilities of failure of each 
MERMOS scenario and a residual probability. Residual probability refers to the 
remaining failure probability caused by unknown risks after the other known risks have 
been accounted for in the quantification of failure probability. 
The benefits of using this method include that MERMOS requires an in depth functional 
analysis resulting in improving procedures in a system, its analyses take into 
consideration the wider sequence of failure causes and it takes into account the inherent 
risks to the human operations. The main criticisms of using MERMOS are lack of 
published information on MERMOS's application in HRA and lack of guidance on the 
identification of functional failure modes and CICAs. Furthermore, MERMOS has only 
been applied to the nuclear industry resulting in being a nuclear specific tool and only 
been tried for emergency operations, hence leaving doubts on whether it could be used 
satisfactorily for normal operations (Collier, 2001; Pesme et al., 2007; Reer, 2008; Bell 
and Holroyd, 2009). 
2.5.2.8 Human Reliability Management System (HRMS) 
HRMS is used to determine error reduction mechanisms. It is related to the PSFs 
contribution to the assessed error probabilities and provides fully computerised 
assessments. The quantification approach of HRMS is primarily associated with 
extrapolation from real data to the desired HEPs, based on a comparison between the 
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real PSF profiles and the task to be assessed. The major PSFs used in this model are the 
time scale involved, quality of the interface, training/experience/familiarity, degree of 
adequacy of procedures, organisation, and complexity of task. 
The advantages of using HRMS are that it allows for PSF based sensitivity analysis, and 
that it focuses on quantitative modelling and PSF based justifications. Furthermore, its 
error reduction module is more explicit compared to the other HRA methods. Among 
the criticisms of using HRMS are that it requires an analyst with good human reliability 
experience and that its exhaustive stages have resulted in its less use for HRA purposes, 
with a trend of being superseded by the much simpler HRA method (Kirwan, 1994; 
1997; Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
2.5.2.9 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
CREAM was developed by Hollnagel (1998), and can be used retrospectively to analyse 
and quantify error, and prospectively to identify potential human error for an 
incident/accident that is possibly encountered. It is based on a set of principles for 
cognitive modelling with detailed classification of erroneous actions. The CREAM 
utilises a cognition model, which is known as a COCOM. It has four control modes of 
Scrambled Control, Opportunistic Control, Tactical Control and Strategic Control. The 
scale of control that a management system is categorised in determines the reliability of 
the system's performance. Hollnagel (1998) stated that the reliability of a management 
system performance would increase when the level of the management control rises. 
The CREAM uses a classification scheme that describes the error modes and causes of 
an erroneous action. The error modes, known as phenotypes, are divided into eight 
erroneous actions, which include timing, duration, force, distance, speed, direction, 
object and sequence. Meanwhile, the causes of an erroneous action, known as genotypes 
are divided into three groups that include person, technological and organisational 
related genotypes. Additionally, the CREAM also uses a set of nine CPCs, which take 
into account the objective circumstances of a management system to describe the 
scenario context that is being analysed. 
The main advantages of CREAM are that it provides a well structured systematic 
approach to identifying and quantifying human error, it can be utilised for retrospective 
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and prospective analyses, and it, being a generic method, can be used for different 
domains. However the method is criticised as that its classification scheme is large, 
resulting in this method being exhaustive, it has not been widely used, resulting in lack 
of data to enhance and support its performance in HRA, it does not provide a solution to 
the established human error and its application could take a longer time for simple 
analyses (Salmon et al., 2003; Konstandinidou et al., 2006). 
2.5.2.10 A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA) 
ATHEANA integrates advances in psychology with engineering, human factors, and 
PRA disciplines to provide an HRA quantification process and PRA modelling interface 
that can accommodate and represent human performance in event management of a 
system. It uses error forcing contexts (EFCs), which are combinations of working 
conditions and other influences that affect and probably cause the human error, to obtain 
qualitative and quantitative HRA results. It utilises psychology, human factors, 
engineering knowledge and probabilistic risk assessment for retrospective and 
prospective analyses. The technique involves identifying human failure event sequences 
and recognising the working conditions and limitations in the human machine interface. 
A systematic structured approach is used to determine reasons for the occurrence of a 
human failure event, taking into account the working conditions and PSFs. The 
ATHEANA also provides the quantification of the EFCs and the probability of human 
failure events (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
The benefits of using ATHEANA are that it is capable of estimating HEPs for various 
conditions of events and that it allows for a focused approach in predicting specific error 
and significant factors influencing that specific error. It provides a holistic approach 
emphasising the importance of the whole and the interdependence of its components 
and comprehension of the perspective concerning human factors being the cause of an 
incident/accident. Meanwhile, the criticisms of using ATHEANA are that there are a 
limited number of ATHEANA applications and rigorous methods are applied in 
identifying the influencing factors used for quantification purposes (Forester et al., 
2004; 2007). 
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The CREAM has been selected for use in this research because it can be easily 
integrated into an overall safety system allowing assessors to adapt to the context of the 
initiating events of an incident/accident being analysed. In addition, the specification of 
CPC that takes into account the objective circumstances of an incident/accident and 
their possible favourable or unfavourable influence on the occurrence process of the 
incident/accident enhances the use of CREAM. Furthermore, it can be utilised for 
retrospective and prospective analyses, and it, being a generic method, can be used for 
different domains. 
2.5.3 Quantification Analysis of HRA' 
Recently some research efforts have been made to improve HRA quantification 
including a simplified CREAM prospective quantification process and its application 
(He et al., 2008), an AHP-SLIM method to estimate HEPs (Kyung and Jae, 2008), a 
fuzzy set approach (Konstandinidou et al., 2006), HEPs for offshore operation (Khan et 
al., 2006), HEPs for offshore platform musters (Dimattia et al., 2005), probabilistic 
techniques (Fujita and Holinagel, 2004) and the quantitative developments in CREAM 
(Marseguerra et al., 2006). Other relevant studies on HRA quantification focusing on 
using simulators to obtain human reliability values are simulation methods for 
determination of human reliability function taking stress into consideration in the 
maritime domain (Hann, 2008), simulation of operating crew response to accidents in 
nuclear power plants (Chang and Mosleh, 2007), HRA methods for space safety where 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) simulation architecture is used 
(Boring, 2005), simulation in the manufacturing sector (Baines et al., 2004) and a 
simulator study of CREAM to predict cognitive errors (Collier, 2001). Data available 
for Human Error Quantification (HEQ) relevant to the maritime industry is limited. 
Hence a fuzzy logic approach could be appropriate to quantitatively evaluate the human 
reliability probabilities in the maritime domain. Fuzzy logic is a precise logic of 
imprecision and approximate reasoning (Zadeh, 2008). Fuzzy logic theory assists in 
addressing qualitative information considering that it can accommodate the ambiguities 
presented in maritime human decision factors while investigating a maritime accident. 
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2.6 MCDM Methods 
Naturally the selection of RCOs is a MCDM process. Research studies on human 
judgements and decision making indicate that human beings are inclined to be biased in 
their assessments of alternatives. These assessments can be classified into the 
representativeness heuristic and the availability heuristic. The representativeness 
heuristic refers to assessments of alternatives that can more readily be linked to what is 
familiar, whereas the availability heuristic refers to assessments of alternatives that can 
be unduly influenced by recent, memorable events or successful experiences (Dodgson 
et al., 2009). The basic ingredients of MCDM include a finite or infinite set of actions, 
at least two criteria and one decision maker. The actions can be in the form of 
alternatives, solutions or courses of action. The MCDM is a procedure that facilitates 
decision making processes, such as choosing, ranking or sorting actions. 
The history of MCDM can be traced back to approximately 105 AD in Rome, where the 
ternary approval of voting strategy was studied. Nevertheless, MCDM is generally 
considered to have been officially established in the 1970s, as a conference on MCDM 
was organised by Cochrane and Zeleny at Columbia University in South Carolina in 
1972 (Figueira et al., 2005). MCDM is one of the most recognised branches of decision 
making studies (Triantaphyllou, 2000). The MCDM can be divided into Multi-objective 
Decision Making (MODM) and Multi-attribute Decision Making (MADM). The 
MODM analyses decision problems where the decision field is continuous, such as 
mathematical programming problems with multiple objective functions. The MADM, 
on the other hand, focuses on problems with discrete decision fields where the decision 
alternatives have been predetermined. MCDM in this research is the MADM type. Each 
MCDM problem is associated with multiple attributes. The attributes represent the 
different dimensions from which the alternatives can be viewed. 
In MCDM methods, the choice of objectives and criteria that a decision maker made 
initially can be further reviewed and modified if they are felt to be inappropriate. 
Another advantage of MCDM is that it facilitiates the auditing process of the MCDM 
method used for administration purposes (Dodgson et al., 2009). The difficulties of 
using MCDM have been seen as the conflicts among criteria, where different criteria 
represent different dimensions of the alternatives and incommensurable units, where 
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different criteria could be associated with different units of measurement 
(Triantaphyllou, 2000). There are many MCDM methods available in the literature and 
each method has its own characteristics. The MCDM can be classified based on the type 
of data _used. 
such_as deterministic, stochastic, fuzzy and combined MCDM methods. 
Another way of classifying MCDM methods is according to the number of decision 
makers involved in the decision process, including a single decision maker and a group 
decision makers MCDM methods. A general decision making process can be described 
in the following steps (Baker et al., 2002): 
a). Define the problems by providing a concise problem statement, which describes the 
initial condition and the desired condition. 
b). Determine the requirements where there are constraints by describing the set of the 
feasible solutions to the decision problems. 
c). Establish goals by stating the objectives that need to be achieved. 
d). Identify alternatives by considering a set of solutions fulfilling the constraints of the 
requirement stated in (b). 
e). Define criteria by taking goals into consideration. The objectives of the decision 
problems are represented in the form of criteria. 
f). Select a decision making tool based on the distinct decision problem taking into 
account the objectives of the decision makers. 
g). Evaluate alternatives against criteria where an assessment could be objective based 
on factual data using scale of measurement, or subjective using expert judgment based 
on the subjective assessment of the selected experts. 
h). Validate solutions against the problem statement referring to the requirements and 
goals of the decision problem. 
Some of the MCDM methods are described in more detail in the following sections. 
However, each MCDM method has its own benefits and shortcomings. An appropriate 
MCDM method to solve a decision making problem can only be selected once all the 
elements relating to the concerned problem have been developed in detail (Bufardi et 
al., 2004). 
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2.6.1 Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) 
The SAW method is one of the traditional MCDM methods. The application of this 
method begins with the identification of the objectives of and alternatives to a decision 
making problem. This is followed by evaluating alternatives and determining objective 
weights. Then, an additive aggregation of weighted partial preferences values is 
performed. Finally a sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the degree of sensitivity 
of the MCDM model's variables. The SAW method uses direct rating on a standardised 
scale in case of purely qualitative attributes. For numerical attributes, scores are 
calculated by normalising observed attribute values to match the standardised scale. 
Local and global scales are usually used. A local scale is defined as the best and worst 
existing alternatives forming the reference points for the bounds of the scale. 
Meanwhile, the global scale is defined as a relative to absolute values for best and worst 
performance. Furthermore, the global scale allows the decision maker to define 
objective weights independent of observed attribute values. The objective weights are 
obtained using a direct estimation method. The combination of a simple scoring method 
and a ratio or swing weights approach is also referred to as the Simple Multi-Attribute 
Rating (SMART) technique (Belton and Stewart, 2002; Goodwin and Wright, 2004). 
Although showing some advantages, the SAW method still reveals some problems, 
including that its direct scoring of alternatives and direct estimation of weights often 
lead to the results that lack an argumentative justification, and that the resulting 
preference values are lacking in economic interpretation. Additionally, it is also not 
possible to perform consistency checks on the decision maker's inputs (Hubner, 2007). 
2.6.2 Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) 
An AHP, developed by Saaty to solve MCDM problems, has been extensively used to 
deal with the fundamental need for subjective judgment involving MCDM 
(Mahmoodzadeh et al., 2007). It enables a complex problem to be structured and 
presented in a simple hierarchy form. It uses the procedure of deriving weights by 
converting subjective assessments of the relative importance of each criterion made by 
decision makers, based on pairwise comparisons. This is followed by specifying a 
preference for each decision alternative using each criterion. Finally a set of ranked 
decision alternatives is obtained. Saaty (2008) also provided a nine point scale 
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expressing the preference of decision alternatives for performing pairwise comparisons. 
On developing the pairwise comparisons, a synthesisation process is carried out to 
obtain priorities of the compared elements. The AHP also provides a means of checking 
the consistency of pairwise comparison, to assess the quality of judgment made during a 
series of pairwise comparisons, by computing a consistency ratio. The consistency ratio 
is obtained by computing a ratio of the consistency index derived from computation, 
and a random index that is taken from standard average random index values, which are 
provided based on the size of the pairwise comparison matrix. The pairwise comparison 
matrix is considered consistent if the obtained consistency ratio value is less than or 
equal to 0.1. For a consistency ratio of more than 0.1, the re-evaluation of ratios needs 
to be performed (Anderson et al., 2008; Li and Li, 2009). 
The advantages of using AHP are that it is suitable for decision making processes with 
both quantitative and qualitative criteria, the approach of applying an analytical 
hierarchy method provides a structured model to solve a problem, and it provides a 
method to verify the consistency of the performed pairwise comparisons. Some of the 
criticisms of the AHP include concerns over rank reversal upon changing the structure 
of the decision and the theoretical foundation of the rigid fundamental scale (Baker et 
al., 2002; Saaty, 2008). 
2.6.3 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is a technique used to evaluate efficiency in cases where multiple input and output 
factors are observed and where it is not possible to turn them into one aggregate input or 
output factor. For example, this technique could be used to evaluate the efficiency of 
non-profit entities, such as public universities, which are not focused on obtaining 
profits and for which the main source of finances does not come from the sale of goods 
and services. The DEA provides a comparative efficiency indicator of the units to 
evaluate. The analysed units are referred to as Decision Making Units (DMUs). The 
relative efficiency of a DMU is defined as a ratio of the total weighted output to the 
total weighted input. The inputs and outputs can be expressed in any unit of 
measurement provided that consistency is maintained. The actual inputs and outputs 
observed are used to estimate a benchmark production frontier. The efficiency indicator 
obtained is relative because it is elaborated by referring to the rest of the DMUs. The 
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DEA allows each DMU to choose the vectors of input and output weights which 
maximise its own ratio of weighted output to weighted input. However, it is subjected to 
a constraint which does not allow a DMU to achieve a ratio of weighted output to 
weighted input in excess of unity. The DEA technique was extended by the study of 
Banker et al. (1989), who introduced a concept of most productive scale size to define 
the size of scale that maximises the efficiency of the DMU. Additionally, the extended 
approach further demonstrated that it is possible to separate the global efficiency into 
technical and scale efficiencies. The technical efficiency is determined by the situation 
of the DMU on the frontier of the efficient production. The efficiency of scale is given 
by the size of the DMU, which makes it possible to operate in a zone of constant or 
variable returns. The selection of the variables to be included in the model is one of the 
most important phases in the development of a DEA analysis because the acceptability 
and reliability of the results depend to a great extent on the accurate selection of the 
indicators that are best adapted to the objective of the study (Pina and Torres, 2001). 
The advantages of the DEA for the evaluation of the efficiency include that it can 
readily incorporate multiple inputs and outputs without requiring any judgments, and 
that it only requires information on output and input quantities. It is ideal for solving a 
problem for which it is difficult or impossible to assign prices to many of the outputs. It 
allows for nominated researchers to choose inputs and outputs to represent a particular 
approach and is a useful tool for benchmarking because it identifies targets for 
inefficient units and indicates what improvements can be made to achieve efficiency. It 
also determines possible sources of efficiency and inefficiency (Tomkins and Green, 
1988; Johnes and Johnes, 1993; McMillan and Datta, 1998; Avkiran, 2001). One of the 
criticisms of using DEA is that it does not provide any clarification as to how to 
improve the performance of empirically efficient units, as the efficiency is measured in 
a relative form. Furthermore, a high percentage of efficiency could be registered in 
DMU due to the limited quantity of resources of inputs or outputs. Although the DEA 
assists in setting targets, it does not provide any means of how to reach the targets 
(Johnes and Johnes, 1993; Avkiran, 2001; Sowlati and Paradi, 2004; Mantri, 2008). 
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2.6.4 Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE) 
The outranking approach of Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE) 
was developed by Roy (Figueira et al., 2005) in 1965 to overcome the drawbacks of the 
then used Methode d'Analyse, de Recherche, et de Selection d' Activites Nouvelles 
(MARSAN), which used a weighted sum based technique to solve decisions dealing 
with the selection of new activities. It was referred to as ELECTRE I and was used to 
construct a partial ranking and to choose a set of promising alternatives. This was 
followed by the birth of ELECTRE II, which was developed in order to rank the 
alternatives using the thresholds approach. The original ELECTRE was further 
developed to ELECTRE III, which used pseudo-criteria and fuzzy binary outranking 
relations where an outranking degree is established, representing an outranking 
creditability between two alternatives. ELECTRE IV then emerged, which allowed 
actions to be ranked without using the relative criteria importance coefficients and was 
equipped with an embedded outranking relations framework. Continuous evolution of 
ELECTRE resulted in the emergence of ELECTRE A and more recently ELECTRE 
TRI. The ELECTRA A was developed to cater for the needs of decision making 
problems in banking institutions, while ELECTRE TRI is the latest simplified version 
(Figueira et al., 2005). 
The ELECTRE method is based on two processes of construction of one or several 
outranking relations and the exploitation process. The construction of one or several 
outranking relations refers to comprehensively comparing each pair of actions. The 
exploitation process is used to elaborate on recommendations from the results obtained 
from the previously performed outranking. Hwang and Yoon (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) 
considered the ELECTRE collection of methods to be one of the best methods for 
decision making because of the way it uses the information available in the decision 
matrix and due to its simple logic. However, Belton and Stewart (Belton and Stewart, 
2002) criticised ELECTRE methods because they do not provide any allowance to 
perform a sensitivity analysis on the weights and the thresholds values. Additionally, 
they argued that weights and thresholds do not clearly indicate elucidation of the 
decision maker's preferences. Furthermore, they stated that the aggregation procedures 
of ELECTRE II and III are difficult to associate and that with ELECTRE III, if an 
alternative is added or removed, contradictory results and rank reversal may occur. 
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2.6.5 Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) 
TOPSIS was developed by Hwang and Yoon (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) as a substitute 
for the ELECTRE method (Triantaphyllou, 2000). The hypothesis of TOPSIS is that the 
shortest distance from the Positive Ideal Solution (PIS) and the farthest distance from 
the Negative Ideal Solution (NIS) in an Euclidean sense is the selected best alternative. 
The preference order of alternatives is obtained by comparing the relative distances to 
the ideal solutions. The sequence of the TOPSIS method comprises the construction of a 
normalised decision matrix and a weighted normalised decision matrix, determination 
of the PIS and NIS values, computation of separation measures of positive ideal and 
negative ideal solutions and the obtaining of relative closeness to the ideal solutions. 
The TOPSIS can be modified to fuzzy TOPSIS by absorbing a human's assessment of 
uncertainty when complex decision making problems are considered (Percin, 2008). 
Some recent research studies on TOPSIS included those in business (Tsou, 2007; 
Percin, 2008; Sun and Lin, 2009), maritime operations (Celik et al., 2009a), computer 
operating systems (Ball and Korukoglu, 2009), finance (Mahmoodzadeh et al., 2007; 
Salehi, 2009) and manufacturing (Li and Huang, 2009; Zeydan and Colpan, 2009). 
The criticisms of TOPSIS include its inability to adequately handle the ambiguity 
associated with mapping of the decision maker's perception to crisp values 
(Dagdeviren, 2009) and its inability to provide weight elicitation of various compared 
attributes (Celik et al., 2009b). 
2.6.6 Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMA TEL) 
The DEMATEL technique originated from the Science and Human Affairs Programme 
of the Battelle Memorial Institute of Geneva (Tzeng et al., 2007). It is used to solve 
complex problems by developing a better understanding of the existing groups of 
elements within the problems (Lin and Tzeng, 2009). The DEMATEL technique allows 
for a complicated structure of causal relationships to be apparently illustrated using a 
causal diagram. The causal diagram displays the cause and effect groups. The causes 
illustrate the reasons why something occurred, whereas the effects are the results of the 
occurrence. Recent research studies on DEMATEL included those in business (Lin and 
Tzeng, 2009; Noori and Amiri, 2009; Wu and Lee, 2007; Wu, 2008), engineering 
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(Seyed-Hosseini et al., 2006), safety management systems (Liou et al., 2007; Liou et al., 
2008) and education (Tzeng et al., 2007). 
DEMATEL can accommodate subjective human judgments in determining relationships 
among the components within a complex system or subsystem. It involves a simple 
application to solve complex relationships, and has been proven to he successful in large 
domains such as business (Hu et al., 2009; Lin and Tzeng, 2009; Noori and Amiri, 
2009; Tseng, 2009a; 2009b; Wu and Lee, 2007; Wu, 2008), engineering (Hori and 
Shimizu, 1999; Seyed-Hosseini et at., 2006), safety management systems (Liou et at., 
2007; Liou et al., 2008), education (Tzeng et at., 2007) and social studies (Tamura et at., 
2002; Tamura and Akazawa, 2005). 
The entire process of MCDM can be computed and presented using Decision Making 
Software (DMS). The DMS is an application that incorporates decision analysis tools to 
facilitate a person's decision making process, which results in a choice of a course of 
action or a variant among several alternatives. The DMS belongs to the class of decision 
support systems used to structure information, identify and solve problems, and make 
decisions. Some of the available DMSs are 1000Minds, Analytica, Criterium 
DecisionPlus, Decision Lab, Decision Manager, Electre Tri, Expert Choice, Vanguard 
Studio, Logical Decisions, TreeAge Pro and RPM-Decisions (Weistroffer et al., 2005). 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the difficulty in apprehending the definition of human error is analysed. 
This is followed by a brief description of human factors being a part of the human error 
element. Detailed analysis of past oil tanker incidents/accidents from 1974 to 2008 is 
presented to establish and substantiate the need for research on HRA incorporating HOF 
in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. An effectual way of incorporating 
the human elements of human error and human factors in preventing oil tanker spills is 
through the use of HRA. Brief descriptions of HRA and reasons for the selection of 
CREAM as a theme of this research are provided. MCDM methods are also reviewed 
for the study of RCOs' selection in this research. The research will address some of the 
shortcomings raised in the literature review such as of the generic HRA and FSA 
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methodologies that exist independently in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil 
spills. CREAM's inability of providing solutions to an incident/accident investigation 
and robust quantification of human reliability features will be overcome by proposing 
an advanced CREAM and a human reliability quantification model. Furthermore, lack 
of CREAM studies on relationships among CPCs will be addressed by proposing a 
DEMATEL model, which allows for an inclusive understanding of relationships and 
interdependencies among the CPCs. Finally, the research will be concluded with an 
integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model for determining the selection of an 
appropriate RCO while performing an incident/accident investigation by taking 
subjective judgments of decision makers into consideration as an alternative to the 
present practice of making RCO selection. 
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Chapter 3 
Use of HRA for Facilitating 
FSA: An Oil Tanker Case 
Summary 
Following the literature review, this chapter addresses the application of HRA for 
facilitating FSA incorporating HOF in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil 
spills. The FSA and HRA are scrutinised. A new framework of an application of HRA 
to FSA is developed. The application of HRA to FSA onboard oil tankers is examined 
and critically evaluated. Identification of RCOs for HOF of various networks within the 
management of an oil tanker is analysed and presented to provide means of risk control. 
The proposed framework is demonstrated with a case study. Hierarchical Task Analysis 
(HTA) on status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves during discharging operations onboard 
oil tankers is presented. Finally, recommendations that should be adopted by tanker 
owners to reduce the risk of oil spills are presented. 
3.1. Introduction 
Human reliability refers to the probability that a person correctly performs an action 
required by the system in a required time without performing any extraneous activity 
that can degrade the system (Pyy, 2000). HRA aims to assess and reduce human error 
potential in a system and has been used since the early 1980s. It becomes more 
prominent following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, from which the approach 
became customary in the nuclear industry, and spread to others such as oil, gas and 
chemical industries (Kirwan et al., 2008). The purpose of HRA is to render a complete 
description of the human contribution to risk and to identify ways of reducing that risk. 
The assessment of human reliability provides a means to represent the human 
contribution to risk as part of the total risk in a system leading to prevention and 
reduction of human error which is significant for the improvement of safety within that 
system (Kariuki and Lowe, 2006). HRA is also a critical element of Probabilistic Risk_ 
Assessment (PRA) since it is a tool used to assess the implications of various aspects of 
human performance on risk (Konstandinidou et al., 2006). The PRA relates to 
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comprehensive systematic identification of damage due to a possible result from the 
operation of some systems. It also includes a quantitative assessment of the probability 
of similar incidents. The introduction of automation and advancement in system designs 
has resulted in a reduced number of accidents attributed to technological failures, 
however it has increased accidents due to human performance failures and 
organisational factors of management systems (Hollnagel, 2005). This chapter 
investigates the feasibility of applying HRA to Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) to 
overcome the above mentioned problems in the management of oil tankers. The effort 
of incorporating HRA to FSA can provide a better comprehensive coverage of human 
factors instead of merely using an isolated HRA or FSA framework for the purpose of 
reducing human errors. The framework of applying HRA to FSA incorporates HRA's 
comprehensive stages of Kirwan (Kirwan, 1994) into FSA. Although the IMO and 
maritime communities have echoed the need for human factors' element to be included 
in FSA, none has come forward with comprehensive HRA elements assimilated into the 
FSA framework as proposed. In addition, this framework has also introduced a CBA 
element, which plays an important role for maritime industry stakeholders in selecting 
appropriate RCOs, into HRA. 
3.2 The FSA Methodology 
3.2.1 The Five Steps of FSA 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the flow chart of FSA steps. 
Figure 3.1 The Flow Chart of FSA Steps (IMO, 2002b) 
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3.2.1.1 Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
Hazard can be defined as an undesirable outcome in the process of meeting an 
objective, performing a task or engaging in an activity (Kuo, 1998). The undesired 
outcome could involve injury to the crew, damage to the vessel, pollution of the 
environment or a combination of all three. In this step, a list of all relevant accident 
scenarios with potential causes and outcomes needs to be produced. Such a list of 
accident scenarios can be obtained using various hazard identification techniques. The 
frequency of occurrence and consequence of each possible outcome can be estimated 
based on expert judgement, historical data, or a combination of the two. Consequently, 
all the various hazards are ranked in order to set priorities for more detailed risk 
evaluation by using a risk matrix approach. A risk matrix is an approach whereby a risk 
level is assigned as the product of the appropriate levels from the consequence and 
frequency bands and is illustrated in Table 3.1. Additionally, with reference to Table 
3.1, low frequency is equivalent to less than one incident in the lifetime of all ships of a 
particular type and high frequency refers to incidents that occur on average to each ship 
every year. 
Table 3.1 Risk Matrix (Billington, 1999) 
3.2.1.2 Risk Assessment (RA) 
In this step, risk factors contributing to the identified hazards with high risk from Step 1 
are evaluated. Historical data and expert judgement are used to carry out the evaluation. 
Risk can be defined as a measure of a hazard's significance involving simultaneous 
examination of its consequence and probability of occurrence using a combination of 
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practical experience and relevant information on the system and its operating 
environment (Kuo, 1999). The probability of occurrence, which is expressed as "events 
per year", can be determined from historical data if a significant number of events 
occurred in the past. When the risk analysis is focused on severe consequences events, 
which have the lowest number of historical data, a RA model is used to compute the 
event probability. The consequence, which is expressed "per event", refers to the 
number of people injured or killed, property damaged and amount of spill, etc. 
Meanwhile, the quantitative risk measures are expressed as "consequences per year". 
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example of the RA process that uses a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative risk assessments to assess a risk significantly. 
Figure 3.2 The Risk Assessment Process (ABS, 2000) 
3.2.1.3 RCOs 
In this step, the regulatory measures to control and reduce the risk factors identified in 
Step 2 are established. The RCOs can be performed based on the following hierarchy: 
i). Eliminate the hazard. 
ii). Prevent the occurrence. 
iii). Mitigate the consequences. 
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Some of the techniques used in executing the RCOs are described as follows. 
3.2.1.3.1 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Principle 
The ALARP principle refers to the analysis of costs versus benefits. The risk is reduced 
to the lowest level, as far as it is practical to do so, following the ALARP parameter. 
There are risks that can only be tolerated if the risk mitigation measures are in place, 
which reduce the risks within the ALARP region. In addition, the risk cannot be reduced 
further without grossly disproportionate cost or disruption. Figure 3.3 illustrates the risk 
level of a hazard upon applying the frequency and consequence of the hazard 
parameters with reference to the ALARP principle. 
Figure 3.3 Risk Matrix with reference to ALARP (Leedham and Riding, 2001) 
For example, when the frequency of an event is EXTREMELY REMOTE and the 
consequence of the event taking place is MINOR or almost insignificant, the risk falls 
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within the ACCEPTABLE level. Thus, no control measures are required to reduce the 
risk and in the operational phase this risk should be kept within this region. Meanwhile, 
when an event's frequency and consequence are FREQUENT and CATASTROPHIC 
respectively, the risk falls within the INTOLERABLE level. Hence, control measures 
are required to reduce this particular risk to the ALARP level. Figure 3.4 provides a 
self-explanatory diagram of the ALARP principle. 
Figure 3.4 Diagram of the ALARP Principle (Vlachos and Nikolaidis, 2002) 
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3.2.1.3.2 Management Method 
This is another RCO technique, which deals with the management of an organisation. 
The implementation of this method relies on the motivation provided by the shipboard 
management to instil the safety culture and safety practices among crew members 
onboard. This method involves continuous training of crew members in all aspects of 
safe operation onboard a vessel. In addition, means of monitoring the performance of 
the crew members, by maintaining good records of any incident/accident and near 
misses that occur in the fleet, are adopted. The types of training to be carried out could 
be determined and emphasised based on the past incident/accident records. A longer 
period of time is required to see the outcome of this method. 
An example of this method is to conduct monthly departmental meetings, followed by a 
monthly safety meeting onboard vessels. These meetings enable all the crew members 
to raise various safety matters affecting their daily shipboard operation. It is a 
continuous process of implementing, monitoring and revising any step taken to reduce 
risk factors of existing hazards onboard a vessel. In return, the shore management 
rewards good safety practice and nil incident/accident records with an annual Safety 
Award Certificate along with cash distribution to purchase recreational equipment 
onboard. Crew members are motivated to nurture a safety culture shipboard community 
in order to reduce human errors in shipboard operations as the effect of implementation 
of the ISM Code (IMO, 2002c; Subramaniam, 2003). 
3.2.1.3.3 Engineering Method 
This RCO technique deals with the initial stage of the designing and building of a ship. 
This method can also be used to install new safety equipment onboard vessels. An 
example of this RCO method is the introduction of double hull tankers to prevent and 
minimise pollution from oil tankers (Kuo, 1998). 
3.2.1.3.4 Operational Method 
This RCO deals with the operational procedures of equipment onboard vessels. This 
method addresses the human error aspects by the introduction of appropriate procedures 
to carry out various tasks onboard a vessel. The utilisation of this method enhances the 
competency of seafarers in carrying out tasks onboard safely. Training of crew is 
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emphasised again in this method. The application of management, engineering and 
operational methods as RCOs all together provides a better means of controlling the 
existing various risks onboard a vessel. 
3.2.1.4 CBA 
CBA is a technique used in decision making that evaluates the costs and benefits of the 
RCO alternatives on a financial basis. It will determine the costs and benefits involved 
in implementing each RCO identified in Step 3. The cost effectiveness of each RCO is 
compared with a base case. A base case refers to the existing level of risk associated 
with the shipping activity before the implementation of risk controls. Consequently, the 
RCOs are ranked in terms of their cost to achieve a unit reduction of risk. Some of the 
aspects taken into account in determining the costs include capital costs and items 
requiring replacement, labour costs, operating costs, installation and commissioning 
costs, maintenance costs, inspection, surveying and certification costs, off hire and 
delay costs, and training costs. 
The benefits of the implementation of the RCOs include reduced injuries and fatalities, 
reduced vessel casualties, reduced environmental damage including cleaning up costs, 
reduced salvage costs and increased availability of assets. Costs and benefits are 
perceived differently by the various stakeholders in the shipping industry, and are 
affected by risk management decisions. Stakeholders' feedback on the distribution of 
cost of reducing risk and the remaining risk is also to be taken into consideration 
(Rosqvist and Tuominen, 2004). Furthermore, the acceptable risk level as per ALARP 
may itself change in time as the standard of safety increases. Figure 3.5 illustrates some 
of the principal stakeholders in the shipping industry. 
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Figure 3.5 Principal Stakeholders in the Shipping industry (Subramaniam, 2003) 
Some of the criticisms of the application of CBA are that relevant data may not be 
available or may be too costly to collect. In addition, there could be results that cannot 
readily be quantified in a way that could be established against a scale of monetary 
values (Dodgson et al., 2009). 
3.2.1.5 Recommendations for Decision-making 
In this final step, information about the hazards, their associated risks and the cost 
effectiveness of alternative RCOs are provided to regulatory decision makers. The FSA 
can facilitate identification of the stakeholder to whom the risks, costs or benefits fall. 
An equitable and fair RCO can be selected upon scrutinising the available RCOs. An 
example in selecting an ideal RCO can be performed by following the Risk Balance 
concept by the UK MCA. First, an overall risk balance is used to assess the proposed 
recommendations from the aspect of cost effectiveness on an industry wide basis. If the 
initial proposal is accepted, it will be followed by the assessment of the effects of the 
proposed measures on each affected stakeholder. If the implementation of risk control 
measures, however, results in one or more stakeholders bearing a risk or cost that is 
disproportionate to their expected benefits, the proposed measures will be revised in 
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order to address the imbalance prior to submitting to the decision makers (Peachey, 
1999). Figure 3.6 illustrates the stakeholder risk balance. 
Figure 3.6 Stakeholder Risk Balance (Billington, 1999) 
The risk balance scale shows that the right hand side of the balance outweighs the left- 
hand side. This reflects the stakeholder benefits are greater than the sum of the risks and 
costs, which is the aim of decision makers. Following the description of FSA, an HRA 
is reviewed, because an effectual way of incorporating the human elements in 
preventing oil tanker spills by conducting FSA is through the use of HRA (IMO, 
2002b). 
3.3 Application of HRA to FSA: An Oil Tanker Case. 
The majority of maritime accidents are initiated by human errors that included slips, 
lapses, mistakes and violations (DNV, 2002). Recent views on the development of 
human errors indicate that they are the symptom of a deeper fault within a management 
system and are an initiating point for an investigation of an accident (Dekker, 2006). 
These human errors can be assessed by means of HRA that consists of various 
techniques to estimate the occurrence probability of human errors. 
Figure 3.7 illustrates the application of HRA to FSA. It begins with the definition of the 
problem, followed by a task analysis and Human Error Analysis (HEA). Accordingly, 
various techniques are used to estimate the probabilities of human errors in the 
particular activity examined. Subsequently, a logical representation is provided to 
illustrate various elements that contributed to the investigated incident/accident. 
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STEP 1 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Problem Task 
Definition Analysis 
STEP 2 
RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
STEP 5 
DECISION 
MAKING 
RECOMMEN- 
DATIONS 
Human Error Representation 
Analysis 
H Quantification 
Assessment 
Is Screening 
Required? 
No 
Yes 
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Errors 
Discarded 
Is Human 
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No 
STEP 3 
IDENTIFICATION OF 
RISK CONTROL OPTIONS 
Factor Error 
Influencing Reduction 
Performance 
and Error 
Causes 
STEP 4 
COST BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 
Figure 3.7 Application of HRA to FSA 
Representation 
Documentation 
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This is followed by screening where irrelevant errors are discarded by HRA and 
quantification. On completion of the assessment of probability, if it is found that the 
human reliability is at an acceptable level for a stakeholder, then representation and 
documentation is performed. Otherwise, error reduction will be employed to reduce 
those unacceptable errors taking into account CBA, meeting the requirements of the 
stakeholders. Although Figure 3.7 includes comprehensive stages of the HRA process, 
selection of HRA methods would be the determining factor on whether to use all the 
stages while carrying out HRA in an incident/accident investigation. 
3.3.1 HAZID [Step 1] 
3.3.1.1 Problem Definition 
Problem definition allows for determination of HRA scopes. In fact the definition of 
problem is a focal point in conducting HRA in investigating an incident/accident. There 
is a tendency for the problem definition to shift as the HRA progresses. Hence, it is 
important for the team leader carrying out the HRA to ensure direction of the 
investigation, in order to achieve a desirable outcome to solve an incident/accident. 
3.3.1.2 Task Analysis 
Task analysis refers to methods of describing and analysing human system interactions 
including the one between the operator, the system, and other personnel within the 
system (Kirwan, 1994). In addition, the presence of more circumstances onboard vessels 
could result in the high chance of disruption of performance of a system. Thus, a high- 
level risk analysis needs to be selected using a screening technique. It can be carried out 
by analysing data collected from interviews, design information, information on critical 
incident/accident, observation and past experience. Upon finding the list of key human 
interactions within the examined system, decisions need to be made to list out the 
potential contributors to human error. Among the available task analysis techniques, 
HTA is the most often used technique due to its ease of assimilating a large amount of 
information relatively quickly (Shepherd, 2001). Some of the benefits of using the HTA 
include the hierarchical structure of HTA that allows the analysts to concentrate on 
imperative features of the task and it can be used at an initial phase to examine the 
human error in an incident/accident investigation. The disadvantages of HTA are that 
the analyst needs to develop skills to analyse the task effectively and it requires 
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collaboration between the analyst and the personnel involved with the incident/accident 
to develop a realistic description of the task (Salmon et al., 2003). The methodology of 
constructing an HTA is shown in Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.8 Methodology of HTA Construction (Kirwan and Basra, 1998) 
Upon completion of HTA, a review of the accident events will be carried out. A 
thorough analysis of the accident and collection of data will be executed by means of 
direct observation, searching training records and engaging experts in the concerned 
field investigated. In addition, information deduced from expert judgement will be 
scrutinised and categorised under paired comparison and absolute probability judgment. 
Finally, an HEP can be derived. A detailed description of the methodology is 
demonstrated by a case study in Section 3.4. 
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3.3.1.3 HEA 
In HEA, a list of potential human errors including the typical physical and mental 
human errors that can lead to undesired consequences are identified and classified. 
Figure 3.9 illustrates some of the typical physical and mental human errors. Both errors 
are categorised in five types of actions. 
Figure 3.9 Typical Physical and Mental Human Errors (IMO, 2002b) 
Some examples of potential human error classification are as follows (MCA, 2001): 
a). The supposed cause of the human error. 
b). The potential for error-recovery, either by the operator or by another person. 
c). The potential consequences of the error. 
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3.3.1.4 Representation and Screening 
Representation refers to logical presentation of the whole HRA incorporating aspects of 
human, hardware, software and environmental contributions to risk on the investigated 
incident/accident. Recently cultural differences have also been assimilated in 
developing HRA where influence of different cultures is used to increase the realism of 
HRA modelling (Gertman et al., 2006). Screening deals with restriction of 
quantification process where irrelevant errors are discarded based on the HEPs which 
contribute above a certain level to the overall risk level in the system. Mainly the 
screening involves a large HRA. Some of the difficulties that arise from representation 
and screening are decisions on when to cease categorising human errors into yet more 
detailed causes and overlaps of contributions of human, hardware, software, 
environmental and cultural elements in failure data used for HRA. 
3.3.2 Risk Assessment [Step 2] 
3.3.2.1 HEQ and Assessment 
Identification and evaluation of areas that pose high risk to the examined system will be 
carried out in risk assessment. One of the most frequently used methods for this purpose 
is HEQ. It is also known as Human Reliability Quantification (HRQ). When the Human 
Error Probability (HEP) is required to be put into a quantitative FSA, HRQ is 
developed. It can be illustrated as follows (IMO, 2002b): 
HEP = 
Number of human errors that have occurred 
Number of opportunities for human errors 
(3.1) 
However, the numbers in Equation 3.1 may sometimes not be easy to obtain. A new 
HEQ approach of human reliability quantification is proposed in Chapter 6 using a 
combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach. At the end of HEQ and assessment, if it is 
found that the human reliability is at an acceptable level for a stakeholder such as the 
ALARP level, then representation and documentation is performed if further risk 
reduction cannot be justified. On the contrary if the stakeholder finds that the proposed 
human reliability is still at an unacceptable level, error reduction needs to be carried out 
in the next step. 
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3.3.3 Identification of RCOs [Step 31 
3.3.3.1 Error Reduction, Factors Influencing Performance and Error 
Causes 
This step is to identify the measures of controlling and reducing the risks estimated in 
Step 2. This is carried out with the evaluation of four important networks in the 
management of an oil tanker. The networks are technical and engineering systems, 
working environment systems, personnel systems and, organisational and managerial 
systems. The identification of RCOs can be specified in order to (IMO, 2002b): 
a). Reduce the frequency of failure. 
b). Mitigate the effects of failure. 
c). Alleviate the circumstances in which failures occur. 
d). Mitigate the consequence of accidents. 
Each risk control measure needs to be assessed for human intervention in the system to 
prevent emergence of any new hazard. Examples of RCOs for a generic oil tanker can 
be described as shown in Figures 3.10,3.11,3.12 and 3.13. The figures illustrate 
examples of RCOs for HOF for various networks within the management of an oil 
tanker. 
3.3.3.2 RCOs for HOF of Technical and Engineering Systems 
The illustration of RCOs for HOF of the technical and engineering systems onboard an 
Figure 3.10 RCOs for HOF of the Technical and Engineering Systems 
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Specification of information requirements for the crew to perform their tasks onboard is 
addressed by shipping companies through the use of maritime English as a means of 
communications onboard. The variety of crew nationalities onboard emphasises this 
aspect. Ergonomic needs in the man machine and human computer interfaces, design of 
equipment and workplaces onboard have been implemented gradually in newer vessels. 
This is yet to be deployed in the majority of shipping companies due to increased 
operating costs. 
3.3.3.3 RCOs for HOF of Working Environment Systems 
Figure 3.11 presents the RCOs for HOF of the working environment systems onboard 
an oil tanker. 
Noise levels, temperature, 
humidity and the effects of 
vibration on task performance 
Ship stability, effect on crew of 
working under rough sea and 
weather conditions 
Ship location, open sea, 
approach to ports, etc. 
Time of operations and 
appropriate levels of 
lighting 
ity, effect on crew of Good layout of bridge & 
ider rough sea and machinery spaces 
editions 
Figure 3.11 RCOs for HOF of the Working Environment Systems 
The implementation of safety rules such as the use of safety equipment and permits to 
carry out tasks could be adopted by seafarers to reduce the working risk that comes 
along with the job scope. The enforcement of the International Convention on Standards 
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 1995) related to 
working hours onboard produces scheduling and sufficient manning which has certainly 
reduced the ill effects that could lead to mental illness and fatigue among seafarers. The 
advancement in ship design and construction along with the use of modem technology 
contributes to a better modem navigating bridge and engine room layout providing a 
better conducive working environment onboard. In addition better ship design also 
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reduces the level of vibration while sailing at higher speed. The advancement in modern 
technology allows a ship loadicator to be used to monitor the ship stability throughout 
any shipboard operation. These have emphasised the need of training seafarers to 
upgrade skills and knowledge to meet the requirements to operate modern vessels. 
3.3.3.4 RCOs for HOF of Personnel Systems 
The RCOs for HOF of the personnel systems onboard an oil tanker are presented in 
Figure 3.12. 
Motivation and Development of L 
appropriate training leadership issues 
for crew members 
Language and Workload 
cultural issues assessment 
Figure 3.12 RCOs for HOF of the Personnel Systems 
Shipping companies have to address language and cultural issues among the crew 
onboard vessels by using the common maritime working language of English. The 
implementation of the ISM Code and STCW 1995 requires oil tanker companies to 
follow a mandatory requirement of training their crew. The introduction of various 
training sessions and workshops on leadership, security and practical skills and 
knowledge base classes as per requirement of the ISM Code and STCW 1995 could 
contribute to the improvement of the management of modern oil tankers. Additionally 
the requirement for vessels to comply with STCW 1995 fitness for duty regulations has 
further enhanced the shipboard management to ensure that seafarers have sufficient rest. 
This is necessary given that excessive workload could cause the crew to lose 
concentration while carrying out tasks onboard and result in an accident. 
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3.3.3.5 RCOs for HOF of Organisational and Managerial Systems 
Figure 3.13 illustrates the RCOs for HOF of the organisational and managerial systems 
onboard an oil tanker. 
Development of 
operational and emergency 
procedures 
/_` Development of 
organisation policies 
on crew recruitment, 
selection and training 
Figure 3.13 RCOs for HOF of the Organisational and Managerial Systems 
The implementation of the ISM Code requires any type of vessel including oil tankers to 
be certified to carry a Safety Management System (SMS) certificate onboard. This 
system provides a defined level of authority on ship and ashore management. The 
system also contains a safety policy with procedures for reporting accidents and non- 
conformities along with an environmental protection policy with procedures for 
responding to emergency situations. Therefore, a continuous monitoring safety system 
already exists in the shipping practice with the implementation of the ISM Code. In 
addition, safety and security concerns are also included in the shipboard SMS along 
with the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS). Manning onboard oil tankers is based on the minimum manning requirements 
stipulated by the flag state administration of the vessel's port of registry. The 
implementation of rules, procedures and regulations by the shipowners needs close 
monitoring by the Port State Control (PSC) surveyors when a vessel calls at a port. This 
could be achieved if the PSC employs a more stringent and increased frequency of 
vessel inspections. Shortage of seafarers in the maritime industry is yet to be addressed 
by the principal stakeholders in the shipping industry (Li and Cheng, 2007). Thus, it is 
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necessary to have a long-term policy of recruitment and training to support the 
reduction of experienced seafarers due to family commitment and increase of shore job 
opportunities. Modern technology provides weather routeing and a vessel position 
reporting system to monitor a vessel's transit throughout her sea passage. This allows 
vessels to carry out the passage plan more prudently on every passage to sea and 
reduces the risk of a vessel coming across a typhoon or hurricane. 
3.3.4 CBA [Step 4] 
CBA will determine the costs and benefits involved in implementing each identified 
RCO with reference to HOF prudently. Costs should be expressed in terms of life cycle 
costs and may include initial, operating, training, inspection, certification and 
decommission considerations. Benefits may include reduction in fatalities, injuries, 
casualties, environmental damage and clean-up, indemnity of third party liabilities and 
an increase in the average life of ships (IMO, 2002b). 
3.3.5 Recommendations for Decision-making [Step 5] 
Practical use of the results of the HRA study should contribute to balanced decisions 
and recommendations of the whole FSA study (MCA, 2001). The recommendations 
should be presented in such a way that they can be well understood by all the principal 
stakeholders in the shipping industry irrespective of their experience in the application 
of risk and CBA and related techniques. 
3.4 A Case Study on 'Open/Shut' Status of Cargo Tanks' Inert Gas 
Valves during Discharging Operations 
3.4.1 Background 
The case study is presented to illustrate the application of the proposed HRA to the FSA 
framework. The assessment is concentrated on a crude oil tanker's inert gas valve status 
whilst discharging at an oil terminal. The example provided here is qualitative in nature 
which emphasises errors that can lead to faulty status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves 
during discharging operations. The presence of inert gas inside the cargo tanks creates 
an atmosphere that does not support combustion of the hydrocarbon oil vapours. Hence, 
it is of paramount importance to ensure that the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves is 
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closely monitored. This case study incorporates all the phases involved in the HRA to 
the FSA framework. More detailed analysis about the quantification phases, CBA and 
decision making is elaborated in the following chapters. 
3.4.2 Problem Definition 
The primary task of the case study is to identify the potential errors related to the status 
of an oil tanker inert gas valves' that could lead to a dangerous situation during 
discharging operations, subsequently resulting in breaching of cargo tanks leading to an 
explosion. The secondary task will include providing error reduction recommendations. 
3.4.3 Task Analysis 
3.4.3.1 Data Collection 
Data collection for this case study is based on observations and experience of master 
mariners carrying out numerous discharging operations onboard crude oil tankers. In 
addition, documentation on cargo operation procedures and related inert gas incident 
reports are also reviewed (IMO, 2006a). 
3.4.3.2 System Description 
The whole oil tanker cargo tanks' inert gas valves operations during discharging could 
be described as follows: 
a). All the cargo tanks' inert gas valves are required to be in an open position when the 
oil tanker is carrying one grade of crude oil. 
b). Isolation of cargo tanks' inert gas valves could be required when more than one 
parcel of cargo is carried onboard to prevent vapour of one grade of cargo from 
contaminating another parcel of cargo. 
c). The inert gas plant should be in operation throughout the discharging operations 
ensuring the oxygen concentration level of the inert gas provided into the cargo tanks to 
be less than 5% by volume. The inert gas operation checklist needs to be completed and 
other operations related on inert gas plant are not within the scope of this case study. 
d). A Ship Shore Safety Checklist needs to be completed prior to commencement of 
discharging operations and should be duly monitored at intervals as required by the 
checklist. 
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e). Deck cargo watchkeeepers are required to check the status of cargo tanks' inert gas 
valves during discharging operations at frequent intervals. 
3.4.3.3 HTA 
An example of HTA on the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves onboard an oil tanker 
is presented in Figure 3.14. It shows the hierarchical approach that describes the task 
from the top goal of monitoring the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves including of 
the venue where the checking of the valves will be performed, systematically 
downwards to each individual level of operations. 
Status of Cargo Tanks' 
Inert Gas Valves 
Check Valves 
Indicators at Locations 
Physical Check 
of Valves 
on Deck 
Check Valves Indicators 
Lights on Navigating 
Bridge 
Check Valves 
Indicators Lights in 
CCR 
Figure 3.14 HTA on Status of Cargo Tanks' Inert Gas Valves 
Some of the plans that could be derived from the HTA are as follows: 
a). Procedures for checking cargo tanks' inert gas valves. 
b). The standardisation of frequency to check the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves. 
c). Improved locking arrangement of cargo tanks' inert gas valves with padlocks and 
keys arrangements. 
d). Maintenance plans of cargo tanks' inert gas valves including the indicator lights in 
the navigating bridge/cargo control room (CCR). 
e). Record keeping the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves during cargo operations. 
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3.4.4 HEA 
Using the SHERPA method, a list of potential human errors that could lead to undesired 
consequences are identified and established in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 HEA for Status of Cargo Tanks' Inert Gas Valves 
Task Error Modes Description Consequences 
Check valve Action omitted Failure of risk Failure to 
indicators in recognition monitor valve 
navigating Action too little Lack of status could 
bridge/CCR awareness on lead to 
the need to catastrophic 
check valve situation 
status 
frequently 
Action wrong Not knowing 
direction/Lack of what direction 
knowledge of the valve 
system should be 
Lack of attention Not noticing 
the indicator 
lights need 
replacement 
Check valve Lack of attention/ Not checking Failure to 
indicators Communication IG valves monitor valve 
physically at breakdown properly status could 
locations Forgets to lead to 
check the valve catastrophic 
position during situation 
cargo 
watchkee in 
SHERPA involves three stages which are identification of the set of tasks, HTA and 
HEA. It was selected because: 
a). It allows for simple presentation of elements provided in the proposed application of 
HRA to the FSA framework. 
b). Its approach allows for determination of whether errors can be recovered 
immediately, at a later stage in the task or not at all. 
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c). It also incorporates error reduction measures to overcome causes of human errors. 
3.4.5 Representation and Screening 
Table 3.3 provides a logical presentation of the error modes, recovery and error 
reduction reflecting the HRA on the status of cargo tanks' inert gas valves. None of the 
errors were discarded whilst screening due to the nature of grave consequences. 
Table 3.3 Error Modes and Error Reduction for Status of Cargo Tanks' Inert Gas Valves 
Task 
Check valve 
indicators in 
Bridge/CCR 
Check valve 
indicators 
physically at 
locations 
Error Modes I Recovery 
Action omitted I No 
Action too little I Yes, monitor 
cargo tank inert 
Action wrong 
direction/ Lack 
of knowledge 
of system 
Yes, monitor 
cargo tank inert 
gas pressure 
Lack of 
attention 
Lack of 
attention/ 
Communication 
breakdown 
Error 
Reduction 
a). Safety 
training to 
accentuate inert 
gas use in 
cargo operation 
b). Introduce 
record keeping 
of inert gas 
valve status 
Yes, monitor 
cargo tank inert 
Yes, monitor 
cargo tank inert 
Yes, monitor 
cargo tank inert 
gas pressure 
a). More than 
one crew to be 
designated to 
check the 
valves 
b). Clear 
communication 
of feedback on 
open / shut 
valve status 
c). Introduce IG 
valves locking 
system using 
padlocks and 
keys 
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3.4.6 Error Reduction, Factors Influencing Performance and Error 
Causes 
These stages are incorporated and illustrated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. One of the networks 
in the management of an oil tanker (i. e. technical and engineering systems) is taken into 
account during this assessment on a crude oil tanker's inert gas valve status whilst 
discharging at an oil terminal. 
3.4.7 Representation and Documentation 
Many potential human errors are raised, due to the crew's poor time management and 
hectic cargo operation schedules, slips and lapses of crew's actions while performing 
cargo watchkeeping duties. Furthermore, the use of SHERPA method facilitates 
external human reliability analysis, which can easily review the whole HRA process and 
enhance the justification and judicious error reduction modes raised. 
3.5 Discussion 
The fundamental information and development of the application of HRA is addressed 
and the followings are derived. 
a). In view with the requirement of the ISM Code along with a SMS on safety policy, 
the maritime industry should have a good means of collecting and maintaining 
reliable data on the occurrence of any accident or near miss. A similar data base as 
found in the nuclear and aviation industries can be developed for the maritime 
industry and should be made easily accessible by maritime communities. Increased 
transparency of this information by establishing common formats for onboard vessels 
and ashore information should be initiated. 
b). Good dissemination of reliable data on any accident or near miss would further assist 
in preventing similar accidents from reoccurring. 
c). The requirement for more stringent and increased frequency of internal and external 
inspections onboard oil tankers emphasising shipboard management is to be enforced. 
d). The requirement of a good structured training regime and motivation of crew and 
officers onboard oil tankers should be cultivated to nurture and produce a committed 
crew with good attitudes and perceptions towards safety, that would significantly avoid 
shipboard operational errors, and subsequently, will prevent oil spills. 
66 
Chapter 3- Use of HRA for Facilitating FSA: An Oil Tanker Case 
e). Tanker owners should ensure that the crew members are trained to anticipate the 
worst scenario and equip ship's crew effectively to deal with incident/accident related to 
oil spills at all levels of the organisation within a shipboard management. This could be 
further emphasised by implementing a safety organisational culture. An organisation 
where the crew's pursuit of safety is not so much about preventing isolated human 
failures or technical failures but more towards making the organisation robust as 
practicable to its human operational hazards. 
f). Tanker owners should be willing to invest on an initial good design of oil tanker 
during the shipbuilding phase itself which, could then help prevent oil spills in the 
future. 
g). Use of a good preventive management system of all tanker operational equipment 
supported with good emergency repairs of equipment if broken should be 
accentuated. Subsequently this would play a long-term role in reducing operational 
errors in oil tanker fleets. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the application of HRA to FSA in order to improve the oil 
tanker shipboard operations and to control the risk of an oil spill. A newly developed 
HRA to the FSA framework is presented. The need for human factors' element to be 
assimilated into FSA has been highlighted by the research community for some time, 
however no solution has been forwarded. The proposed framework addresses this aspect 
judiciously by adding HRA elements into FSA and at the same time incorporating the 
CBA element into HRA. Finally, it is timely for the principal stakeholders in the 
shipping industry to take the initiative in applying HRA to FSA more comprehensively 
as proposed instead of idle application using sole FSA or HRA, in general and in the 
management of oil tankers in particular, to continuously improve the shipboard 
operation to prevent oil spills. In addition, continuous application of this approach will 
further refine it and subsequently, will improve the decisions made by the oil tanker 
owners leading to a safer oil tanker shipping community. 
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Chapter 4 
Use of CREAM to Facilitate HRA in 
Oil Tanker Operations 
Summary 
This chapter presents a CREAM tailored for its application to a maritime context 
succeeding the critical review of FSA and HRA in Chapters 2 and 3. To address the 
shortcomings of the generic HRA and FSA methodologies in the management of oil 
tankers in order to prevent oil spills, a new framework of CREAM is developed and 
presented to study the human error and reliability associated with oil tanker operations. 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of modem technology has resulted in human work from being mostly 
manual skills to knowledge intensive functions as cognitive tasks. The word cognitive 
denotes relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual activities such as thinking, 
reasoning or remembering. Hence, the development of modem technology has led to a 
change from conventional ergonomics to cognitive ergonomics. Meanwhile, ergonomics 
is defined as a scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of the interactions 
among humans and the other elements of a system and the profession that applies 
theories, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimise comfort of human 
well being in executing any tasks and overall system performance (Grech et al., 2008). 
CREAM presents a consistent error classification system, which integrates individual, 
technological and organisational factors. The reason of selecting this method in this 
study is due to its feature of being a promising HRA model for identifying root causes 
of human errors (Kim, 2001). Past evidence from a large number of incident/accident 
inquiries indicates that the incident/accident initiating events are more often the result of 
error prone situations and error prone activities, which are mainly caused by human 
factors (Reason, 1997). Human factor researchers viewed human errors as originating 
from human behaviours including those due to poor management, inadequate 
supervision and lack of communication (Dekker, 2002; Reason, 1997). 
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The CREAM accentuates the important influence of the context on human performance 
and has a useful cognitive model and framework, which could be used in retrospective 
and prospective analysis (He et al., 2008). The method is based on a COCOM and deals 
with EOC (Kennedy et al., 2007). Four control modes used in COCOM are Scrambled 
Control, Opportunistic Control, Tactical Control and Strategic Control. It is explicitly 
based on a set of principles for cognitive modelling with detailed classification of 
erroneous actions. The classification describes the relations between causes and effects 
by defining some interactive tables. These tables are provided for the error modes and 
cognitive functions required by COCOM along its general system and organisational 
causes. In each table, causes and consequences are further divided into general and 
specific categories. These methods of going through tables of classification describe 
how an analysis can progress recursively through the tables, where the possible links are 
defined by the underlying operator model. Thus, CREAM allows a possible distinction 
between the classification scheme, the method and the cognitive model. It can therefore 
be used to identify the most likely cause of an observed incident/accident or erroneous 
action. CREAM is a promising approach in identification of cognitive failure types 
(Reer, 2008). A specialised version of CREAM for use in the analysis of traffic 
incidents/accidents has been developed. The adapted version was named DREAM, for 
Driver Reliability and Error Analysis Method (Sagberg, 2007). Some research was 
carried out on Bridge Reliability and Error Analysis Method (BREAM) for use in the 
maritime accident analysis (Nygren, 2006). Furthermore, the principles of CREAM 
have been successfully applied to the analysis of aircraft incidents/accidents (Subotic et 
al., 2007). 
4.2 Literature Review 
CREAM was developed by Hollnagel (1998) upon analysing the existing HRA 
approaches. It can be used retrospectively to analyse and quantify human error, and 
prospectively to predict potential human error in an incident/accident investigation. 
Some of the advantages of CREAM are that it can be easily integrated into an overall 
safety system and allow assessors to adapt to the context of the initiating events of the 
incident/accident being analysed. Another significant element in the CREAM is the 
specification of CPCs, which takes into account the objective circumstances of an 
incident/accident and their possible favourable or unfavourable influence on the 
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occurrence process of the incident/accident. In a maritime context, an assessment of the 
CPCs can provide an overall prediction of how likely it is for the ship's crew and the 
related shipboard systems to lose controls. The CREAM can be used for both 
retrospective and prospective analyses. On the other hand, some of the criticisms of 
CREAM include that it does not take into account collaborative work to a great extent, 
it may be time and resource intensive, it is demanding in terms of the need of expertise 
in human factors, it suffers the problems of subjectivity and lack of data to enhance and 
support its work in HRA. Furthermore, it does not provide a solution to the root causes 
of the incident/accident investigated (Salmon et al., 2003; Konstandinidou et al., 2006). 
Based on Hollnagel's approach (Hollnagel, 1998), an advanced CREAM, which 
incorporates additional features of RCOs and CBA to provide solutions to an 
incident/accident investigation, is proposed in this chapter. 
4.3 CREAM Principles 
4.3.1 CREAM Classification Scheme 
CREAM was originally developed to analyse safety critical incidents/accidents in 
nuclear power plants. It is based on Man-Technology-Organisation (MTO) genotypes. It 
includes taxonomy for causal categories covering the three elements of man, technology 
and organisation. The method begins with characterising the action, which is directly 
connected to a critical event. The critical event could be an incident/accident. This 
action characteristic is an error mode (Hollnagel, 1998). For a given incident/accident, a 
general phenotype is selected from a list of eight diverse classes. The classes are timing, 
duration, sequence, object, force, direction, speed and distance. The error modes are 
further specified according to the general phenotypes. A given genotype is always an 
antecedent to a phenotype or to different genotypes, which means that the given 
genotype could also be a consequent of other genotypes. The taxonomy specifies the 
possible connections backward from a consequent to an antecedent, which in turn is the 
consequent of one or more other antecedents. As a result, a network of causal 
relationships is constructed. 
Antecedents and consequences are used in the CREAM classification methodology to 
prevent confusion among the paths between the categories of the classification scheme 
(Hollnagel, 1998). The antecedent can give rise to a specific consequent or consequents, 
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given the premises of the classification scheme. In this research, domain specific causal 
categories have been added to the general categories (genotypes) of CREAM tabulated 
in Appendix II to realise its application in the maritime context. Furthermore it allows 
for easier reference related to maritime tasks to HRA analysts when using the 
classification tables. Among the changes that have been made in the classification 
scheme of Appendix II to suit the maritime domain are: 
a). Added new descriptions on the functional impairment and cognitive style of general 
consequent of the permanent person related functions categories (Table AII. 9). 
b). Improvised general consequent of the categories of equipment failure by creating 
navigation bridge, cargo control room and engine room sections to allow more detailed 
description of equipment failures (Table All. 10). 
c). Added new descriptions on the specific consequent of the incomplete information of 
general consequent of the temporary interface problems categories (Table All. 12). 
d). Added new description on the specific antecedent of incorrect prediction general 
consequent of the general and specific antecedents for interpretation (Table AII. 21). 
e). Added new descriptions on general antecedent and specific antecedent for fear and 
psychological stress general consequent of the general and specific antecedents for 
temporary person related functions (Table AII. 23). 
f). Added new descriptions on general antecedent for functional impairment, cognitive 
style and cognitive bias general consequents of the general and specific antecedents for 
temporary person related functions (Table AII. 24). 
g). Added new description on the specific antecedent of software fault general 
consequent of general and specific antecedents for equipment (Table AII. 25). 
h). Added new description on the specific antecedent of incomplete information general 
consequent of general and specific antecedents for temporary interface problems (Table 
AII. 27). 
i). Added new description on the specific antecedent of access problems general 
consequent of general and specific antecedents for permanent interface problems (Table 
AII. 28). 
j). Added new description on the specific antecedent of insufficient skills general 
consequent of general and specific antecedents for training (Table AID 1). 
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k). Added new description on the specific antecedent of adverse ambient conditions 
general consequent of general and specific antecedents for ambient conditions (Table 
AII. 32). 
1). Added new descriptions on the specific antecedent of excessive demand, inadequate 
work place layout and inadequate team support general consequent of general and 
specific antecedents for working conditions (Table AII. 33). 
4.3.1.1 COCOM 
COCOM is presented to show the relationship between components of the classification 
scheme. It describes a set of cognitive functions that can be used to explain human 
erroneous actions. Human performance is a result of the controlled use of competence 
adapted to the requirements of the surrounding environment and situation at the time of 
incident/accident initiating events. This corresponds to a fundamental principle of 
cognitive systems of engineering that human action is intentional as well as reactive. 
The COCOM model is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 The Contextual Control Model of Cognition (Hollnagel, 1998) 
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Scrambled Control - It characterises a situation where there is little or no thinking 
involved in choosing what to do. The extreme case of this control is the state of 
momentary panic resulting in the choice of next action in a random manner. It can be 
concluded that there is no relationship between the situation and the actions, in situation 
assessment. 
Opportunistic Control - This is determined by the salient features of the current context. 
Little anticipation is involved due to time constraint, lack of understanding of the 
situation or due to poor working conditions. It results in an inefficient choice of actions. 
Tactical Control - The performance in this mode is based on planning by following a 
known procedure. The planning is of limited scope resulting in some actions taken 
unprepared. 
Strategic Control - It considers wider time horizon and focuses on higher level of goals. 
It provides more robust and efficient performance. This control can be attained by the 
competence of a person. 
The control mode is determined by analysing CPCs for an incident/accident 
investigated. Each CPC is described by means of a linguistic descriptor. The CPCs are 
associated to a particular contextual effect on the performance reliability. The 
performance reliability is categorised into improved reliability effect, reduced reliability 
effect and non-significant reliability effect. The ratio application of improved 
reliabilities and reduced reliabilities will establish the control mode acted by ship's crew 
on the incident/accident investigated (Marseguerra et al., 2007). The linguistic 
descriptors and its performance reliability effects of the nine CPCs comprise adequacy 
of shipboard organisation (ASO), shipboard working condition (SWC), adequacy of 
man machine interface and shipboard operational support (MMI), availability of 
plans/procedures (APP), number of simultaneous goals (NSG), available time (QAT), 
time of day (circadian rhythm) (CRT), adequacy of shipboard training and preparation 
(ASP) and shipboard crew collaboration quality (SCQ) are illustrated in Table 4.1. 
Finally, there are two important aspects of the control modelling in the COCOM. The 
first aspect deals with the conditions under which a person changes from one control 
mode to another. Meanwhile, the second feature deals with the characteristic 
performance in a given control mode. A given control mode refers to how and what 
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determine the actions chosen and carried out. The relation between the control modes 
and its performance reliability is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Table 4.1 The Linguistic Descriptors and Performance Reliability Effects of CPCs 
CPCs Linguistic Descriptors and its Performance Reliability Effects 
ASO Very Efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
[Improved] [Not Significant] [Reduced] [Reduced] 
SWC Advantages [Improved] Compatible [Not Significant] Incompatible [Reduced] 
MMI Supportive Adequate Tolerable Inappropriate 
[Improved] [Not Significant] [Not Significant] [Reduced] 
APP Appropriate [Improved] Acceptable [Not Significant] Inappropriate [Reduced] 
NSG Less than actual capacity Matching current capacity More than actual 
[Not Significant] [Not Significant] capacity [Reduced] 
QAT Adequate Temporarily inadequate Continuously inadequate 
[Improved] [Not Si nificant] [Reduced] 
CRT Night-time (unadjusted) Daytime (adjusted) Night-time (adjusted) 
[Reduced] [Not Significant] [Reduced] 
ASP Adequate with vast Adequate with limited Inadequate experience 
experience [Improved] experience [Not Significant] [Reduced] 
SCQ Very Efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
[Improved] [Not Si nificant] [Not Si nificant] [Reduced] 
Figure 4.2 Relations between Control Modes and Type of Control 
Human Performance Reliability (Hollnagel, 1998) 
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The COCOM model has been tested and found to be satisfactory by Stanton (Stanton et 
al., 2001). It has been found that human behaviour could be categorised reliably into the 
four control modes as elaborated above. Each control mode is also associated to a 
Human Performance Failure Probability (HPFP) interval. Table 4.2 illustrates the HPFP 
intervals between the four control modes. 
Table 4.2 COCOM and HPFP Intervals (Marseguerra et al., 2007) 
COCOM HPFP Intervals 
Scrambled 1.0 x 10" < < 1.0 x 10 
Opportunistic 1.0 x 10" <p < 0.5 x 10 
Tactical 1.0 x 10" <p < 1.0 x 10' 
Strategic 0.5 x 10--< p < 1.0 x 10-2 
Meanwhile Figure 4.3 illustrates the ship crew's likely action by means of comparing 
the improved and reduced reliability effects influence determined from the nine types of 
CPCs. 
Figure 4.3 Basic Diagram of CREAM Methodology for 
Ship Crew's Control Mode (Konstandinidou et al., 2006) 
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An example application of Figure 4.3 is that six of the analysed CPCs were found to 
have improved reliability effects whereas two CPCs fell into reduced reliability effects, 
having a negative effect on human reliability. Meanwhile the remaining one CPC was 
having a non-significant effect on human performance. With reference to Figure 4.3, 
according to CREAM, the control mode in which ship's crew acted on the assumed 
example of an incident falls in `Strategic' Control. It reflects that a very low probability 
for a human erroneous action is expected on the incident. Further detailed 
demonstration on the use of Figure 4.3 to determine the type of control mode that ship 
crews are likely to act is provided in the study cases of `Carina' and `Prestige'. 
4.3.1.2 CREAM Classification Categories 
The CREAM classification consists of three categories. The first category contains the 
genotypes associated with human psychological characteristics. It includes genotypes 
relating to cognitive functions, psycho-physiological variables, emotional state and 
personality traits, etc. The second category consists of the genotypes associated with the 
technological system. This category deals with the state of components and subsystems, 
man-machine interaction, the man-machine interface and technological hardware 
including software, etc. The third category contains the genotypes that characterise the 
organisation, the working environment and the interaction between people. It includes 
permanent features of the system, aspects of the organisation and environmental 
conditions. It also includes other genotypes that do not fit in the previous two categories 
(Hollnagel, 1998). Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the differentiation of genotypes and the 
classification categories applied in CREAM respectively. 
4.3.1.2.1 Error Modes 
The term "Error Modes" signifies the particular form in which an erroneous action can 
explain itself. It also refers to the systematic phenotypes. The eight types of erroneous 
actions shown in Figure 4.5 are included as Error Modes. They are Timing, Duration, 
Force, Distance, Speed, Direction, Object and Sequence. The error modes are presented 
in Tables AII. 1, AII. 2, AII. 3, AII. 4 and AII. 19. 
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Figure 4.4 Differentiations of Genotypes 
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Figure 4.5 CREAM Classification Categories 
4.3.1.2.2 Person Related Genotypes 
Person related genotypes contain the groups of antecedents that can be associated with a 
person (Hollnagel, 1998). 
i). Specific Cognitive Functions 
Specific cognitive functions describe the functions that are assumed to constitute the 
basis for meaningful human action. The cognitive functions must reflect the principles 
of the underlying model of cognition. In CREAM, these principles are taken from the 
78 
Chapter 4- Use of CREAM to Facilitate HRA in Oil Tanker Operations 
COCOM that includes observation, interpretation, planning and execution. These 
functions are presented in Tables AII. 5, AII. 6, AII. 7, AII. 20, AII. 21 and AII. 22. 
ii). General Person Related Functions (Temporary) 
Temporary person related functions are physiological states or emotional states that 
refer to characteristics of a person at a given time. Examples from this classification 
group are circadian rhythm, memory failure, fatigue, time pressure, distraction, 
psychological stress and physiological stress. These functions are presented in Tables 
AII. 8 and AII. 23. 
iii). General Person Related Functions (Permanent) 
Permanent person related functions are constant characteristics of an individual that 
include colour blindness or cognitive biases in thinking and judgement. These functions 
are presented in Tables AII. 9 and AII. 24. 
4.3.1.2.3 Technology Related Genotypes 
Technology related genotypes contain the groups of antecedents that can be associated 
with the technological systems. The antecedents are ordered in the following four 
groups. 
i). Equipment 
This group refers to the technological elements such as mechanical or electronic 
components including their software, subsystems and control systems, etc. This group 
may coincide with antecedents in the temporary interface group. These functions are 
illustrated in Tables All. 10 and AII. 25. 
ii). Procedures 
This classification group refers to the system specific procedures or prescriptions on 
how a task shall be carried out. It may have similarities with the organisation group. 
These functions are illustrated in Tables All. 11 and AII. 26. 
iii). Interface (Temporary) 
This group describes the antecedents related to temporary conditions of the man 
machine interaction, such as failure of equipments operating in navigation bridge, cargo 
control room or engine room. These functions are presented in Tables AIL 12 and A11.27 
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iv). Interface (Permanent) 
This group describes the antecedents related to permanent features such as faulty 
design, maintenance failure, poor layout or working space and oversights, etc. These 
functions are presented in Tables AII. 13 and AII. 28. 
4.3.1.2.4 Organisation Related Genotypes 
Organisation related genotypes contain the groups of antecedents related to the 
organisational environment, such as working conditions in general. The antecedents are 
categorised in the five groups described as follows: 
i). Communication 
This classification group aims on communication systems in running operation of a 
vessel. It involves communication between ship and shore management, and includes 
communication among vessels. This group may coincide with the temporary interface 
and ambient condition groups. These functions are illustrated in Tables AII. 14 and 
AII. 29. 
ii). Organisations 
This classification group refers to antecedents that deal with the management of the 
organisation. Among the features included are management problems, quality control 
policy, design failure, safety climate, social climate, reporting procedures, lines of 
command and responsibility, inadequate task allocations, social pressure and 
maintenance failure, etc. These functions are illustrated in Tables All. 15 and AII. 30. 
iii). Training 
This classification group refers to the antecedents that emphasise on skills and 
knowledge achieved by ship's crew members in performing their routine tasks. Thus, 
this classification group weighs on the ship management in providing training in the 
development of crew members operating the vessels. These functions are presented in 
Tables AII. 16 and AII. 31. 
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iv). Ambient Conditions 
This classification group refers to the antecedents that characterise the ambient 
conditions, such as temperature, time of day (or night), humidity, sounds and 
illumination, etc. These factors have impacts on the well being of the ship's crew in 
performing their routine tasks efficiently. These functions are presented in Tables 
AII. 17 and AII. 32. 
v). Working Conditions 
This classification group concentrates on antecedents that characterise the working 
conditions, such as task demands, work place design, team support and working hours. 
Changes in working conditions have more influence on crew management than the ones 
in ambient conditions. These functions are presented in Tables AII. 18 and AII. 33. 
4.3.2 CPCs in Maritime Operations 
Detailed descriptions of the nine CPCs used in CREAM produced in the maritime 
context are described as follows: 
i). ASO 
This CPC describes the characteristic and responsibilities of crew onboard ships, 
additional support, communication systems, Safety Management Systems (SMS), 
instructions and guidelines in carrying out the activities resulting in initiating events of 
an incident/accident. 
ii). SWC 
This CPC includes the nature of the physical working conditions onboard ships 
including ambient lighting, glare on screens, noise from alarms and any interruption 
from carrying out relevant tasks, etc. 
iii). MMI 
This CPC consists of the information available on control panels, navigation bridge, 
cargo control room, engine control room and shipboard operational support provided by 
specifically designed decision aids such as marine navigation equipments, cargo 
operation and engine room instruments. Furthermore, this CPC requires thorough 
analysis to be conducted due to the increased automation in shipboard operations. 
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iv). APP 
This CPC is used to match the existing operating and emergency instructions and 
procedures in carrying out ship operations. 
v). NSG 
This CPC describes the number of tasks a crew is required to carry out at the same time. 
vi). QAT 
This CPC refers to the time available to carry out a task competently resulting in a 
reasonable outcome. 
vii). CRT 
This CPC relates to the time of the day or night when the task is carried out. Emphasis 
lies in how the crew can get well adapted to the current time. Examples are the nature of 
four hourly of navigation bridge and engine room watch keeping sequence. 
viii). ASP 
This CPC describes the quality of training provided to the crew in carrying out their 
routine tasks onboard ship. It includes familiarisation training and refreshers' courses to 
new joiners and experienced crew respectively within the shipboard management. 
ix). SCQ 
This CPC relates to the efficient manner in which crew works among them to complete 
a task efficiently onboard ship. 
The nine CPCs have interdependencies. Table 4.3 illustrates the dependency between 
CPCs. The characteristic of CPCswc is influenced by the CPCASO, CPCMMI, CPCQAT, 
CPCCRT and CPCASP. The features of the CPCMMI, CPCAPP and CPCASP are influenced 
by a sole CPCASO. Meanwhile, the characteristic of CPCNSG is influenced by the 
CPCswc9 CPCMMI and CPCAPP, whereas the CPCQAT is influenced by the CPCswc, 
CPCMMI, CPCAPP, CPCNSG and CPCCRT. Finally, the feature of CPCSCQ is influenced by 
CPCASO and CPCASP. 
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Table 4.3 Dependency between CPCs (Adapted from Hollnagel, 1998) 
Principal CPC (Influenced CPC) Component CPCs (Influencing CPCs) 
SWC ASO, MMI, QAT, CRT and ASP 
NSG SWC, MMI and APP 
QAT SWC, MMI, APP, NSG and CRT 
SCQ ASO and ASP 
MMI ASO 
APP ASO 
ASP ASO 
When four out of five component CPCs within a CPC group have improved or reduced 
reliability effects then, the reliability effect of a principal CPC will be changed from the 
initial analysed non-significant reliability effect, to the similar reliability effects of the 
four component CPCs in the group. Otherwise, the principal CPC will retain the 
analysed non-significant reliability effect feature. This rule applies to the principal 
CPCswc and CPCQAT. Meanwhile, in the cases of principal CPCNSG and CPCscQ, two 
component CPCs within the group are to have the same improved or reduced reliability 
effects in order to allow for changes in the non-significant reliability effects of the 
principals CPCNSG and CPCscQ. Finally, no rules of changing the reliability effects 
apply to the principal CPCs CPCMMI, CPC, e, PP and CPCASP because they are dependent 
solely to CPCASO (Hollnagel, 1998). 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 New Advanced CREAM Framework 
CREAM can be applied by means of prospective or retrospective analysis. Prospective 
analysis deals with predictive application, typical design and Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA). Meanwhile, retrospective analysis refers to the identification of the 
root causes of an incident/accident investigation. The CREAM methodology also takes 
into account the dynamic interaction between human and machines. 
4.4.1.1 Prospective Analysis 
Prospective analysis is applied when qualitative performance prediction of CREAM is 
carried out prior to quantifying the risk associated with the human actions under a study. 
83 
Chapter 4- Use of CREAM to Facilitate HRA in Oil Tanker Operations 
It allows a good retrieval of qualitative information input for detailed quantitative 
prediction to follow. A performance prediction describes the development process and 
external environment of a scenario. Figure 4.6 illustrates the CREAM performance 
prediction methodology. Its main steps consist of task analysis, opportunities for error 
reduction and consideration of human performance on overall safety system. 
Application PSA 
(Task Analysis) 
Describe Context 
(CPCs) 
General Possible Error 
Modes 
Specify Probable Cause 
Quantitative Performance 
Prediction 
RCOs 
CBA 
Figure 4.6 CREAM Performance Predictions 
Describe 
Initiating 
Event 
Qualitative 
Performance 
Prediction 
Select Events for 
Further Analysis 
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Detailed explanation of the above framework is provided as follows: 
i). Task Analysis 
This step is to analyse a task and a situation such as a marine incident/accident. The 
analysis will include the consideration on organisations, technical systems, involved 
ship's crew and the control task to be carried out emphasising on all the systems and 
activities towards a safe maritime operation. 
ii). Context Description 
The context is described by means of CPCs through identifying the probable external 
and internal antecedents and the possible error modes. 
iii). Describing Initiating Event 
Task analysis from the first step would assist in carrying out the description of initiating 
events by means of suggesting events and conditions that should be instigated. This step 
will produce a set of initiating events for which a performance prediction can be made. 
iv). Qualitative Performance Prediction 
It utilises the classification scheme, as adapted by the context, to describe the expected 
development of an initiating event. A detailed classification scheme is originally 
developed in a maritime domain as shown in Appendix II. It allows the maritime 
incident/accident to be analysed in depth to ascertain the possible error modes and 
probable causes. 
v). Selecting Events for Further Analysis 
Based on the results of the qualitative performance prediction, a quantitative 
performance prediction can be carried out for some selected events. 
vi). Quantitative Performance Prediction 
A detailed qualitative performance needs to be carried out prior to conducting 
quantitative performance prediction. This step will produce a final action failure 
probability figure for the analysed event. 
vii). RCOs 
Upon completion of detailed qualitative performance prediction by means of specifying 
possible error modes and causes, appropriate RCOs can be identified and obtained to 
prevent the reoccurrence of the same incident/accident in the future. 
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viii). CBA 
The CBA determines the costs and benefits involved in implementing the RCOs 
identified above. This action enables the prioritisation of the RCOs for supporting 
decision making. 
4.4.1.2 Retrospective Analysis 
Detailed illustration of retrospective analysis is presented in Figure 4.7. 
Describe CPCs 
Describe General 
Possible Error 
Modes 
Describe General 
Probable 
Categories of 
Causes 
Description of 
Initiating 
Events 
n 
Identify Possible 
Genotypes 
Specify Probable 
Error Modes 
C Describe Individual Task Steps to be 
Analysed 
Probable Cause(s) 
of Analysed Event 
JL 
RCOs 
LL 
CBA 
Figure 4.7 Retrospective Analysis 
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The analysis begins with a description of initiating events by describing nine CPCs 
relevant to the incident/accident investigated. Each CPC is evaluated and possible error 
modes are determined. Detailed analysis of an accident is further carried out by 
referring to three groups of genotypes in determining the weight of each towards the 
nine CPCs. This allows more detailed clarification of the probable error causes of the 
accident. The retrospective analysis deals with traditional and conservative means of 
analysis. The two new features, the RCOs and CBA, added to the advanced CREAM 
framework are elaborated in the following sections. 
4.4.1.3 RCOs 
This step assists in determining regulatory measures and actions required to be carried 
out based on the outcome of detailed qualitative performance analysis taking into 
consideration the hazard elimination, mitigating the consequences and preventing the 
occurrence of same incident/accident. The quantitative risk analysis related to the RCO 
selection is provided in Chapter 7. All the intolerable risks from detailed qualitative 
analysis need to be reduced to an ALARP level. It can be carried out by evaluating the 
important networks in the management of oil tankers as described in Section 3.3.3 from 
the following aspects: 
a). Management aspect that deals with human and organisational factors such as the 
application of administrative controls including attending of a Bridge Resource 
Management course. 
b). Operational aspect that deals with human and organisational factors such as training 
crew in error management strategies to increase comprehension of critical situation 
onboard. 
c). Engineering aspect that deals with the technical factors. 
4.4.1.4 CBA 
CBA determines the costs and benefits involved in implementing the RCOs that are 
deduced from the detailed analysis of main task steps. The cost effectiveness of each 
RCO is compared with a base case. A base case reflects the existing levels of risk 
associated with the shipping activities before the implementation of any risk control. 
Consequently, the options are ranked in terms of their costs to achieve a unit reduction 
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of risk (Subramaniam, 2003). The costs include capital costs and items requiring 
replacement, labour costs, operating costs, installation and commissioning costs, 
maintenance costs, inspection, surveying and certification costs, off hire and delay 
costs, and training costs. The benefits of the implementation of the risk controls include 
reduced injuries and fatalities, reduced vessel casualties, reduced environmental damage 
including cleaning up costs, reduction of salvage costs, and increased availability of 
assets. 
A good guide of CBA can be illustrated by Table 4.4. The amounts provided as 
benchmarks are for illustrative purposes only. Appropriate cost and benefit benchmarks 
need to be determined and documented by different shipping organisations or 
companies. The benefit gained on the implementation of the RCOs can be divided into 
four categories. The maximum benefit achieved on the implementation of a RCO is 
categorised as `High', whereas the minimum benefit achieved as `Low'. Meanwhile, 
those benefits attained between maximum and minimum are categorised as `Medium' 
and `Moderate', whichever the benefits are close to the maximum or minimum 
respectively. The benefit is categorised as the following upon taking into consideration 
all the items listed above. 
a). If it is `High' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Outstanding" provided that less 
than £10,000 was spent to implement the selected RCO. 
b). If it is `High' then the outcome of applying CBA is categorised as "Good" provided 
that cost required to implement the selected RCO falls within the range of £10,001 and 
£ 100,000. 
c). If it is `High' then the outcome of applying CBA is only "Average" provided that 
more than £100,000 was spent to implement the selected RCO. 
d). If it is `Medium' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Good" provided that the 
budget spent to implement the selected RCO is less than £50,000. In addition, a 
qualitative comparison should distinctly show that some improvement can still be 
gained, compared to `High' categorisation. 
e). If it is `Medium' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Average" provided that 
amount spent to implement the selected RCO falls within the range of £50,001 and 
£ 100,000. 
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f). If it is `Medium' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Poor" provided that more 
than £100,000 was spent to implement the selected RCO. 
g). If it is `Moderate' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Good" provided that less 
than £ 10,000 was spent to implement the selected RCO. 
h). If it is `Moderate' then the outcome of applying CBA is only "Average" if the 
amount spent to implement the selected RCO falls within the range of £10,001 and 
£50,000. 
i). If it is `Moderate' then the outcome of applying CBA is categorised as "Poor" if the 
cost spent to implement the selected RCO was more than £50,000. 
j). If it is `Low' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Average" provided that less 
than £10,000 was spent to implement the selected RCO. 
k). If it is `Low' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Poor" provided that the budget 
spent to implement the selected RCO is between £10,001 and £100,000. In such a case 
the cost to implement the selected RCO is higher than the benefit gained. 
1). If it is `Low' then the outcome of applying CBA is "Very Poor" provided that more 
than £ 100,000 was spent to implement the selected RCO. 
Table 4.4 CBA Matrix 
ssessment 
Cost 
Benefit 
Less than 
£10,000 
£10,001 to 
£50,000 
£50,001 to 
£100,000 
£100,001 to 
£1,000,000 
High Outstanding Good Good Average 
Medium Good Good Average Poor 
Moderate Good Average Poor Poor 
Low Average Poor Poor Very Poor 
With reference to Table 4.4, assume the cost to implement the RCO from a detailed 
analysis of the main task steps is less than £10,000. Meanwhile the benefit gained from 
the application of the selected RCO is at a `Medium' level. Thus, it can be considered 
that the RCO is "Good" in terms of its cost effectiveness. If the cost of implementing a 
RCO is £51,000 and the benefit achieved is estimated at a `Low' level, then the RCO is 
considered "Poor". Table 4.3 can provide a guide to the shipboard management in 
determining which RCOs should be implemented. 
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The matters of costs and benefits are perceived differently by the various stakeholders 
in the shipping industry affected by risk management decisions. Stakeholders' feedback 
on the distribution of costs of reducing risk and the remaining risk should also be taken 
into consideration (Rosqvist and Tuominen, 2003). Furthermore, the acceptable risk 
level as per ALARP may itself change with time as the standard of safety increases. 
4.5 Case Studies 
The following case studies are focused on a qualitative analysis, whereas the 
quantitative analysis feature is provided in the following chapters. 
4.5.1 A Case Study of `Carina' 
The following case study of `Carina' incident is presented to illustrate the prospective 
application of CREAM, which can be used to identify possible sources of human errors 
for an incident that has not been encountered. A simulated incident is assumed to have 
taken place onboard `Carina' while she was discharging crude oil at one of the US Gulf 
of Mexico ports. 
4.5.1.1 Chronicle of `Carina' 
M. T. CARINA, an ABS classed double hull tanker of 16 years old was discharging 
crude oil at one of the US Gulf of Mexico oil terminal. While the vessel was 
discharging in daytime, it was found that two branches of cargo tanks inert gas valves 
were in a closed position. The vessel was using non return butterfly valves. The closing 
mechanism takes in the form of a disc. The disc is located in the centre of the inert gas 
pipe, passing through the disc is a rod connected to the lever of the valve. The valve can 
be opened and closed by turning the lever at an angle of 90 degrees. The valve could 
close by itself due to vibration or poor locking arrangement or even due to poor 
maintenance. The presence of inert gas inside the cargo tank ensures that the cargo tank 
atmosphere is retained at a lesser percentage of oxygen content to prevent any 
combustion that could lead to tank explosion. Therefore, discharging crude oil without 
having a positive supply of inert gas could result in cargo tank to collapse and 
subsequently results with an explosion. It was found during routine deck cargo watch 
that both inert gas valves of four wing cargo tanks were in a closed position. Upon 
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seeing the status, the deck cargo watch keepers, immediately, opened the valves and had 
prevented an immediate danger from occurring. 
4.5.1.2 Detailed Analysis of Main Task Steps 
The following comprises the detailed analysis of the `Carina' incident utilising 
CREAM illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
i). The initiating event was the delay in noticing the status of the inert gas valves as to 
whether they were in an open or a close position. 
ii). Therefore, the most likely Error Mode was timing. The specific consequent was a 
delay in noticing and awareness on the status of cargo tank inert gas valves. 
iii). With reference to General and Specific Antecedents for Error Modes in Table 
AII. 19, there are six possible general antecedents and two specific antecedents. The six 
general antecedents are Inattention, Inadequate plan, Inadequate procedures, 
Communication failure, Faulty diagnosis and Observation missed. Meanwhile the two 
specific antecedents of Omission and Trapping Error can be disregarded due to 
irrelevancy to the initiating event. 
The delays in noticing and reporting the status of cargo tank inert gas valves could have 
led to vessel explosion and human casualties. Tables 4.5,4.6 and 4.7 present the CPCs, 
probable Error Causes and possible Error Modes for the `Carina' incident respectively. 
In Table 4.5, all the nine CPCs were analysed in detail to produce an evaluation on each 
CPC. For example, on the CPCASO, failure to frequently monitor the status of inert gas 
branch valves of each cargo tank reflects an inefficient shipboard organisation. With 
reference to Table 4.5 six of the CPCs, the CPCASO, CPCsWc9 CPCAPP, CPCNSG, CPCQAT 
and CPCASP fall into reduced reliability effects. Meanwhile, the remaining two CPCs, 
CPCMM! and CPCsCQ fall into non-significant effect on human performance. The 
CPCCRT is not relevant for the case study. With reference to the ratio application of 
improved and reduced reliabilities for the `Carina' incident in Figure 4.3, it can be 
deduced that the ship's crew acted in a `Scrambled' control mode. 
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Table 4.5 CPCs for the `Carina' Incident 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms 
ASO Failure of monitoring to ensure that Very Efficient/Efficient/ 
all the cargo tanks inert gas branch Inefficient/Deficient 
valves are kept in open position 
during discharging cargo operations. 
SWC Cargo operations could distract the Advantages/Compatible/ 
shipboard working condition. Incompatible 
MMI Manual monitoring of inert gas Supportive/Adequate/Tolerable/ 
branch valves to indicate open/shut Inappropriate 
position can be carried out. 
APP Lack of procedures to monitor the Appropriate/Acceptable/ 
status of inert gas branch valves while Inappropriate 
cargo operation is in progress. 
NSG Vessel was having a vetting Less than actual capacity/ 
inspection along with discharging Matching current capacity/ 
cargo operations. More than actual capacity 
QAT Continuous cargo operations could Adequate/Temporarily 
distract monitoring the status of inert inadequate/Continuously 
gas branch valves. inade uate 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant for the Night time (Unadjusted)/Day 
case. time (Adjusted)/Night time 
(Adjusted) 
ASP Lack of training and awareness on the Adequate, vast experience/ 
importance of monitoring inert gas Adequate, limited experience/ 
branch valves. Inade uate experience 
SCQ Inefficient crew management during Very Efficient/Efficient/ 
cargo operations in port. Inefficient/Deficient 
In Table 4.6, identification of CPCs in relation to the three genotypes was carried out. 
Ticks denote the importance of a particular CPC to the ticked type of genotypes. Double 
ticks represent more weight than single ones. For example, the CPCASO has more 
importance/weight to organisation related genotype than CPCswc does. Upon 
meticulous analysis of CPCs along with identification of various genotypes, probable 
error causes are comprehended. Thus, detailed analysis of Table 4.6 assists in producing 
an informative Table 4.7 in which each of the eight error modes is clarified to determine 
the probability of each error mode that caused the incident. Finally, Figure 4.8 illustrates 
the analysis of the `Carina' incident in a graphical presentation for ease of 
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understanding of the analysed incident. The analysis begins with Table AII. 1 which 
presents an error mode of timing which describes the late action of the crew to inspect 
the inert gas branch valves. This is followed by analysis of Table All. 19 that presents 
six specific consequents. On further analysis of each specific consequent, the general 
and specific antecedents are obtained. The specific antecedent becomes the attributed 
cause and result in the end point of the analysis. An example of analysis on `Inattention' 
specific consequent is described as follows. From Table AII. 19, following the 
`Inattention' consequent, Table AII. 23 is analysed to derive `Adverse ambient 
conditions' general antecedent. The analysis is continued to Table AII. 32 under 
`Adverse ambient conditions', to select `Distraction' of general antecedent. Finally, 
`Poor cargo planning' is derived as the specific antecedent, which becomes the 
attributed cause of the incident. A similar approach of analysis is performed on the 
remaining five specific consequents. 
Table 4.6 Probable Error Causes for the `Carina' Incident 
CPCs Person 
related 
genotype 
Technology 
related 
genotype 
Organisation 
related 
genotype 
ASO: Inefficient    
SWC: Incompatible    
MMI: Tolerable    
APP: Inappropriate    
NSG: More than Capacity   
QAT: Continuously 
inadequate 
 
CRT: Daytime 
ASP: Inadequate 
experience 
   
SCQ: Inefficient   
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Table 4.7 Possible Error Modes for the `Carina' Incident 
Error Mode Points of Clarification Possibility 
Timing Failure of the cargo watchkeepers 
to frequently monitor the status of 
inert gas branch valves during Possible 
discharging operations. 
Failure in verifying the status of 
Duration inert gas branch valves in time Possible 
could have resulted in cargo tank 
explosion. 
Level of force is not a parameter 
Force in this incident investigation. Impossible 
Distance/Magnitude is not a 
Distance/ parameter in this type of incident Impossible 
Magnitude investigation. 
The speed of action in opening the 
Speed inert gas branch valves is Possible 
important for this event scenario. 
Direction is not a parameter in 
Direction this type of incident investigation. Impossible 
Object is not a parameter in this 
Wrong Object nature of incident investigation. Impossible 
The sequence of action in opening 
Sequence the inert gas branch valves Possible 
immediately is important for this 
event scenario. 
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Cargo tank inert 
gas branch 
valves in shut 
position during 
discharging 
operation 
Timing: 
Too late 
AII. 1 
Inattention Inadequate 
Plan 
AII. 19 AII. 19 
Inadequate Communication 
Procedures Failure 
AII. 19 AII. 19 
Faulty 
Diagnosis 
AII. 19 
Observation 
Missed 
AII. 19 
Adverse Distraction Design Inattention Inadequate 
Ambient Failure Procedures 
Conditions 
AII. 23/32 AII. 22 AII. 26 AII. 29 AII. 21 
SMS Presentation 
Distraction Inadequate Failure Failure 
Training 
AII. 26 AII. 29 
AII. 32 AII. 22 
Poor 
Cargo 
Planning 
AII. 32 
Figure 4.8 Analysis of `Carina' Incident 
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iv). RCOs 
The RCOs that can be taken into consideration to prevent reoccurrence of this incident 
can be divided into three aspects. 
a). Management aspect 
The shore management should implement a policy that provides a periodical checking 
of the cargo tank's inert gas branch valves. Ideally, the whole cargo tanks' inert gas 
valve system should be dismantled during vessels drydocking and verified for its 
integrity. 
b). Operational aspect 
Continuous training of crew onboard oil tankers is to be conducted to emphasise the 
significance of proper use of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves. All new crew 
onboard should be provided with the training along with a vessel familiarisation 
briefing. 
c). Engineering aspect 
The shore management should ensure that at the shipbuilding phase itself, an oil tanker 
is built with a good structural design taking into consideration the shipboard operational 
needs. Thus, much better and more reliable design of a locking arrangement of cargo 
tanks' inert gas branch valves should be constructed. In addition, an appropriate means 
of a warning system such as an audible alarm, visual light warning signals, or the 
combination of the two may be provided in the cargo control room on the status of the 
cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves. 
v). CBA 
The incident could result in a structural failure of the oil tanker leading to oil spill and 
even human casualties. The following elucidation by comparing cost of oil spill and cost 
of training officers and crew helps to determine and select suitable RCOs. It also further 
strengthens the need of an oil tanker crew training regime to overcome and prevent any 
oil spill in the future (Subramaniam, 2003). 
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A). Cost of Oil Spills 
The following are among the factors that determine the cost of oil tanker spills: 
a). Type of oil spilled. 
Light crude oil tends to evaporate easily. Thus, it does not persist on the surface of the 
sea. In addition, if rough seas are present, the light crude oil tends to disperse and 
dissipate naturally. Meanwhile, heavy crude oil such as heavy fuel oil is highly 
persistent when spilt resulting in the oil travelling great distances far from the original 
spilt location. Therefore, clean-up cost for heavy crude oil is much higher than the one 
for light crude oil. It is mainly due to the large areas covered by the heavy crude oil, 
followed by the oil characteristics of being difficult to clean. 
b). Location of oil spill 
The location of oil spill will determine the degree of damage to the environment and 
economic resources. It also determines the extent of the clean-up operation required. 
State of sea, wind direction and speed, tidal range, currents, depth of water and distance 
of coast from the location of oil spill will determine the extent of coastal contamination 
and clean-up response. 
c). Amount of oil spilt 
This factor works parallel with the location of oil spilt. More amount of oil spilt will 
result in much greater damage to the environment and far more extensive clean-up 
operation. The location of spill, however, plays a role in determining the cost. A good 
example is of the oil tanker spill from M. T. Castillo De Bellver off South Africa in 
1983. The tanker spilt 252,000 tonnes of crude oil but the clean-up and damage costs 
were not much due to the fact that the spill did not contaminate any coastlines. 
d). Economic resources at risk at the oil spilt area 
Compensation to be paid for affecting the environment and the economic resources at 
the location of oil spill such as the fishing industry and the tourism industry could 
further increase heavily the cost of an oil tanker spill. 
97 
Chapter 4- Use of CREAM to Facilitate HRA in Oil Tanker Operations 
e). Clean-up Cost 
Clean-up cost of an oil spill depends on the extent of damage the oil spill had caused. In 
addition, the location of oil spill will also determine the clean-up cost. Among the few 
factors that will be accounted for in the clean-up cost are damages to roads and piers 
during clean-up operation, expenses related to the disposal of the recovered oil and 
residues, cost of personnel utilised for clean-up operation and, clean-up and restoration 
of the damaged properties. 
B). Cost of Training Officers and Crew 
The implementation of STCW 1995 results in training being a way of life in the 
shipping industry. Hence, the shore management is obliged to provide various training 
courses to the officers and crew onboard oil tankers. The crew competence increases by 
receiving appropriate training, thus, resulting in less shipboard operational errors. This 
will, subsequently reduce the occurrence probability of oil spill. 
One oil spill tanker incident could destroy the image and reputation of the tanker owner 
that has taken decades and millions of dollars to build up. Furthermore, the large 
amount of money required to compensate due to the oil spill alone is enough to reflect 
clearly that whatever costs spent on training of crew onboard oil tankers will be the 
advantage to the tanker owners or the ship management company. In addition, 
continuous training and retaining same crew in the fleet will produce a safety culture 
within a fleet and subsequently, in the maritime community itself. Such well trained 
crew will play a large role in the future of the oil tankers' safety leading to lesser 
occurrence of oil spills. With reference to Table 4.4, comparison can be made between 
the costs required for masters and senior officers to attend oil tanker cargo handling 
simulator courses and the costs required to repair the damaged shell plating of cargo 
tanks due to possible explosion. The loss of the affected oil tanker from service while 
carrying out repair of cargo tanks also needs to be taken into consideration when 
determining the costs. 
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4.5.2 A Case Study of `Prestige' 
The following case study of `Prestige' accident is presented to illustrate the 
retrospective analysis use of CREAM. The accident occurred to `Prestige' while sailing 
off the West Coast of Galicia on November 13,2002. All the data available related to 
the accident had been collected and restricted to the ABS analysis. 
4.5.2.1 Chronicle of `Prestige' 
On November 13,2002, `Prestige', a 26 years old Bahamian registered Ship to Ship oil 
transfer (STS) ship and ABS classed single hull tanker, carrying 77 000 tonnes of heavy 
oil developed a substantial starboard list. She was underway in heavy seas and high 
winds in the region of Cape Finisterre, between 25 to 30 nautical miles, off the coast of 
Galicia in the northwest of Spain (ABS, 2003). A large crack was found in the starboard 
side of the hull. Vessel lost her main propulsion due to list and began to drift. Twenty 
four out of twenty seven crewmembers were evacuated by helicopter from the Spanish 
authority. The remaining onboard, Master, Chief Engineer and Chief Officer managed 
to counter flood port side ballast tanks and reduced the list to about 3 degrees starboard 
list. The vessel, however, was still adrift. On November 14,2003, SMIT, a Dutch 
salvage company, took control of the vessel upon a request from `Prestige' owner and 
insurer. Two of the SMIT's tugs, the Rio De Vigo and Sertosa 32 with difficulty 
managed to secure towlines onboard `Prestige'. The ship was towed out to sea into 
heavy weather away from Spanish coast. Meanwhile, discussions were going on to find 
a safe haven for the vessel to lighten its cargo to another vessel, the condition however, 
deteriorated onboard. Consequently, `Prestige' structure gave away and collapsed; 
subsequently the vessel broke into two and sank about 133 nautical miles off the coast 
of Spain on November 19,2002. Prior to the accident, she was engaged heavily on STS 
trade, which includes 174 oil transfers from June 2001 to October 2002 (ABS, 2003). 
4.5.2.2 Detailed Analysis of Main Task Steps 
The detailed analysis of the `Prestige' accident using CREAM retrospective analysis is 
described as follows: 
i). The initiating event is the delays in taking the vessel to a safe haven to offload the 
remaining cargo. 
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ii). Therefore, the most likely error mode was timing. The specific consequent was a 
delay. 
iii). With reference to General and Specific Antecedents for Error Modes in Table 
AII. 19, there were six possible general antecedents and two specific antecedents. The 
six general antecedents are Inattention, Inadequate plan, Inadequate procedures, 
Communication failure, Faulty diagnosis and Observation missed. The two specific 
antecedents of Omission and Trapping Error can be disregarded due to their irrelevance 
to the initiating event. 
The delays of the coastal authorities at the vicinity where the vessel was drifting, to 
provide permission for the vessel to be brought in for removal of the remaining cargoes 
safely at a secured safe haven resulted in the vessel finally breaking and sinking. Tables 
4.8,4.9 and 4.10 present the CPCs, probable Error Causes and possible Error Modes for 
the `Prestige' accident respectively. In Table 4.8, all the nine CPCs were analysed in 
detail to produce evaluation on each CPC. For an example on the CPCswc, the presence 
of rough weather, which does not provide reasonably good condition, to deal with the 
accident reflects an incompatible working condition. Six of the CPCs, CPCASO, 
CPCswc, CPCAPP, CPCNSG, CPCQAT and CPCASP fall into reduced reliability effect. 
Meanwhile, the remaining two CPCs, CPCMMI, and CPCscQ fall into non-significant 
effect on human performance. The CPCCRT is not relevant for the case study. The ratio 
can be determined of improved and reduced reliabilities for the `Prestige' accident with 
reference to Figure 4.3. Then it can be concluded that the ship's crew acted in a 
`Scrambled' control mode. Finally, a graphical presentation of analysis of the `Prestige' 
accident is shown in Figure 4.9. The analysis is carried out using Tables in Appendix II 
with a similar approach to the analysis for `Carina' incident. 
Table 4.8 CPCs for the `Prestige' Accident 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms 
ASO Failure of getting the vessel to a safe Very Efficient/Efficient/ 
haven does reflect a reasonable level Inefficient/Deficient 
of inefficiency in management 
SWC Rough weather does not provide Advantages/Compatible/ 
reasonably good condition to deal Incompatible 
with the accident 
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MMI Shipboard operation was reasonably Supportive/Adequate/Tolerable 
carried out to overcome the /Inappropriate 
emergency listing of the vessel 
APP Vessel had the standard contingency Appropriate/Acceptable/ 
plan for quick action to alleviate the Inappropriate 
flooding 
NSG It is the case for any emergency Less than actual capacity/ 
situation in general Matching current capacity/More 
than actual capacity 
QAT Quick action to get the vessel to safe Adequate/Temporarily 
haven is vital due to the encountered inadequate/Continuously 
rough weather inadequate 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant for the Night time (Unadjusted)/Day time 
case (Adjusted)/Night time (Adjusted) 
ASP Crew onboard are qualified and had Adequate, vast experience/ 
received standard training as required Adequate, limited experience/ 
by STCW 1995 Inadequate experience 
SCQ Crew had not responded well under Very Efficient/Efficient/ 
stress Inefficient/Deficient 
Table 4.9 Probable Error Causes for the `Prestige' Accident 
CPCs Person 
related 
genotype 
Technology 
related 
genotype 
Organisation 
related 
genotype 
ASO: Inefficient  
SWC: Incompatible   
MMI: Tolerable V/   
APP: Inappropriate   
NSG: More than Capacity 
V/ 
I 
V/ 
QAT: Continuously 
Inadequate 
  
CRT: Daytime 
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ASP: Inadequate 
experience 
 
V/ V/ 
SCQ: Inefficient  / 
Table 4.10 Possible Error Modes for the `Prestige' Accident 
Error Mode Points of Clarification Possibility 
Failure of the vessel brought to 
safe haven in time along with 
Timing longer exposure to the rough Possible 
weather subsequently resulted in 
the sinking of the vessel 
Duration of action e. g. upright the 
Duration vessel upon listing is not Impossible 
considered as important factor for 
this event scenario 
level of force is not a parameter 
Force in this accident investigation Impossible 
Distance/Magnitude is not a 
Distance/ parameter in this type of accident Impossible 
Magnitude investigation 
The speed of action to get the 
Speed vessel protected within the safe Possible 
haven is important for this event 
scenario 
Direction is not a parameter in 
Direction this type of accident investigation Impossible 
Object is not a parameter in this 
Wrong Object nature of accident investigation Impossible 
The sequence of action in the 
Sequence recovery procedure upon flooding Possible 
and towing is important for this 
event scenario 
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Delay in Getting 
`Prestige' 
to Safe Haven 
Timing: 
Too Late 
AII. 1 
Inadequate Communication Faulty Observation 
Inattention Inadequate Procedures Failure Diagnosis Missed 
Plan 
AII. 19/23 All. 19/22 AIL 19 All. 19 All. 19 AIL 19 
Adverse Insufficient Inadequate Inattention Inadequate Faulty 
Ambient Knowledge Quality Procedures Diagnosis 
Condition Control 
AII. 32 AII. 22 AII. 26 AII. 29 AII. 21 AII. 20 
Distraction Inadequate SMS Lack of Multiple Lack of 
Training Failure system Disturbances system 
knowledge knowledge 
AII. 32 AII. 22 AII. 26 AII. 20 AII. 2I AII. 20 
Heavy 
Weather 
AII. 32 
Figure 4.9 Analysis of `Prestige' Accident 
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iv). RCOs 
The RCOs that can be taken into consideration to prevent reoccurrence of this accident 
can be divided into three aspects (Subramaniam, 2003). 
a). Management aspect 
It is required to implement a policy that ensures all the ship officers involved with cargo 
operations to attend training on ship stability and cargo operations including training on 
a cargo operation simulator course. The shore management should implement a policy 
that stipulates the criteria on the state of weather at which Ship to Ship (STS) cargo 
transfer operation can be carried out. The entire mooring masters and masters onboard 
vessels engaged with STS activities should be well trained in STS operations. Doubling 
up master or mooring master rank engaged in STS operations could be one way of 
training on this matter. Feedback from the senior master or mooring master on the 
performance of the doubling up junior master or mooring master to the management 
should exist. The shore management should ensure that at the shipbuilding phase itself, 
an oil tanker is built with a good structural design. The shipbuilders should take into 
account the stress concentration factors while building a vessel. Stringent inspection 
during surveys should be carried out on the vessel's structure. This could allow an early 
detection of any fatigue sign of the structure. The shore management should have in 
place some means of monitoring corrosion of oil tanker structures. Periodical inspection 
of ballast tanks is a good example. In addition, continuous follow up on the monitoring 
and repair works carried out on these structures are to be closely examined and well 
documented. The shore management should have a policy that all oil tankers are 
equipped with spare sets of gas detecting or measuring equipment to be used onboard. 
Furthermore, various training on fire fighting onboard oil tankers should be provided to 
all officers and crew serving on oil tankers. The shore management should have a policy 
that ensures all fire fighting equipment spare parts are sufficiently stored onboard oil 
tankers. Technical or safety inspection carried out by superintendents onboard oil 
tankers can enhance this aspect. 
b). Operational aspect 
The master should verify the stress condition of the vessel prior to its departure from 
any port. A copy of the report on the vessel's stress condition while departing port 
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should be transmitted to the head office. Vessel stresses should be monitored at all times 
during cargo operation while the vessel is in port. The senior officers should provide 
guidance on this matter to the junior officers. All the crew involved on board STS 
tankers should be well versed in STS operations. This could only be achieved by 
ensuring that well experienced STS tanker crew sail with less experienced crew, 
running the ship operation onboard STS oil tankers. This shipboard training is an 
effective way that allows the experienced senior officers to pass their professional skills 
to their subordinates onboard. Thus, manning of crew onboard tankers should be well 
planned by the shore management. In addition, a good preventative management 
system, in which the planned maintenance program is carried out on all tanker 
operational equipment periodically supported with good emergency repairs of 
equipment if broken, can be an alternative to prevent operational errors in STS oil 
tankers. A dedicated senior officer onboard oil tankers should diligently carry out water 
ballast tank inspections. The visual inspection of ballast tanks should be planned in such 
a way that all the ballast tanks are inspected thoroughly within a six-month period. This 
allows the detection of any ship structure failure at an early stage. A proper 
documentation on the inspections should be recorded and filed. A copy of the inspection 
reports needs to be sent to the head office for superintendent's review. This will ensure 
continuous follow up on the state of ballast tanks and its structure on any oil tanker 
within the company's fleet of vessels. 
Application of better paint coatings to prevent or reduce corrosion should be practiced 
onboard oil tankers. There are significant difficulties in reinstating an effective coating 
system if the ballast tank coating failure occurs before the end of the projected 
operational life (OCIMF, 2003). Once significant ballast tank coating failure is 
experienced, the rate of corrosion on exposed areas will accelerate resulting in extensive 
replacement of steelwork. Therefore, it is prudent to ensure that good ballast tank 
coatings are applied initially at the stage of building the vessel itself. In addition, close 
monitoring of the level of corrosion onboard oil tankers can prevent structural failure 
resulting from corrosion. The presence of hydrocarbon gases in the ballast tanks of oil 
tankers especially, the double hull tankers should routinely be monitored during loaded 
passage. Any presence of hydrocarbon gases in the ballast tank could be the initial sign 
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of a tank bulkhead structural failure. This can even result in fire or explosion onboard 
double hulled oil tankers. 
Pump room atmosphere should be checked every day at all times whether the oil tanker 
is at sea or in port. Pump room ventilators should be kept in good working order. Proper 
maintenance on all the running parts of ventilators should be carried out periodically as 
recommended in the manufacturers' manual. All equipment used to detect presence of 
gasses onboard tankers should be kept in a good working condition at all times. In 
addition, sufficient spare parts of the detecting equipment and gas sensors should be 
kept onboard. The expiry dates of these sensors also need to be closely monitored. A 
monthly inventory of all the gas detecting equipment spare parts and sensors is required 
to ensure sufficient spares onboard at all times. Checklists and hot work permits should 
be utilised whenever carrying out any hot work onboard oil tankers. Furthermore, a 
head office approval should be requested prior to any hot work to be carried out on deck 
or in the ballast tanks. Fire extinguishers onboard should be routinely checked and 
tested. All the fire hoses, fire hydrants, fire nozzles including their spares are to be kept 
in a good working condition at all times. 
c). Engineering aspect 
Every vessel should be fitted with a reliable continuous ship stress monitoring 
equipment such as a loadicator. A spare set of all the replaceable parts of the loadicator 
should be carried at all times onboard an oil tanker. All oil tankers involved with STS 
operation should use Yokohama fenders as recommended in STS Transfer Guide 
(Petroleum) OCIMF (1997). Provisions can be made to fit fender cradles and allocate 
fenders onboard the oil tanker. This should be planned at the shipbuilding stage itself. 
Those older vessels can get the fender cradles to be fitted at dry dock. Furthermore, the 
location of fairleads, chokes and bitts on deck are also, important in proper STS 
mooring operations. Thus, the shore management should consult with a shipyard to 
ensure that a tanker meant to operate in STS trade is built by considering the following: 
1). The location of chokes, fairleads and bitts on deck. 
2). The capacity and the winch power fitted on board designated for lifting the 
Yokohama fenders. 
3). Fitting of fender cradles onboard for carrying own Yokohama fenders. 
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4). Sufficient number of mooring tails onboard for quick replacement if the used one 
parted during STS operation. 
The shore management should implement a policy that provides a scheme where 
periodical hull thickness measurement is carried out on every oil tanker based on the 
vessel's nature of trade regions and its age. Hull scanning of ageing tankers provides 
owners and managers with an effective tool to optimise the requirements for steel 
renewal. The shore management could also fit equipment such as hull stress monitoring 
system onboard vessel to provide data on the level of stress encountered during the 
vessel's service. This could allow any badly affected structures to be refitted while 
drydocking the vessel. The fitting of sacrificing anodes in ballast tanks should be 
practiced onboard oil tankers. The conditions of anodes are to be closely monitored and 
documented together with the ballast tank inspection report. Heavily wasted anodes are 
to be renewed promptly. All the fire fighting equipment onboard oil tanker should be 
kept in a good working condition. All the smoke and heat detectors fitted onboard 
should be tested weekly and recorded on a test log. The automatic sprinkler system 
should be tested monthly to ensure that the nozzles are not choked. Foam samples 
should be tested annually from fixed high and low expansion foam fire fighting systems 
filling tanks. A weekly test should be carried out on all the fixed fire detection and fire 
alarm systems fitted onboard. Fire pumps should be kept in good working condition. 
Maintenance on fire pumps should be well planned. Tankers fitted with a fixed carbon 
dioxide (C02) release system should ensure that all the CO2 cylinders are weighed and 
kept in a good working condition. Nozzles that are used for releasing CO2 should be 
tested routinely with compressed air to ensure that they are not choked. Engine room 
and pump room CO2 release alarms should be tested monthly to verify their working 
conditions. Fixed gas detecting equipment fitted onboard should be tested weekly to 
ensure that the detecting gas sensors are working within the safe parameters to detect 
gasses. Inert gas plants should be kept well maintained at all times. Maintenance of the 
Inert Gas System (IGS) should be well planned and sufficient spare parts should be kept 
onboard. 
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v). CBA 
Well elaborated clarification in Section 4.5.1.2 part (v) narrates that a huge amount of 
capital required to compensate any oil spill is adequate and provides a rational reason to 
implement RCOs described above to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents in the 
future. It is possible to make a comparison using Table 4.4, between the costs required 
to carry out above listed RCOs and the costs required to repair the ship if she was 
salvaged successfully to a port of refuge. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The significance of addressing human cognitive functions and context in the human 
error analysis leads to the creation and development of CREAM. The CREAM 
framework provides a practical approach to its prospective and retrospective analysis. 
The successful application of the CREAM principle in the analysis of aviation and 
nuclear power plant incidents/accidents triggers its use to the maritime domain. In 
addition to applying the methodology, two new phases of RCOs and CBA are added to 
a newly advanced CREAM framework. Therefore, the new framework of maritime 
CREAM not only finds the causes of incident/accident investigated but also provides 
the corresponding solutions to the causes in a cost effective way. Furthermore, changes 
in the classification schemes including renaming of a few CPCs, introduction of a CBA 
matrix and addition of classification categories have made CREAM more adaptable to 
the maritime domain. Case studies of `Carina' and `Prestige' incident/accident are used 
to demonstrate that CREAM could be applied to deal with human error analysis related 
to maritime incidents/accidents. The issues about CPC dependencies, HEP 
quantification, CBA analysis and RCO ranking, which as essential parts complement 
the framework, will be investigated in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Reprioritisation of CPCs in CREAM 
Using a DEMATEL Technique 
Summary 
In Chapter 4, an advanced CREAM has been outlined in detail. Lack of CREAM 
research studies on relationships among CPCs is addressed in this chapter. It presents a 
novel approach using a DEMATEL technique to reprioritise CPCs in the CREAM. 
Qualitative analysis is used to describe linguistic terms of CPCs in CREAM. Each 
linguistic term of CPCs is related to a particular contextual effect on the performance 
reliability. The resultant number of effects of CPCs will provide the state of the 
COCOM of CREAM. The interdependencies of CPCs are taken into account when the 
effects of principal CPCs in designated CPC groups fall into non-significant reliability 
effect. A careful literature review indicates that few previous studies analyse the 
prioritisation of CPCs, suggesting that all the CPCs are of different importance. This has 
led to the introduction of the proposed approach using a DEMATEL model, taking 
subjective judgments of decision makers into consideration, which allows for 
reprioritisation of CPCs within the designated CPC groups. This innovative approach 
provides an effective solution for decision makers to determine which CPCs need to be 
emphasised to prevent a similar incident/accident from occurring. The proposed model 
is demonstrated by a case study and validated using a sensitivity analysis. 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces a novel approach using a DEMATEL technique to reprioritise 
CPCs in the CREAM. The specification of CPCs takes into account the objective 
circumstances of an incident and their possible favourable or unfavourable influence on 
the occurrence process of the incident. There are nine CPCs, which are described by 
variable linguistics, in CREAM. The variable linguistics are classified into three sets in 
terms of their effects on human reliability performance, which include improved 
reliability effect, non-significant reliability effect and reduced reliability effect. The 
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state of the COCOM of CREAM, which concentrates on predicting the dynamic 
equilibrium between human actions and system response, is determined by the total 
resultant number of effects of CPCs derived from a comprehensive qualitative analysis 
(Konstandinidou et al., 2006). The COCOM has four characteristic control modes: 
Scrambled, Opportunistic, Tactical and Strategic modes. The interdependencies and 
relationships among the CPCs can be shown distinctly with nine CPCs being separated 
into seven groups and each group being affiliated with two to six CPCs. The 
interdependencies among the CPCs in a designated CPC groups is illustrated in Table 
4.3. 
Whilst carrying out a qualitative analysis, if a principal CPC's effect falls into non- 
significant reliability effect, its relevant component CPCs' effects within the designated 
CPC group needs to be observed. The state of the principal CPC is determined on the 
basis of the component CPCs' effects within the designated CPC group. Some of the 
previous studies analyse the prioritisation of CPCs, suggesting that all the CPCs are of 
different importance (Marseguerra et al., 2007). However, no prioritisation of CPCs 
exists within the designated CPC groups, suggesting that the CPCs are of equal 
importance and influence within the particular designated CPC group. This has led to 
the introduction of the proposed approach using the DEMATEL model that would allow 
for reprioritisation of CPCs within the designated CPC groups, taking subjective 
judgments of decision makers into account. Additionally, the reprioritisation of CPCs 
takes into account the interdependencies of CPCs within the designated CPC groups. 
The proposed approach provides a better solution in knowing the relationships among 
the CPCs rather than the traditional CREAM, which relies merely on the 
interdependencies of CPCs in determining the effects of the principal CPCs in the 
designated CPC groups. The traditional CREAM leaves a gap in illustrating 
. relationships between the CPCs. The proposed 
innovative approach using the 
DEMATEL model plays a significant role in providing a comprehensive illustration of 
relationships and interdependencies among CPCs within the designated CPC groups. 
Detailed knowledge of the relationships and interdependencies among the CPCs would 
provide decision makers with an alternative of determining an appropriate CPC that 
needs to be improved to prevent similar incidents/accidents from reoccurring. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Overview on DEMATEL 
The DEMATEL technique was developed by the Geneva Research Centre of the 
Battelle Memorial Institute (Fontela & Gabus, 1976; Gabus and Fontela, 1973). This 
technique allows the involved factors of a system or subsystem to be separated into 
cause group and effect group (Wu, 2008). The causes illustrate the reasons why 
something occurred whereas the effects are the results of the occurrence. The 
DEMATEL technique presents the cause and effect groups within a system or 
subsystem by applying matrices and digraphs to visualise the structure of complicated 
causal relationships. This technique can be used to develop the relationships and 
interdependencies among CPCs in CREAM. It is based on a graph theory and results in 
a causal diagram that illustrates the causal relationships among CPCs within a 
designated CPC group. The DEMATEL has been successfully applied in many fields 
including maritime operations (Topcu, 2008), business (Chiu et al., 2006; Hu et al., 
2009; Lin and Tzeng, 2009; Noori and Amiri, 2009; Tsai and Chou, 2009; Tseng, 
2009a; 2009b; Wu and Lee, 2007; Wu, 2008), engineering (Hori and Shimizu, 1999; 
Seyed-Hosseini et al., 2006), safety management systems (Liou et al., 2007; Liou et al., 
2008), education (Tzeng et al., 2007) and social studies (Tamura et al., 2002; Tamura 
and Akazawa, 2005). The DEMATEL technique could assist HRA analysts to visualise 
and simplify components of a complex system or subsystem via a series of simple 
illustrations of causal diagrams and digraphs. This technique has been preferred to 
distinguish the relationships of the CPCs within a designated CPC group due to (Lin 
and Wu, 2008); (Lin and Tzeng, 2009): 
(a). Its simplicity in illustrating the complex relationships via a simple causal diagram. 
(b). Its wide application in many domains. 
(c). Its reliability in producing consistent results of causal diagrams. 
(d). Its capability of allowing for a large quantity of criteria to be considered. 
(e). Its capability of accommodating human subjective judgments in determining the 
relationships among the components within a complex system or subsystem. 
5.3 Methodology 
Most of the research in CREAM was focused on quantification aspects, which included 
the HRA quantification using fuzzy approaches (Konstandinidou et al., 2006; 
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Marseguerra et al., 2007), using probabilistic techniques (Fujita and Hollnagel, 2004; 
Kim et al., 2006), using CREAM prospective quantification (He et al., 2008) and some 
quantitative developments in CREAM (Marseguerra et al., 2006). This leaves a void in 
the research on relationships of CPCs in CREAM, despite the fact that CPCs play an 
important role and are a core element in the CREAM. The developed novel approach of 
using a DEMATEL technique to illustrate relationships and interdependencies of CPCs 
could reduce the gap left in CREAM research in terms of understanding and prioritising 
CPCs. The general framework of the proposed model is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
Initially a digraph is constructed to demonstrate the directed relationships of CPCs 
within a designated CPC group on completion of a qualitative analysis of CREAM 
modelling an incident. This is followed by solving various matrices, beginning with a 
pairwise comparison of CPCs within the designated CPC groups to a final total relation 
matrix. Finally, a causal diagram is produced to illustrate distinctly the relationships and 
interdependencies of CPCs within the designated CPC group. The research 
methodology is elaborated in detail in the following subsections. 
Tabulated List of CPCs 
from Qualitative Analysis 
of CREAM 
DEMATEL 
Digraph Pairwise Comparison 
Direct Relation Matrix 
Causal Diagram 
-]4 
R+CR-C 
11 Normalised Direct 
Relation Matrix 
CPCs' Reprioritisation 
Total Relation Matrix 
Figure 5.1 The General Framework of the Proposed DEMATEL Model 
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The proposed framework can be described as follows: 
(a). Step 1- Obtain a tabulated list of CPCs from detailed qualitative analysis of 
CREAM in an incident/accident. This table facilitates the experts' judgments whilst 
performing pairwise comparisons in terms of the influence among the CPCs within a 
designated CPC group. 
(b). Step 2- Construct a digraph to portray a contextual relationship among the CPCs 
within the designated CPC group. 
A digraph, or directed graph, is a diagram composed of points called vertices (nodes) 
and arrows called arcs going from a vertex to another vertex. A digraph is drawn to 
illustrate the relationships among CPCs in a designated CPC group. 
(c). Step 3- Carry out pairwise comparison in terms of the influence of the CPCs to 
obtain a direct relation matrix. A pairwise comparison based on expert judgments in 
terms of the influence among the CPCs assists in determining the relative importance 
among the CPCs within the designated CPC group. Equation 5.1 needs to be applied to 
obtain an average scale to be used for pairwise comparison when more than one expert 
is used for the analysis (Klir and Yuan, 1995). 
n 
1 
ab (x) 
b=1 
B(x) = 
n 
(5.1) 
where B(x) is the synthesised value of n experts' judgments, ab (x) is the value given by 
the bth expert, ben and n is the total number of experts. 
A four point scale using Wu's (Wu, 2008) approach of scaling influence matrix 
measuring the relationship between criteria is adopted and illustrated in Table 5.1. This 
will be used as a fundamental CPCs' scale for expert judgments in terms of influence 
and direction among CPCs within the designated CPC groups. 
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Table 5.1 The Fundamental CPCs' Scale for Expert Judgments 
Scale Linguistic Influence to corresponding CPCs 
0 No Influence 
1 Low Influence 
2 High Influence 
3 Very High Influence 
Decimal judgments, such as 2.9, are allowed for fine tuning, however judgments greater 
than 3 are recommended to be avoided if possible. A matrix A of pairwise ratios whose 
rows give the ratios of the scale of each CPC with respect to all others within a 
designated CPC group can be described as follows: 
CPCI """ CPC """ CPCB 
CPCI 0 ... tip ... tig 
CPC; ti l"""t;. ... tig 
A= 
CPCg tgl ... tgi . ". 0 
where CPC1,..., CPCg refer to the evaluation elements of CPCs in a designated CPC 
group, t; ý represents the relative influence from CPC; to CPC, i=1,2,..., g and j=1, 
2,..., g. 
The result of this evaluation produces a direct relation matrix, A. 
(d). Step 4- Construct a normalised direct relation matrix. 
Utilising Wu's (Wu, 2008) approach, a normalised direct relation matrix can be 
obtained by using Equation 5.2. 
The normalised relation matrix, X= kA (5.2) 
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where 
1 
k= (i, j=1,2,..., g) 
g 
max 
1 CPC; 
1 zi<g j=1 
(e). Step 5- Obtain a total relation matrix, T. 
A total relation matrix can be obtained by using Lin and Wu's (Lin and Wu, 2008) 
approach, which is illustrated in Equation 5.3. 
T=X (I - X) -1 (5.3) 
where I is the identity matrix. 
The detailed elaboration of deriving Equation 5.3 is provided in Appendix III. 
(f). Step 6- Construct a causal diagram and reprioritise the CPCs within the designated 
CPC group. 
In this step, the sums of row and column of the ith CPC in a total relation matrix 
denoted by R; and C; respectively are required to produce a causal diagram. A causal 
diagram is constructed by mapping the dataset of (R; + C; ) and (R; - C; ). The R; is the 
sum of the i`h row and C; is the sum of the j`h column of the total relation matrix, i and j 
Egand, iandj= 1,2,..., g. 
In the casual diagram, the horizontal axis of (R; + C; ) will show the state of the 
relationship among the CPCs, whereas the vertical axis of (R; - C, ) will display the state 
of influence among the CPCs. Similarly the horizontal axis (R, + C, ) and the vertical 
axis (R, - C; ) divide the CPCs into cause and effect groups. The maximum and 
minimum values of (R; + C; ) and (R; - C, ) are known as "Master Dispatcher", which has 
the most relationship with the CPCs within a designated CPC group, and "Master 
Receiver", which has the least relations to the remaining CPCs respectively (Seyed- 
Hosseini et al., 2006). Generally when the value of (R, - C; ) is positive, the CPC, 
belongs to the cause group, whereas when the value of (R; - C; ) is negative, the CPC; 
belongs to the effect group. All component CPCs in the designated CPC groups will be 
reprioritised referring to the causal diagram, which illustrates distinctly the complex 
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causal relationships and interdependencies among the CPCs within that designated CPC 
group. Knowing more about the relationships of CPCs within the designated CPC 
groups could provide decision makers with better alternatives to take improved action to 
overcome and prevent a similar incident/accident from reoccurring. Subsequently, an 
enhanced solution is achieved to reduce human error in a management of an 
organisation. 
5.4 Case Study of `Prestige' 
The case study of `Prestige' is used to demonstrate the proposed novel approach using a 
DEMATEL model to reprioritise the CPCs in CREAM. 
(a). Step 1-A tabulated list of CPCs from a detailed qualitative analysis in CREAM of 
the `Prestige' incident is illustrated in Table 4.8. 
(b). Step 2- Construct a digraph to portray contextual relations among the CPCs within 
the designated CPC group. 
A digraph to illustrate relationships among the CPCs in the CPCswc, CPCASO, CPCMML 
CPCQAT, CPCCRT, CPCASP CPCs group in CREAM is shown in Figure 5.2. 
CPCSWC )Hý CPCASO )( >( CPCMMI 
CPCQAT )( 30'Q CPCCRT )c CPCASP 
Figure 5.2 The Digraph of the CPCsWO, CPCASO, CPCMML CPCQAT, 
CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
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(c). Step 3- Carry out pairwise comparison in terms of the influence and direction 
among the CPCs to obtain a direct relation matrix. 
A human reliability specialist from a classification society and two officials from two 
flag state administrations with accident investigation backgrounds, and a master mariner 
with more than ten years of oil tanker sailing experience were used to provide 
evaluation of the direct relation matrix of CPCs. The individual expert evaluations are 
provided in Appendix III. The average scales used for the pairwise comparison of CPCs 
are obtained by using Equation 5.1. Table 5.2 illustrates the results of the expert 
judgments pairwise comparison in terms of the influence among the CPCs. 
From Equation 5.1, an example of calculation to obtain direct relation matrix value of 
CPCsWC to CPCASO by row is shown as follows: 
(a! (x)+a2(z)+Q3(X)+a4(x)) 
CPCswc to CPCASO direct relation matrix value = 
4 
(2+1+2+1) 
4 
= 1.500 
al (x), a2 (x), a3 (x) and a4 (x) are the values on the direct relation matrix of CPCswc to 
CPCASO by row obtained from expert evaluations. 
Table 5.2 The Direct Relation Matrix of the CPCswc, CPCASO, 
CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 0.000 1.500 2.250 1.250 1.250 2.000 
ASO 0.750 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.500 2.750 
MMI 1.250 0.750 0.000 0.750 1.500 0.750 
QAT 1.000 1.500 1.500 0.000 1.500 2.750 
CRT 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.750 0.000 0.750 
ASP 1.750 2.000 1.250 1.750 0.750 0.000 
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(d). Step 4- Construct a normalised direct relation matrix. 
A normalised direct relation matrix is obtained by using Equation 5.2. The normalised 
direct relation matrix of the CPCswc9 CPCASO, CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT, CPCASP CPCs 
group is presented in Table 5.3. 
From Equation 5.2, the sums of the rows of the direct relation matrix of CPCswc, 
CPCASO. CPCMML CPCQAT, CPCCRT, CPCASP are 8.250,8.000,5.000,8.250,4.250 and 
7.500 respectively. 
1 
Hence, k= 
8.250 
An example of calculation to obtain normalised value of CPC5WC to CPCASO by row is 
illustrated as follows: 
1 
CPCswc to CPCASO normalised value =x1.500 
8.250 
= 0.182 
Table 5.3 The Normalised Direct Relation Matrix of the CPCswc, 
ASO, MMI, QAT, CRT and ASP CPCs Group 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 0.000 0.182 0.273 0.152 0.152 0.242 
ASO 0.091 0.000 0.121 0.242 0.182 0.333 
MMI 0.152 0.091 0.000 0.091 0.182 0.091 
QAT 0.121 0.182 0.182 0.000 0.182 0.333 
CRT 0.121 0.121 0.091 0.091 0.000 0.091 
ASP 0.212 0.242 0.152 0.212 0.091 0.000 
(e). Step 5- Obtain a total relation matrix, T. 
A total relation matrix is obtained by using Equation 5.3. From Equation 5.3, initially 
the normalised direct relation matrix X, is subtracted from an identity matrix I, to obtain 
(I - X) matrix. The I is shown in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 The I Matrix of the CPCswc, CPCASO, 
CPCMML CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
swc 1.000 0 0 0 0 0 
ASO 0 1.000 0 0 0 0 
MMI 0 0 1.000 0 0 0 
QAT 0 0 0 1.000 0 0 
CRT 0 0 0 0 1.000 0 
ASP 0 0 0 0 0 1.000 
An example of calculation to obtain value of CPCSWc to CPCASO by row in the (I - X) 
matrix is shown as follows: 
CPCswc to CPCASO (I - X) matrix value = (0 - 0.182) = -0.182 
The (I - X) matrix is illustrated in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 The (I - X) Matrix of the CPCswc, CPCASO, 
CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 1.000 -0.182 -0.273 -0.152 -0.152 -0.242 
ASO -0.091 1.000 -0.121 -0.242 -0.182 -0.333 
MMI -0.152 -0.091 1.000 -0.091 -0.182 -0.091 
QAT -0.121 -0.182 -0.182 1.000 -0.182 -0.333 
CRT -0.121 -0.121 -0.091 -0.091 1.000 -0.091 
ASP -0.212 -0.242 -0.152 -0.212 -0.091 1.000 
This is followed by inversing the obtained matrix (I - X). It would be tedious and 
involves large calculation for inversing a 6x6 matrix. Software such as Excel or 
MATLAB can be used for computing larger than 3x3 matrices. The inverse matrix of 
the (I - X) matrix is presented in Table 5.6. 
119 
Chapter 5- Reprioritisation of CPCs in CREAM Using a DEMATEL Technique 
Table 5.6 The (I - X)-' Matrix of the CPCswc, CPCASO. 
CPCMM!, CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 1.740 0.998 1.041 0.949 0.920 1.249 
ASO 0.832 1.861 0.928 1.030 0.942 1.336 
MMI 0.594 0.613 1.516 0.594 0.653 0.744 
QAT 0.863 1.020 0.982 1.837 0.950 1.337 
CRT 0.525 0.588 0.551 0.550 1.449 0.689 
ASP 0.892 1.025 0.934 0.981 0.856 2.048 
Finally, the normalised direct relation matrix X is multiplied by the inversed matrix 
(I - X)'1 to obtain the total relation matrix, T. An element in the T matrix can be 
obtained by computing the product of multiplication of each row in the X matrix with 
the corresponding column in the (I - X)"1 matrix. 
An example of the calculation to obtain the value of CPCswc to CPCASO by row in the T 
matrix is shown as follows: 
CPCswC to CPCASO T matrix value ={ (0 x 0.998) +{ (0.182 x 1.861) + j(0.273 x 0.613) 
+ (0.152 x 1.020) + «0.152 x 0.588) + j(0.242 x 
1.025) } 
= 0.998 
The total relation matrix is presented in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 The Total Relation Matrix of the CPCswc, CPCASO, 
CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 0.740 0.998 1.041 0.949 0.920 1.249 
ASO 0.832 0.861 0.928 1.030 0.942 1.336 
MMI 0.594 0.613 0.516 0.594 0.653 0.744 
QAT 0.863 1.020 0.982 0.837 0.950 1.337 
CRT 0.525 0.588 0.551 0.550 0.449 0.689 
ASP 0.892 1.025 0.934 0.981 0.856 1.048 
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(f). Step 6- Construct a causal diagram and reprioritise the CPCs within the designated 
CPC group. 
The R; and C, values are computed for all the CPCs within the CPCswc, CPCASO, 
CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs group. The values of R;, C;, (R; + C; ) and 
(R; - C; ) are illustrated in Table 5.8. 
An example of calculation to obtain R;, C;, (R; + C; ) and (R; - C; ) values of CPCswc is 
presented as follows: 
R; swc = (0.7399 + 0.9978 + 1.0408 + 0.9487 + 0.9203 + 1.2489) = 5.8964 
C. Swc = (0.7399 + 0.8321 + 0.5943 + 0.8630 + 0.5253 + 0.8916) = 4.4462 
(R; + C; )swc = (5.8964 + 4.4462) = 10.3426 
(R; - C; )swc = (5.8964 - 4.4462) = 1.4502 
Table 5.8 The R;, C;, (R1 + C; ) and (R; - C; ) values of the CPCswc, 
CPCASO, CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs Group 
CPCs R; C; (R; + C; ) (R; - C, ) 
SWC 5.896 4.446 10.343 1.450 
ASO 5.929 5.105 11.034 0.824 
MMI 3.714 4.951 8.665 -1.238 
QAT 5.989 4.941 10.930 1.048 
CRT 3.352 4.770 8.122 -1.418 
ASP 5.735 6.401 12.136 -0.666 
A causal diagram is constructed by mapping the dataset of (R; + C1) and (R; - C; ) from 
Table 5.8. Figure 5.3 displays the causal diagram of the CPCswc, CPCASO, CPCMMI, 
CPCQAT, CPCCRT, CPCASP CPCs group. 
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-1.50 
0 CPCMMI 
CPCCRT 
-2.00 Figure 5.3 The Causal Diagram of the CPCswc" CPCASO, 
CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT, and CPCASP CPCs Group 
Analysing the causal diagram, it is apparent that the CPCASP with a maximum value of 
(R; + C; ) is the "Master Dispatcher", while the CPCCRT is the "Master Receiver", with a 
minimum value of (R, - Q. The CPCASP has the most relations with the other five 
CPCs of CPCswc9 CPCASO, CPCMMI, CPCQAT, and CPCCRT. The CPCCRT having the 
minimum value of (R; + C; ), is considered to have the least relations to the other five 
CPCs. Furthermore, the characteristics of the CPCASO, CPCswc and CPCQAT CPCs 
belong to the cause group while the CPCMMI, CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs belong to the 
effect group. The CPCASP experiences the most relations towards CPCMMI and CPCCRT 
CPCs within the effect group. The CPCASO and CPCQAT play a significant role in 
determining the effect of the principal CPC of this group, CPCswc. It can be established 
that the proposed approach using a DEMATEL model has provided decision makers 
with a better understanding of the relationships of CPCs within the designated CPC 
group in determining an appropriate CPC, which needs to be improved to prevent 
similar incidents/accidents from occurring in the future. 
5.5 CPCs Reprioritisation Using Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a study of how systematically changing parameters in a model to 
determine the effects of such changes (Tarantola, 2008). It is a method for testing the 
degree of sensitivity of a model's variables. The sensitivity analysis is carried out by 
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changing the effect of CPCCRT to the remaining five CPCs. The original expert 
evaluation values associated with CPCCRT in the direct relation matrix were increased 
from 0.1 to 0.8 at a step of 0.1. The assumption made is that the trend line of the 
CPCCRT should increase steadily resulting in the CPCCRT to shift from an effect group to 
a cause group. Meanwhile, the remaining CPCs, CPCswc, CPCASO. and CPCQAT should 
remain in the cause group and the CPCMMI and CPCASP should remain in the effect 
group. Furthermore, the gradient of the trend lines of CPCMMI and CPCASP should 
change due to the changes of one of the member of the effect group, CPCCRT. As for the 
gradient of the trend lines of CPCswc, CPCASO and CPCQAT, there should not be 
apparent changes as to the CPCs in the effect group due to the characteristic of 
belonging to the cause group. The trend lines of resultant simulated causal diagram are 
illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
2.50 
CPCCRT 
2.00 
1.50 CPCswc 
1 '00 CPCQAT 
Ü0.50 CPCASO 
c 0.00 
-0.508. 12 10.12 . 12 14.12 16.12 18.12 20.12 22.12 
-1.00 
(R; + C; ) Relationship 
-1.50 
-2.00 
-2.50 CPCASP 
-3.00 CP('_MMI 
-3.50 
Figure 5.4 The Trend Lines of Simulated Causal Diagram of the CPCswc, 
CPCASO, CPCMMI, CPCQAT, CPCCRT, CPCASP CPCs Group 
A similar proposed approach using the DEMATEL model is applied to determine if 
small changes of the input variables would induce small changes in the output results of 
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the causal diagram. It can be observed from the trend lines of the simulated causal 
diagram in Figure 5.4 that the relationship among the other five CPCs of CPCswc, 
CPCASO, CPCMMI, CPCQAT, and CPCASP has increased correspondingly with increment 
of evaluation values of relationship and influence of CPCCRT. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the CPCASO, CPCswc and CPCQAT CPCs have remained in the cause 
group. Meanwhile the other remaining CPCMMI and CPCASP CPCs have also remained 
within their respective effect group. The CPCCRT has moved from an effect group to the 
cause group. On analysing the trend lines result of the simulated causal diagram in 
Figure 5.4, it has demonstrated that a small increment of scale of the relationship and 
influence among the CPCs within the CPC group can be displayed sufficiently on the 
causal diagram. Additionally, no abrupt large changes of relationship and influence of 
CPCs were generated in the sensitivity analysis. Therefore, the model is able to 
illustrate the differences and has passed the sensibility check adequately. 
5.6 Results 
The case study of `Prestige' is utilised to demonstrate the use of a DEMATEL model to 
provide a better approach in restructuring of CPCs according to their influence and 
relationship within a designated CPC group. The outcome of a causal diagram of the 
proposed novel approach using the DEMATEL model has substantiated the extent of 
the CPCs interrelationships and interdependencies. The causal diagram shown in Figure 
5.3 distinctly illustrates that the CPCASO, CPCswc and CPCQAT CPCs belong to the 
cause group and that the CPCMMI. CPCCRT and CPCASP CPCs belong to the effect group. 
In addition, the causal diagram could assist decision makers to establish that the 
CPCASO and CPCQAT play significant roles in determining the effect of the principal 
CPC of a designated CPCswc group. Based on the outlined findings from the causal 
diagram, decision makers can improve the CPCASO and CPCQAT to obtain better results 
in the outcome of CPCswc leading to improved shipboard management to prevent the 
reoccurrence of a similar incident. In a similar way, an understanding of the 
relationships and interdependencies among CPCs within other designated CPC groups 
in CREAM could be established, allowing for improvement of shipboard management 
in reducing human error. 
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5.7 Discussions 
The existing generic CREAM framework employs a qualitative analysis approach to 
determine the state of linguistic terms of CPCs. The nine CPCs within the CREAM are 
assembled into four groups of multiple CPCs. Each group consists of a principal CPC 
and its component CPCs to model their interdependencies. The state of the principal 
CPC of the designated CPC group is determined on the basis of the effects of the 
component CPCs within the designated group. There is no research related to the 
description of relationships among the CPCs in CREAM. Hence the present CREAM 
leaves a significant gap in illustrating the relationships among the CPCs. The proposed 
novel approach using a DEMATEL model plays an important role by providing a better 
understanding of the relationships and interdependencies among the CPCs within the 
designated CPC groups. In addition, the proposed approach also assists HRA analysts in 
determining whether a CPC belongs to a cause group or an effect group. Furthermore, 
the model also establishes the strength of relationships and interdependencies among the 
CPCs within the designated CPC group. An original aspect of the proposed approach 
using a DEMATEL technique is that the approach has carried out an empirical work 
that has not been done before. Additionally, the proposed approach has looked into 
relationships among the CPCs that researchers in the discipline have not looked at 
before. The presented case study has focused on a maritime incident, however a similar 
approach can be adapted for other industries with some modifications in CREAM 
classification schemes. The proposed model can provide an alternative approach in 
determining relationships and interdependencies within variables of any human 
performance factor groups, leading to a reduction in human errors in various industrial 
environments. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Since the CREAM was developed, few studies have come forward with an efficient 
model to provide a better understanding of the relationships among the CPCs in 
CREAM. The proposed approach using a DEMATEL model addresses this aspect and 
can be applied along with the developed and advanced CREAM framework to assist 
HRA analysts in performing better qualitative analysis. The scrutinising and 
comprehension of relationships among CPCs could improve the utilisation of CREAM 
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in carrying out a good qualitative analysis in determining linguistic terms of CPCs. 
Furthermore, the proposed approach using the DEMATEL model also allows 
reprioritisation of CPCs within the designated CPC groups. The significance of the 
proposed model is that it can assist decision makers in determining an appropriate CPC 
that needs to be improved to overcome the root cause of an incident/accident. As a 
result, actions can be taken to minimise the human errors in the management of an 
organisation effectively reducing the risk of a similar incident/accident occurring in the 
future. The limitation of this model is that it requires experts to provide a scaled 
judgment of the importance and influence of CPCs. It is addressed in this research by 
using experts from classification society and flag state administrations. Furthermore, the 
developed approach using the DEMATEL model can be used to appreciate and 
assimilate the relationships and interdependencies among human factor variables 
involved in other transportation systems and industrial fields, such as the chemical, gas 
and oil industries. A better understanding of the relationships among the human factor 
variables involved in causing an incident/accident can facilitate a reduction of human 
errors in the future. Finally, the innovative approach using the DEMATEL model can be 
developed as computer software to allow for commercial appreciation leading to a 
reduction of human errors in various industries. 
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Chapter 6 
Combined AHP and Fuzzy Approach to Facilitating 
the Quantification Analysis of CREAM 
in Oil Tanker Operations 
Summary 
On addressing the relationships and interdependencies among CPCs of CREAM in 
Chapter 5, this chapter is focused on quantitative analysis of human reliabilities. A 
novel human reliability quantification model using a combined AHP and fuzzy logic 
approach is established. This methodology is found to be particularly useful in dealing 
with the limited availability of data in the maritime domain and the uncertainty and 
complexity that exist in the quantitative analysis of human reliabilities. The proposed 
model is demonstrated with a case study and validated using a sensitivity analysis. The 
result of HPFP in the case study is within the parameters of CREAM's COCOM. Thus, 
this research can facilitate the quantification development of HRA in the maritime field. 
6.1 Introduction 
HRA is a collection of methods used to predict the occurrence of human errors and to 
assess and reduce human error potential in management and safety systems (Hollnagel, 
2005). Most of the HRA research was conducted in the nuclear, chemical, oil, gas and 
aviation industries. Comparatively, limited research of HRA has been carried out in the 
maritime industry. The complexity of the human behaviour involved in human 
operations results in difficulties in quantifying human reliabilities in maritime 
operations. In addition, methodological limitations related to the subjectivity of analysts 
and expert judgments along with inadequate data hinder quantification of HRA. The 
methods that have been developed by engineers and psychologists to analyse human 
errors and human reliabilities often use expert judgment, simulation proofs and 
statistical data (Konstandinidou et al., 2006). 
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Maritime accident data, especially that related to HRA, may be imprecise and 
insufficient. Apart from the uncertainty due to data or information, deficiencies in the 
definition of the system while analysing its environment and deficiencies associated 
with the prediction of accident escalation could also be present, which may result in 
difficulties in carrying out HRA successfully (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Some 
relevant research efforts have been made in improving HRA quantification using a 
fuzzy approach (Konstandinidou et al., 2006; Marseguerra et al., 2007), using 
probabilistic techniques (Fujita and Hollnagel, 2004) and the quantitative developments 
in CREAM (Marseguerra et al., 2006). The proposed model of a combined AHP and 
fuzzy logic approach produces a HPFP value. The developed methodology of 
quantifying each CPC value to obtain a final HRA value is comprehensive compared to 
the past practices using the methodology of assigning a probability of occurrence to 
each human error event. The detailed qualitative CREAM analysis identifies root causes 
of human errors in an incident. The outcome of the qualitative analysis includes the 
descriptions of nine CPCs. The quantification of the nine CPCs is carried out by 
converting CPCs into fuzzy probabilities. In addition, the weight influence of each CPC 
is incorporated into the computation of a final human failure probability. The proposed 
model scrutinises in detail each component that played a significant role in an incident. 
Human error probability is none other than the probability of human failure that is 
assigned based on the characteristics of the task that a human has to perform (Kim et al., 
2006). Therefore, using the CPC which deals with human performance makes it 
judicious to derive a HPFP value. In addition the use of AHP to determine proper 
weighting among the CPCs allows this model to be more human decision-making 
prone. The proposed model could further assist the present HRA to increase technical 
data in maritime human reliabilities. 
6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 Quantification Analysis of CREAM 
There has been limited research carried out in quantification analysis of CREAM. 
Among the research on this aspect are CREAM quantification using a fuzzy approach 
(Konstandinidou et al., 2006), HRA by fuzzy CREAM (Marseguerra et al., 2007) and 
CREAM prospective quantification (He et al., 2008). The recent quantification analysis 
of CREAM by Konstandinidou et al. (2006) had a common fallacy of making an 
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assumption that all the CPCs had an equal weight of influence in causing an incident. 
Meanwhile, Marseguerra et al. (2007) had disintegrated the nine CPCs into three 
attributes and He et al. (2008) had simplified the weighting factors to one common 
performance index for four cognitive functions, to carry out quantification of human 
error probabilities. The proposed methodology in this chapter overcomes the 
shortcomings of the previous studies by introducing an AHP approach to obtain weights 
of influence of each CPC and by carrying out pairwise comparison among the CPCs as 
a whole, taking into consideration the incident investigated. This approach is reliable 
and sensible, understanding that in real life the CPCs are not of an equal influence and 
importance but are interrelated with reference to the incident. However, the newly 
developed methodology would rely on the comprehensiveness of the task analysis 
carried out in the qualitative analysis of CREAM. 
6.2.2 Overview on the Fuzzy Logic Approach 
One of the feasible ways to deal with uncertainty and numerical analysis of ambiguity is 
to use fuzzy logic theory (Sii et al., 2001). Fuzzy logic theory assists in addressing 
qualitative information considering human decision making. Another aspect of fuzzy 
logic theory is that it can accommodate the ambiguities that are present in the maritime 
human decision factors while investigating maritime incidents/accidents. The theoretical 
foundation for modelling imprecise information is the well-known fuzzy set theory 
initially developed by Zadeh (Zadeh, 1965). Fuzzy logic theory is useful for modelling a 
complex process involving qualitative uncertain information. The concept of 
membership functions used by fuzzy logic theory is adequate for depicting this 
knowledge. However, Saaty is against the idea of applying fuzzy logic to the AHP's 
fundamental criteria scale. The fundamental criteria scale for the expert judgment used 
in the AHP was already in the fuzzy form from Weber-Fechner observations. 
Furthermore, he has proven that fuzzification of the fundamental scale does not improve 
the outcome of the AHP analysis (Saaty, 2008). A fuzzy rule-based approach has been 
adopted to carry out HRA quantification of CREAM to obtain HPFP. The fact that the 
influence of the contextual conditions in which the task is performed is greater than the 
characteristics of the task itself was found in the studies of human performance in 
accidents (Marseguerra et al., 2007). It can be concluded that the context is the 
significant aspect that affects human performance failure. Therefore, CREAM, which 
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was developed based on this principle, emphasising the important influence of the 
context on human performance, could provide a good path to quantify human 
reliabilities. In a maritime context, an assessment of the CPCs could provide an overall 
prediction of how a ship's crew and the related shipboard management systems might 
behave towards an incident. 
6.2.2.1 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is a precise logic of imprecision and approximate reasoning (Zadeh, 2008). 
It is a superset of conventional Boolean logic that has been extended to handle the 
concept of partial truth-values between completely true and completely false. It has 
many features; however, basic mathematical features are the logical and fuzzy-set- 
theoretic aspects. Relational features play an important role in all applications of fuzzy 
logic. Fuzzy classification systems have had many applications and fuzzy logic theory 
has emerged as a useful tool for the modelling processes (Konstandinidou et al., 2006). 
The most significant factor of fuzzy logic theory is that it assists in addressing 
qualitative information considering human decision making. The fundamental 
difference of fuzzy logic compared to conventional modelling techniques is in relation 
to the definition of sets. Traditional set theory is based on a binary logic where a 
number or an object is either a member of a set or not. Fuzzy logic on the contrary 
allows a number or an object to be a member of more than one set. It introduces the 
concept of partial membership (Klir and Yuan, 1995). A degree of membership in a set 
is based on a scale from 0 to 1 with 1 corresponding to complete membership and 0 
referring to no membership. A membership of 0.5 on the scale will reflect that it 
belongs with a half degree. The fuzzy logic approach often addresses qualitative 
information ideally as it resembles the manner in which humans make assumptions and 
decisions. The basic structure of fuzzy logic consists of fuzzy sets, linguistic variables, 
possibility distributions and fuzzy if-then rules (Kim and Bishu, 2006). 
6.2.2.2 Fuzzy Set 
Fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of membership grades. A membership 
function, which assigns to each object a grade of membership, is associated with each 
fuzzy set (Pedrycz, 1993). 
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Let's assume K to be a set of elements denoted by x, K= {x}. A fuzzy set L in K is 
characterised by a set of ordered pairs L= {(x), mL(x)}, xEK where mL is the 
membership degree of x in L. Membership degree mL (x) assumes its value in [0,1]. In 
fuzzy set theory, a fuzzy set L in K is defined by a membership degree mL (x) between 0 
and 1. 
mL : L--> [0, l] 
For an element x of L, ML (x) is the degree to which x is an element of L 
ML (x) =1 xis totally in L 
0< mL (x) <1 xis partially in L 
mL (x) =0 xis not in L 
In fuzzy logic, the transition from set to set is gradual whereas an object can have partial 
membership in multiple sets. Some of the basic concepts of fuzzy sets are as follows 
(Pedrycz, 1993): 
a). Label implies a descriptive name used to identify a membership function. 
b). Degree of membership refers to how much a crisp value is compatible with a 
membership function. 
c). Membership function defines a fuzzy set by mapping crisp values from its domain to 
degrees of membership. 
d). Scope is the width of the membership function (fuzzy set). 
e). Universe of discourse denotes the range of all possible values applicable to a system 
variable. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the basic concepts of fuzzy sets. 
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Figure 6.1 Basic Concepts of Fuzzy Sets 
6.3 Methodology 
The general framework of the proposed model is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The figure 
shows the research methodology of a combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach which is 
used to obtain the CPCs' weights and to convert CPC linguistic terms into crisp values 
respectively. Each step of the framework is elaborated in detail in the following 
subsections. 
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Figure 6.2 The General Framework of the Proposed Model 
The proposed methodology is described as follows: 
(a). Step 1- Obtain tabulated CPCs from a detailed qualitative CREAM analysis of an 
incident. 
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(b). Step 2- Carry out pairwise comparison of nine CPCs to determine their relative 
importance using AHP by expert judgments. 
Personnel used for expert judgments are apparently better selected by decision makers 
because eventually it is the decision makers that will determine the actions to take to 
overcome the human error in their shipboard management. Furthermore, it is important 
to consider that reducing the number of factors negatively affecting cognition could lead 
to a better-quality expert judgment (Meyer and Booker, 2001). However, if more than 
one expert is used for analysis, then the following formula needs to be applied to obtain 
an average scale to be used for pairwise comparison (Klir and Yuan, 1995). 
E 
ab (x) 
b =l 
B(x) _ 
n 
(6.1) 
where B(x) is the synthesised value of n expert judgments, ab (x) is the value given by 
the bt' expert, b=1,2, ..., n and n is the total number of experts. 
An expert judgment of the relative importance among the CPCs needs to be carried out 
by pairwise comparisons using a nine-point scale suggested by Saaty (Saaty, 1996). The 
scale used in this methodology to indicate the intensity of importance among CPCs is 
illustrated in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 The Fundamental CPC Scale for Expert Judgment 
Scale Linguistic Influence to Description 
corresponding CPC 
1 Equal Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
equally to the incident 
2 Between Equal and Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Moderate between scale 1 and 3 to the incident 
3 Moderate Experience and judgment favour 
one CPC over another 
4 Between Moderate and Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Strong between scale 3 and 5 to the incident 
5 Strong Experience and judgment strongly favour 
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one CPC over another 
6 Between Strong and Very Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Strong between scale 5 and 7 to the incident 
7 Very Strong A CPC is favoured and dominates very 
strongly over another 
8 Between Very Strong and Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Extreme between scale 7 and 9 to the incident 
9 Extreme Evidence of one CPC favouring at the 
highest order to another CPC appears 
Decimal judgments, such as 2.9, are allowed for fine tuning; however, judgments 
greater than 9 are recommended to be avoided if possible. Suppose that a matrix A of 
pairwise ratios is formed whose rows give the ratios of the scale of each CPC with 
respect to all others as follows (Saaty, 2008): 
CPC1""" CPC ... CPC, 
CPCI 1".. Wi S 
A= CPC ; w; ý 
CPCS w: 
1 ... 
1 
where CPC1,..., CPCs refer to the evaluation CPCs, w; ý represents the relative 
importance of CPC; against CPCJ, i=1,2,..., s and j=1,2,..., s. 
(c). Step 3- Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The eigenvectors can be computed with normalisation of the pairwise comparison CPC 
matrix. It is carried out by dividing each element by its column sum. This will produce a 
normalised relative weight matrix for the nine CPCs. The normalised principal 
eigenvector is also known as the priority vector. It is illustrated in Equation 6.2 (Saaty, 
2008). 
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µij 
w;; 
=s (6.2) 
I-W 
where µ; ý is the eigenvector of each CPC of normalised pairwise comparison matrix, w, 1 
represents the relative importance between CPC; and CPC, i and j=1,2,..., s in the 
pairwise comparison matrix. 
Upon having a normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors 
representing each CPC will be computed. The arithmetic mean (average) of the values 
of each row is an element of the eigenvector that produces a principal eigenvector for 
each CPC. The priority vectors show relative weights among the compared CPCs. The 
mathematical expression of this step can be illustrated using Equation 6.3 (Saaty, 2008). 
wi =s ýf=1 Pu (6.3) 
where w; is the weight of ith CPC and i and j=1,2,..., s. 
(d). Step 4- Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue (Xmax) of a CPC matrix of pairwise comparison is required to 
compute a Consistency Index (CI). The principal eigenvalue is the maximum eigenvalue 
of the sxs pairwise comparison matrix A, which is computed " using Equation 6.4 
(Saaty, 2008). 
S wkwr s 
EL 
Äm3x 
- 
ýý=1 
wi 
s (6.4) 
where wk is the weight of the kth CPC. 
The CI value can be obtained using Equation 6.5. 
1 
Cl = (Xmax - s) (6.5) (s-1) 
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This is followed by computing a Consistency Ratio (CR), which is a ratio of the CI to 
the corresponding Random Index (RI). The AHP methodology provides a measure of 
the consistency for pairwise comparisons by introducing a CR. The CR of a pairwise 
comparison matrix is the ratio of its CI to the corresponding RI value. The average RI 
values are presented in Table 6.2, where the size of the pairwise comparison matrix is 
referred to as s. 
Table 6.2 The Average RI values (Saaty, 2008) 
s123456789 10 11 12 13 
RI 000.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.54 1.56 
The CR value can be obtained using Equation 6.6. 
CI 
CR = 
RI 
(6.6) 
On computing the CR, verification needs to be conducted to determine if the CR value 
is less than 0.1. The inconsistency is acceptable if the value of the CR is equal to or less 
than 0.1 (Saaty, 2008). The re-evaluation of ratios is to be performed if the CR value 
obtained is greater than 0.1. The value 0.1 is adopted because it has been proven by 
Saaty and Tran (2007) that improving the CR value to less than 0.1 will not improve the 
accuracy of the outcome in an AHP analysis. 
(e). Step 5- Fuzzy model operations. 
When the fuzzy model is applied to a set of input parameter values, the information 
flows through the fuzzification, fuzzy inference and defuzzification process. 
i). Fuzzification is performed by assigning fuzzy labels in the universe of discourse to 
each of the crisp inputs. The crisp inputs could be of multiple labels whereas the number 
of labels of each CPC in CREAM is fixed. Marseguerra et al. (2007) approach in 
scaling the CPCs' universe of discourse is adopted with some modifications. The details 
of CPC labels and effects with their parameters of universe of discourse are illustrated 
in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 The Membership Labels, Effects and Parameters of CPCs 
CPC Membership Labels, Effects and Parameters (%) 
ASO Very Efficient 
[Improved] 
Efficient 
[Not Si nificant] 
Inefficient 
[Reduced] 
Deficient 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,25) (10,35,60) (40,65,90) (75,100,100) 
SWC Advantages 
[Improved] 
Compatible 
[Not Significant] 
Incompatible 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,30) (20,50,80) (70,100,100) 
MMI Supportive 
[Improved] 
Adequate 
[Not Significant] 
Tolerable 
[Not Significant] 
Inappropriate 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,25) (10,35,60) (40,65,90) (75,100,100) 
APP Appropriate 
[Improved] 
Acceptable 
[Not Significant] 
Inappropriate 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,30) (20,50,80) (70,100,100) 
NSG Less than actual capacity 
[Not Significant] 
Matching current 
ca acit [Not Significant] 
More than actual 
capacity [Reduced] 
(0,0,30) (20,50,80) (70,100,100) 
QAT Adequate 
[Improved] 
Temporarily inadequate 
[Not Significant] 
Continuously 
inadequate 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,30) (20,50,80) (70,100,100) 
CRT Night-time (unadjusted) 
[Reduced] 
Daytime (adjusted) 
[Not Significant] 
Night-time 
(adjusted) 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,30) (20,50,80) (70,100,100) 
ASP Adequate with vast 
experience 
[Improved] 
Adequate with limited 
experience 
[Not Sign ficant] 
Inadequate 
experience 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,30) (20,50,80) (70,100,100) 
SCQ Very Efficient 
[Improved] 
Efficient 
[Not Significant] 
Inefficient 
[Not Significant] 
Deficient 
[Reduced] 
(0,0,25) (10,35,60) (40,65,90) (75,100,100) 
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The parameters of the universe of discourse for nine CPCs - CPCASO, CPCswc, CPCMMI, 
CPCApp, CPCNSG, CPCQAT, CPCCRT, CPCASp and CPCsCQ are between 0% and 100% 
corresponding to the HPFPs. 0% of HPFP corresponds to the better linguistic terms 
compared to 100% HPFP that corresponds to poor linguistic terms. For example, Very 
Efficient for CPCscQ is described by a triangular membership function (0,0,25) as 
shown in Figure 6.3, which is extracted from Appendix IV. According to the generic 
CREAM, a selection of the CPCs' linguistic terms can provide an estimation of the 
control mode that the shipboard management is acting with relevance to COCOM 
(Konstandinidou et al., 2006). 
ii). Fuzzy Inference 
A fuzzy rule base is developed using the CPC's linguistic terms as an input parameters 
based on the features of the generic CREAM. An example of the fuzzy rule for the 
`Carina' case study is as follows: 
IF the CPCASO has been analysed as Inefficient AND the CPCswc is Incompatible 
AND the CPCMMI is Tolerable AND the CPCAPP is Inappropriate AND the CPCNSG is 
More than actual capacity AND the CPCQAT is Continuously inadequate AND the 
CPCCRT is Daytime (adjusted) AND the CPCASP is Inadequate experience AND the 
CPCscQ is Inefficient THEN the shipboard crew would act in a `Scrambled' manner 
with reference to the COCOM. 
iii). Defuzzification 
Similar to Konstandinidou et al. (2006) approach, a triangular membership function is 
adopted to simplify the defuzzification of each of the nine CPCs. The membership 
function for each linguistic term of a CPC is evaluated within its limits on an arbitrary 
scale of 0 to 1. Finally, the fuzzy input is derived by combining the crisp input with 
membership functions. The defuzzified crisp value of a CPC is determined by expert 
judgment evaluation described by membership degrees associated with two linguistic 
terms of a CPC. The structure of a generic CREAM contains three CPCs with four 
linguistic terms and six CPCs with three linguistic terms causes the need to adopt the 
scheme of using two linguistic terms. Two linguistic terms are used to reduce the level 
of uncertainty in determining the estimation of linguistic terms of CPCs. Additionally 
the use of two linguistic terms allows for more coverage of CPCs, providing increased 
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precision in determining the linguistic terms of CPCs. Since two linguistic terms are 
used for describing a CPC, then the CPC's linguistic label would follow the one with 
the greatest membership degree. Defuzzification is a process of combining all fuzzy 
outputs in a specific crisp output of the system. It maps a fuzzy set, which is the output 
of the core of the fuzzy system, into a crisp value (Leekwijck and Kerre, 1999). One of 
the best-known defuzzification operators is the centre of gravity (COG) defuzzification 
method. It computes the centre of gravity of the area under the specific membership 
functions and is easier to compute. The COG equation is presented in Equation 6.7. 
f'm(x)xdx 
COG formula = 
f' m(x) dx 
(6.7) 
where m(x) is the aggregated resultant membership functions of the linguistic term of a 
CPC, x is the universe of discourse and, g and h are the cardinality of a fuzzy set of a 
CPC's linguistic label. 
Finally, a list consisting of defuzzified crisp values of the nine CPCs will be produced. 
An example of the whole fuzzification, inference and defuzzification process of the 
CPCASO fuzzy membership function to a single crisp value is presented in Figure 6.3 
along with detailed elaboration. 
With reference to Figure 6.3 extracted from Appendix N, based on an expert judgment, 
the CPCASO has been evaluated 0.70 Inefficient and 0.30 Efficient. The defuzzification 
computation using Equation 6.7 is illustrated as follows: 
(0.7 x 65%) + (0.3 x 35%) 
CPCLASO) _ 
(0.7+0.3) 
= 0.560 
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where CPCuASO) is the defuzzified crisp value of the ASO CPC. Similar means of 
computation can be performed on the remaining eight CPCs to obtain their defuzzified 
crisp values. 
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(f). Step 6- Compute a HPFP value for the investigated incident. 
A HPFP value for an investigated incident/accident is obtained from the summation of 
products of each CPC's defuzzified crisp value and weight. The relationship is produced 
in Equation 6.8 as follows: 
s 
HPFP = (w * CPCL); 
i=1 
(6.8) 
where w and CPCL are the product of the weight and the defuzzified crisp value of the 
ith CPC in the pairwise comparison matrix. 
6.4 Case Study of `Prestige' 
The case study of `Prestige' is used to demonstrate the proposed human reliability 
quantification model using the combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach. 
(a). Step 1- Tabulated CPCs from a detailed qualitative CREAM analysis of the 
`Prestige' incident are obtained. A human-reliability specialist from classification 
society, two officials from two flag state administrations with accident investigation 
backgrounds, and a master mariner with more than ten years of oil tanker sailing 
experience were used to provide expert judgment of pairwise comparison of criteria. 
The average scales used for the pairwise comparison of criteria are obtained by using 
Equation 6.1. Table 6.4 illustrates the expert judgment evaluation of CPCs for the 
`Prestige' incident. 
Table 6.4 The CPCs for the `Prestige' Incident 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms by Expert 
Judgment 
ASO Failure of getting the vessel to a safe 0.70 Inefficient / 0.30 Efficient 
haven reflects reasonable level of 
inefficiency in management 
SWC Rough weather does not provide 0.67 Incompatible / 0.33 
reasonably good conditions to deal Compatible 
with the incident 
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MMI Shipboard operation was reasonably 0.80 Tolerable / 0.20 Adequate 
carried out to overcome the 
emergency listing of the vessel 
APP Vessel had the standard contingency 0.64 Inappropriate / 0.36 
plan for quick action to alleviate the Acceptable 
flooding 
NSG It is the case for any emergency 0.72 More than actual capacity 
situation in general / 0.28 Matching current capacity 
QAT Quick action to get the vessel to safe 0.38 Temporarily inadequate / 
haven is vital due to the encountered 0.62 Continuously inadequate 
rough weather 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant for the Not relevant 
case 
ASP Crew members onboard are qualified 0.47 Adequate, limited 
and had received standard training as experience / 0.53 Inadequate, 
required by STCW 1995 experience 
SCQ Crew had not responded well under 0.62 Inefficient / 0.38 Efficient 
stress 
(b). Step 2- Pairwise comparisons of the nine CPCs to determine the relative 
importance among the CPCs using AHP by expert judgment were carried out using the 
CPC scale shown in Table 6.1. Table 6.5 illustrates the result of expert judgment 
pairwise comparison of the CPCs. 
Table 6.5 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 1 4 4 2 2 3 6 5 4 
SWC 1/4 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 
MMI 1/4 1/2 1 1 2 1 3 3 2 
APP 1/2 1 1 1 2 1 5 3 2 
NSG 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1 2 6 4 3 
QAT 1/3 1 1 1 1/2 1 5 4 3 
CRT 1/6 1/3 1/3 1/5 1/6 1/5 1 2 1 
ASP 1/5 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/4 1/4 1/2 1 1 
SCQ 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1 1 1 
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(c). Step 3- Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of CPCs of ASO, SWC, MMI, APP, 
NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ are 3.450,9.667,10.667,7.533,9.250,9.783,30.500, 
26.000 and 19.000 respectively. The normalised relative weights of the CPC matrix for 
the nine CPCs are produced by dividing each element in Table 6.5 by its column sum. 
The normalised relative weight of each element in the pairwise comparison judgment of 
the CPCs is shown in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Weight of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 0.290 0.414 0.375 0.265 0.216 0.307 0.197 0.192 0.211 
SWC 0.072 0.103 0.188 0.133 0.108 0.102 0.098 0.115 0.105 
MMI 0.072 0.052 0.094 0.133 0.216 0.102 0.098 0.115 0.105 
APP 0.145 0.103 0.094 0.133 0.216 0.102 0.164 0.115 0.105 
NSG 0.145 0.103 0.047 0.066 0.108 0.204 0.197 0.154 0.158 
QAT 0.097 0.103 0.094 0.133 0.054 0.102 0.164 0.154 0.158 
CRT 0.048 0.034 0.031 0.027 0.018 0.020 0.033 0.077 0.053 
ASP 0.058 0.034 0.031 0.044 0.027 0.026 0.016 0.038 0.053 
SCQ 0.072 0.052 0.047 0.066 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.038 0.053 
From the normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors representing 
each CPC are computed using Equation 6.3. The relative weights of ASO, SWC, MMI, 
APP, NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ CPCs are 0.274,0.114,0.110,0.131,0.131, 
0.118,0.038,0.036 and 0.048 respectively. 
(d). Step 4- Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
Principal eigenvalue, ?m= (1 / 9) x 
1(0.274 x 1.000) + (0.114 x 4.000) + (0.110 x 4.000)+ (0.131 x 2.000)+ (0.131 x 2.000) + ( 
(0.118 x 3.000) + (0.038 x 6.000) + (0.036 x 5.000) + (0.048 x 4.000) 
)+ 
0.274 
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((0.274 x 0.250) + (0.114 x 1.000) + (0.110 x 2.000)+ (0.131 x 1.000)+ (131 x 1.000) +1 
(0.118 x 1.000) + (0.038 x 3.000) + (0.036 x 3.000) + (0.048 x 2.000) J + 0.114 
((0.274 x 0.250) + (0.114 x 0.500) + (0.110 X 1.000)+ (0.131 x 1.000)+ (0.131 x 2.000) + 1 
(0.118 x 1.000) + (0.038 x 3.000) + (0.036 x 3.000) + (0.048 x 2.000) 
) 
0.110 + 
(0.274 x 0.500) + (0.114 x 1.000) + (0.110 x 1.000)+ (0.131 x 1.000)+ (0.131 x 2.000) + ( 
(0.118 x 1.000) + (0.038 x 5.000) + (0.036 x 3.000) + (0.048 x 2.000) 
) 
+ 0.131 
'«0.274 x 0.500) + (0.114 x 1.000) + (0.110 x 0.500)+ (0.131 x 0.500)+ (0.131 x 1.000) + 
(0.118 x 2.000) + (0.038 x 6.000) + (0.036 x 4.000) + (0.048 x 3.000) 
) 
0.131 + 
"«0.274 x 0.333) + (0.114 x 1.000) + (0.110 x 1.000)+ (0.131 x 1.000)+ (0.131 x 0.500) + 
(0.118 x 1.000) + (0.038 x 5.000) + (0.036 x 4.000) + (0.048 x 3.000) 
) 
+ 0.118 
(0.274 x 0.167) + (0.333 X 0.200) + (0.333 x 0.333)+ (0.200 x 0.333)+ (0.167 x 0.333) + ( 
(0.118 x 0.200) + (0.038 x 1.000) + (0.036 x 2.000) + (0.048 x 1.000) 
)+ 
0.038 
(0.274 x 0.200) + (0.114 x 0.333) + (0.110 x 0.333)+ (0.131 x 0.333)+ (0.131 x 0.250) + ( 
(0.118 x 0.250) + (0.038 x 0.500) + (0.036 x 1.000) + (0.048 x 1.000) 
0.036 
(0.274 x 0.250) + (0.114 x 0.500) + (0.110 x 0.500)+ (0.131 x 0.500)+ (0.131 x 0.333) + f( 
(0.118 x 0.333) + (0.038 x 1.000) + (0.036 x 1.000) + (0.048 x 1.000) 
)1 
0.048 
= 9.515 
From Equation 6.5, the CI is computed and illustrated as follows: 
CI = ý9 
1 
1) 
(9.515-9)] 
= 0.064 
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From Equation 6.6 with RI value taken from Table 6.2, the CR is computed and shown 
as follows: 
CR -_ 
0(Ili--(34) 
. 45 
= 0.044 
The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Therefore the subjective expert judgment on 
CPCs is consistent. 
(e). Step 5- Fuzzy model operations. 
With reference to Table 6.4, a fuzzy rule base is established as IF the CPCASO has been 
analysed as Inefficient AND the CPCswc is Incompatible AND the CPCMMI is 
Tolerable AND the CPCAPP is Inappropriate AND the CPCNSG is More than actual 
capacity AND the CPCQAT is Continuously inadequate AND the CPCCRT is not 
relevant AND the CPCASP is Inadequate experience AND the CPCscQ is Inefficient 
THEN the shipboard crew would act in a `Scrambled' manner with reference to the 
COCOM. "The shipboard crew would act in a `Scrambled' manner indicates that the 
probability of performing an erroneous action onboard is between 1.0 x 10-1 and 1.0 x 
10°. Fuzzification is carried out referring to the fuzzy set representation of the HPFP for 
the ASO input variable graph as shown in Figure 6.3. A full set of graphs for the 
remaining eight CPCs is provided in Appendix IV. In a similar way, the remaining eight 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs are obtained. Finally, a list consisting of nine 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs is produced and presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Defuzzified Crisp Values of CPCs 
CPCs CPC Evaluation CPCL 
ASO Inefficient 0.560 
SWC Incompatible 0.735 
MMI Tolerable 0.590 
APP Inappropriate 0.724 
NSG More than actual capacity 0.752 
QAT Continuously inadequate 0.717 
CRT Not relevant 0.000 
ASP Inadequate experience 0.686 
SCQ Inefficient 0.536 
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(f). Step 6- Compute a HPFP value for the investigated incident. 
From Equation 6.8, the computation of HPFP is illustrated as follows: 
HPFP = [(W X CPCL)ASO + (W X CPCL)SWC + (W X CPCL)MMI + (W X CPCL)APP + 
(W X CPCL)NSG + (W X CPCL)QAT + (W X CPCL)CRT + (W X CPCL)ASP + 
(w X CPCL)SCQ] 
_ [(0.274 x 0.560) + (0.114 x 0.735) + (0.110 x 0.590) + (0.131 x 0.724) + 
(0.131 x 0.752) + (0.118 x 0.717) + (0.038 x 0.000) + (0.036 x 0.686) + 
(0.048 x 0.536)] 
= 0.631 
The HPFP value is validated and found to be within the `Scrambled' COCOM 
parameter as shown in Table 4.2. 
Sensitivity analysis is a study of how the uncertainty in the output of a model can be 
apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in the model input (Tarantola, 2008). It is 
a method for testing the degree of sensitivity of a model's variables. Simulated 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs are given to nine CPCs, while retaining the weights of 
the CPCs. The initial defuzzified crisp value of a CPC from the `Prestige' case study 
was reduced from 10% to 90% at an interval step of 10%, while retaining the remaining 
eight CPCs defuzzified crisp values to obtain a new set of HPFP values. A similar 
method is applied to the remaining eight CPCs. The same quantification method of the 
proposed combined AHP and fuzzy quantification model is applied to determine if 
small changes of the input variables would induce small changes in the output results of 
HPFP values. If the model is reliable, then the sensitivity analysis must at least comply 
with two axioms that a reduction of each CPC's relative importance will result in the 
fall of the HPFP values, and the gradient of the HPFP values should be proportionate to 
each CPC's weight. Lesser weight CPCs should register lesser gradient compared to the 
greater weight CPCs. The simulated HPFP values are plotted for each CPC except 
CPCCRT for being not relevant to the case study, and are illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 The Trend Lines of Simulated HPFP values 
On analysing Figure 6.4, it can be illustrated that a small change in the relative 
importance of the CPCs has apparently changed the simulated HPFP values gradually as 
anticipated. Furthermore, continuous reduction of the relative importance of the CPCs 
has reduced the simulated HPFP values and the descent gradient of the reduction is 
proportionate to the weight of the CPCs. Additionally, no abrupt large changes of 
simulated HPFP values were generated in the sensitivity analysis. 
6.5 Results 
The reliability of the output of the proposed combined AHP and fuzzy quantification 
model is tested and the results are compared to the COCOM HPFP interval values 
provided in CREAM. The final HPFP value of the case study is established to be within 
a COCOM parameter. The COCOM has been tested and found to be satisfactory by 
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Stanton (Stanton et al., 2001). It has been found that human behaviour could be 
categorised reliably into the four control modes as illustrated in Table 4.2. In addition, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted of the proposed novel combined AHP and fuzzy 
quantification model to determine that small changes of the input variables would 
induce small changes in the output results. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that a 
continuous reduction of the relative importance of the CPCs has reduced the simulated 
HPFP values and the descent gradient of the reduction is proportionate to the weight of 
the CPCs. The evaluation of HPFP could lead to determination of human error in a 
shipboard management system. This can be performed by computing possible human 
error events through complete accident sequences considered as a whole or considered 
as a separate entity of an accident sequence (Cepin, 2008). The overall HPFP can be 
improved by reducing selected CPCs, resulting in less human error within the shipboard 
management. However, each CPC could further be apportioned into various 
components leading to a more accurate component that needs to be improved to reduce 
the human error within the investigated scope. The apparent distance between simulated 
HPFP values of CPCASO and CPCASP, shows that improving the CPCASO can achieve a 
better result than CPCASP to overcome `Prestige' incident. 
6.6 Discussions 
The proposed combined AHP and fuzzy quantification model has provided a novel 
HRA quantification in CREAM. The proposed model assists in the quantification of 
human performance within the shipboard management. The examples provided in this 
research are of use in maritime operations. However, the model could be applied to 
other industries with appropriate modification in the classifications of the CPCs. The 
significance of this model is that it could assist HRA analysts to determine in numerical 
values the status of human performance within the shipboard management in an 
investigated incident. As a result, actions can be taken to reduce human errors within the 
management system, systematically reducing the risk of a similar incident reoccurring 
in the future. Another aspect is that the newly developed model caters for the real-life 
case of CPCs considering that some of the CPCs could be performing a major role 
compared to other CPCs. This model is practical and still reliable for use in the present 
generic CREAM, which treats CPCs within groups. The limitation of this model is that 
a good qualitative analysis is required to obtain a detailed tabulated CPC along with its 
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linguistic terms. However, this was overcome by creating comprehensive classification 
tables dealing with maritime operations in Chapter 4. For future research, the introduced 
combined AHP and fuzzy quantification model can be created as computer software to 
produce quick results for HRA quantification values. The outcomes from this model can 
be used in other fields, such as quantification of undesired events in a fault tree or an 
event tree analysis. 
6.7 Conclusion 
A novel combined AHP and fuzzy quantification model is developed to estimate the 
HPFP based on the combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach of CREAM in maritime 
operations. The proposed model is found to be suitable for application to HRA due to 
the limited availability of data in the maritime domain and the uncertainty and 
complexity that exists in dealing with human reliability quantifications. The model has 
been tested and partially validated using a sensitivity analysis through the presented 
case study of `Prestige'. The case study has established that the results of HPFP values 
are within the parameters of COCOM of CREAM. The proposed model has also 
demonstrated that CREAM can be used successfully to determine the root causes of an 
incident along with quantifying the HPFP values within the event. Conclusions can be 
made that the proposed model can assist in HRAs, resulting in quantifying and reducing 
human errors in maritime operations. Finally, the developed novel combined AHP and 
fuzzy quantification model can further be used to compute the human performance 
failure probabilities in other transportation systems and industrial fields, such as 
chemical, gas and oil industries, resulting in a reduction in human errors. 
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Chapter 7 
RCO Selection in CREAM Using an 
Integrated AHP and Fuzzy TOPSIS Model 
Summary 
This chapter presents a novel integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model, to determine 
the selection of an optimal RCO by taking subjective judgment of decision makers into 
consideration in CREAM. This facilitates use of the advanced CREAM proposed in 
Chapter 4. The AHP method is used to determine the relative importance weights of the 
established criteria in CBA of the identified RCOs. This is followed by ranking of the 
selected RCOs using a fuzzy TOPSIS. The proposed model has been demonstrated 
through a case study and validated using a sensitivity analysis. The integrated model can 
be used along with the advanced CREAM, for identifying root causes of human error 
and for providing definitive appropriate RCOs that solve the root cause identified. 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter emphasises the newly introduced element of RCOs in the extended 
CREAM in Chapter 4. An appropriate list of RCOs can be identified and obtained on 
completion of detailed qualitative performance prediction in CREAM. The newly 
incorporated RCO in the generic CREAM model can assist in determining regulatory 
measures and actions required to be carried out based on the outcome of detailed 
qualitative performance analysis, taking into consideration elimination of the hazards, 
mitigation of the consequences and prevention of the occurrence of similar 
incident/accidents. In addition, all the intolerable risks from detailed qualitative analysis 
need to be reduced to an ALARP level. It can be carried out from various aspects, 
including management, operational and engineering issues, as described in detail in 
Chapter 3. An equitable and fair RCO can be selected by scrutinising the available 
RCOs. It would be prudent to develop a model that could assist decision makers to 
determine the appropriate RCO that needs to be selected. An integrated AHP and fuzzy 
TOPSIS model is developed to select an appropriate RCO by taking subjective 
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judgment of decision makers into consideration. Such decision making involves the 
identification and selection of alternatives based on the values and preferences of 
decision makers. 
7.2 Literature Review 
7.2.1 Overview on TOPSIS 
TOPSIS is a MCDM technique to identify solutions from a finite set of alternatives, 
based on simultaneous minimisation of distance from a Positive Ideal Solution (PIS) 
and maximisation of distance from a Negative Ideal Solution (NIS). It was developed by 
Hwang and Yoon (Hwang and Yoon, 1981). TOPSIS applies a Euclidean norm to 
obtain PIS and NIS values (Olson, 2004). The TOPSIS method begins with the 
construction of a normalised decision matrix in order to transform the various attribute 
dimensions into non-dimensional attributes and to allow for comparison across the 
attributes. This is followed by constructing a weighted normalised decision matrix. 
Then, the PIS and NIS values are determined, followed by computation of separation 
measures of ideal and negative ideal separations. Finally, relative closeness to the ideal 
solution is obtained, which allows for preferred order ranking among the alternatives. 
TOPSIS has been used extensively and its applications have been established including 
those in maritime operations (Celik et al., 2009a), computer operating systems (Ball and 
Korukoglu, 2009), finance (Mahmoodzadeh et al., 2007; Salehi, 2009), business (Tsou, 
2007; Percin, 2008; Sun and Lin, 2009), military operations (Wang and Chang, 2007; 
Dagdeviren, 2009), manufacturing (Li and Huang, 2009; Zeydan and Colpan, 2009) and 
in complex decision making (Lotfi et al., 2007). However, some of the criticisms of 
TOPSIS are its inability to adequately handle the ambiguity associated with mapping of 
the decision maker's perception to crisp values (Dagdeviren, 2009) and its inability to 
provide weight elicitation of various compared attributes (Celik et al., 2009b). The 
synopsis of TOPSIS development begins with the basic generic TOPSIS (Hwang and 
Yoon, 1981), followed by fuzzy TOPSIS (Chen, 2000) and TOPSIS under fuzzy 
environment to improve the existing ambiguity in the decision maker's judgment. 
Recently, an interval arithmetic-based fuzzy TOPSIS (Chu and Lin, 2009) was 
introduced by using an interval arithmetic approach for the normalisation of fuzzy 
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weights to overcome the present fuzzy TOPSIS approach of using approximate 
membership functions. 
7.2.2 Overview on Integrated AHP and Fuzzy TOPSIS 
The application of fuzzy set theory was introduced by Zadeh to express the linguistic 
terms used in the decision making process in order to determine the ambiguity and 
subjectivity of human judgment (Zadeh, 1965). This facilitates the introduction of fuzzy 
modelling into TOPSIS to address the existing ambiguity of human judgment. The 
fuzzy TOPSIS has been preferred to assist in the selection of an appropriate RCO 
because the fuzzy approach allows for the ambiguity of expert judgment to be taken into 
consideration. The fundamental criteria scale for the expert judgment used in the AHP 
was already in the fuzzy form from Weber-Fechner observations (Saaty, 2008). Hence, 
the fuzzy approach was not used in the AHP but in TOPSIS of the proposed model. 
Using a combination of both subjective approaches of utilising expert judgment to select 
an appropriate RCO could reduce the effects of ambiguity that arose from using 
information from human judgment and preferences. Compared to the AHP, the 
simplicity of fuzzy TOPSIS, which only requires limited subjective input from decision 
makers and its ability to identify the best alternative quickly, encourage the use of it to 
determine an appropriate RCO (Dagdeviren, 2009). 
7.2.3 Overview on Application of Fuzzy Modelling into TOPSIS 
Wang and Chang's (Wang and Chang, 2007) and Wang and Lee's (Wang and Lee, 
2009) approaches of TOPSIS under fuzzy environment have been adopted to improve 
human judgment analysis used in the basic generic TOPSIS. In this study, the 
alternative of RCOs is provided with seven levels of linguistic terms' ratings of 
importance. A membership function is established to each linguistic term to the rating of 
each alternative of the listed RCOs. The concept of membership functions used in fuzzy 
logic theory allows complex modelling, involving qualitative vague information of the 
expert judgment, to be illustrated. A triangular membership function is adopted with 
each linguistic term of the RCOs' rating being evaluated within its limits on an arbitrary 
scale of 0 to 1. Furthermore, modelling using triangular fuzzy numbers has been proven 
to be an effective way to address the subjectivity and ambiguity that exists in decision 
making problems (Chang and Yeh, 2002; Kahraman et al., 2004; Chang et al., 2007). A 
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triangular fuzzy number can be presented as (al, a2, a3), where the membership function 
(q) of the fuzzy number 1V can be defined as follows: 
0, x<a,, 
(x - al) / (a2 - a, ), al : x: 5 a2, 
(a3 - x) I (a3 - a2), a2: 5 x: 5 a3, 
N 
0, x>a3 
The following are the operational laws of triangular fuzzy numbers used in the fuzzy 
TOPSIS. Assume N and Ü as two triangular fuzzy numbers expressed as (a,, a2, a3) and 
(bl, b2, b3) respectively. Then, 
N (+)U= (a1, a2, a3) (+) (b1, b2, b3) = (ai + b1, a2 + b2, a3 + b3) (7.1) 
N (-) U= (a,, a2, a3) (-) (bi, b2, b3) =(a, - b3, a2 - b2, a3 - bi) (7.2) 
N (x)U= (at, a2, a3) (x) (bi, b2, b3) = (aibi, a2b2, a3b3) (7.3) 
(al a2 23 
) N(l)Ü= (ai, a2, a3) (I) (bi, b2, b3) _ \b3' b2' bý 
(7.4 
kN= (kal, ka2, ka3) (7.5) 
1_/1 1 11 7.6 " la3 9 a2 9 al) 
() (TN) 
7.3 Technique of Transforming Quantitative to Qualitative Data 
Procedures to collect and analyse quantitative and qualitative data in the context of a 
single study are known as mixed methods research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). The 
use of both quantitative and qualitative data could facilitate in expanding the scope of a 
research. It can provide means to offset weakness that might appear if either one 
approach was performed in the research (Driscoll et al., 2007). Recent studies, which 
integrates quantitative and qualitative data include those in health studies (Sandelowski, 
2000; Adamson et al., 2004), in social science (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie, 2003), in 
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childhood study (Weisner, 2005; Driscoll et al., 2007), in tourism (MacKay et al, 2004) 
and in business (Bazeley, 2004). 
If a decision maker has decided to use quantitative RCOs to be considered in selecting 
an appropriate RCO, a simple linear utility location algorithm method (Yang et al., 
2001) can be employed to facilitate the proposed methodology. The method can be 
illustrated as follows: 
Assume the costs of four RCOs are £50, £100, £200 and £350. In case, there are seven 
linguistic terms in the model, hence the following computation is performed to obtain 
the cost for each linguistic term. 
Cost for each linguistic term =£ 
(350-50) 
6 
= £50 
The costs of seven linguistic terms for RCOs will be £350, £300, £250, £200, £150, 
£100 and £50 for Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Medium Poor (MP), Fair (F), Medium 
Good (MG), Good (G), and Very Good (VG) respectively. Hence, the costs of four 
RCOs £50, £100, £200 and £350 can be categorised as VG, G, F and VP respectively. 
Meanwhile, if the RCO cost falls between the two linguistic terms for the RCOs, the 
linguistic term for that RCO cost could be computed using a belief degree method 
obtaining proportion values of the RCO cost belonging to the corresponding linguistic 
terms, which is illustrated as follows: 
Assume the cost of RCO as £70, which would be in between VG and G linguistic terms 
for the RCOs. 
Belief degree of VG linguistic term = 
(100-70) 
(100-50) 
(30) 
(50) 
= 0.600 
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Belief degree of G linguistic term = 
(70-50) 
(100-50) 
(20) 
(50) 
= 0.400 
The cost of RCO £70 could be categorised as VG with 0.6 belief degree and G with 0.4 
belief degree. 
7.4 Methodology 
The decision hierarchy of RCO selection and a generic framework of the proposed 
model are illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 respectively. Figure 7.1 displays the 
decision hierarchy structured with the established alternative RCOs and criteria of CBA 
elements. There are three levels in the decision hierarchy structured for the RCO 
selection problem. The base of the three-level decision hierarchy is formed by the 
alternative RCOs identified. This is followed by the criteria of CBA elements at the 
second level. Finally, the decision hierarchy is concluded with the selection of the RCO 
at the uppermost level of the hierarchy. Meanwhile, Figure 7.2 illustrates the research 
methodology, which consists of an AHP application to obtain weighting vectors for 
each of the listed criteria and the fuzzy TOPSIS application to select an appropriate 
RCO. Each step of the framework is elaborated in detail in the following subsections. 
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Figure 7.1 The Generic Decision Hierarchy of RCO Selection in CREAM 
157 
Chapter 7-RCO Selection in CREAM Using an Integrated AHP &FuzzyTOPSIS Model 
CREAM 
Qualitative Analysis 
Criteria of CBA elements 
AHP 
Pairwise Comparison 
Normalised Eigenvectors 
Principal Eigenvalues 
Consistency Validation 
r 
CI Compared RI 
Alternatives of RCOs 
FUZZY TOPSIS 
Fuzzy Decision Matrix 
Normalised Fuzzy Decision 
Matrix 
Weightelormalised 
Fuzzy Decision Matrix 
Fuzzy 
Positive Ideal 
Solutions A+ 
Fuzzy 
Negative Ideal 
Solutions X 
Fuzzy 
Positive Ideal 
Separation S; + 
Fuzzy 
Negative Ideal 
Separation S; 
NO CR < 0.1 
Relative Closeness to 
YES Ideal Solution Cj 
Wi 
I Appropriate RCO 
Selected 
Lý JL 
Figure 7.2 The General Framework of the Proposed Integrated AHP and 
Fuzzy TOPSIS Model 
158 
i 
t 
i 
Chapter 7-RCO Selection in CREAM Using an Integrated AHP &FuzzyTOPSIS Model 
The description of the proposed methodology framework is as follows: 
(a). Step 1- Obtain a list of the established criteria of CBA elements from the listed 
RCOs provided by decision makers. 
Such a list of the criteria can be obtained from expert judgment of a detailed qualitative 
CREAM analysis of an incident/accident. 
(b). Step 2- Carry out pairwise comparisons of the listed criteria to determine the 
relative importance weights among the criteria using an AHP by expert judgment. 
Equation 6.1 can be applied to obtain an average scale used for pairwise comparisons 
when more than one expert is involved for analysis. 
(c). Step 3- Compute the weights of the established criteria. 
The weights of the established criteria values are computed using Equations 6.2 to 6.6 
from Chapter 6. 
(d). Step 4- Evaluation of RCOs with respect to each criterion. 
Adopting Dagdeviren's approach (Dagdeviren, 2009), the alternative RCO ratings are 
determined by the expert judgment' evaluation using linguistic fuzzy values. The 
membership functions of linguistic variables for the alternative RCO ratings, and details 
of the fuzzy linguistic terms and their correspondent fuzzy numbers for the alternative 
RCO ratings are illustrated in Figure 7.3 and Table 7.1 respectively. 
P 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
Figure 7.3 The Membership Functions of Linguistic Variables for RCOs 
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Table 7.1 The Fuzzy Linguistic Terms and 
Correspondent Fuzzy Numbers for RCOs 
Linguistic terms Abbreviation Fuzzy Numbers 
Very Poor VP (0,0,0.20) 
Poor p (0.05,0.20,0.35) 
Medium Poor MP (0.20,0.35,0.50) 
Fair F (0.35,0.50,0.65) 
Medium Good MG (0.50,0.65,0.80) 
Good G (0.65,0.80,0.95) 
Very Good VG (0.80,1.00,1.00) 
Using a combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach model as elaborated in Chapter 6, the 
HPFP for an incident is calculated. Using a similar approach, the HPFP values after 
applying each RCO to the incident can be obtained. Finally, a list of RCOs HPFP 
reduction values is determined by subtracting the HPFP of each RCO from the initial 
HPFP of the incident. The quantitative RCOs estimation can be transformed into 
qualitative ones using the technique described in Section 7.3. 
(e). Step 5- Construct a fuzzy decision matrix for the listed RCOs compared with each 
established criterion of the CBA elements. 
When more than one expert is used for an analysis, Equation 6.1 needs to be applied to 
obtain an average value used in the fuzzy decision matrix. A typical fuzzy decision 
matrix K can be expressed as follows: 
Cri 1... Crij """ Cris 
RCO1 All ... P12 ... Pis 
K= RCO; pa ... pik ... pis 
RCO, pml """ pmt """ p. 
where RCO1, RCO2,..., RCO, are the alternative RCOs, Crü, Cri2,..., Cris referring 
to the evaluation criteria of the CBA elements, p; ý represents the rating of alternative 
RCO; with respect to criterion Crib, i=1,2,..., m and j=1,2,..., s. 
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(f). Step 6- Construct a normalised fuzzy decision matrix. 
The normalised fuzzy decision matrix R is developed by using Equation 7.7. 
R =[rid], ,i=1,2,..., mandj=1,2,..., s. (7.7) 
where for the benefit criteria, 
ell 
ay by c 
cj+ = max; c, and, 
Ldj+ ci + cf+ 
where for the cost criteria, 
Iaj 
a; a; 
rý=a; = mini ay 
'Sy 
by a 
where p; ý = (a, , b; ý, c, ) is the evaluated RCOs' performance to each criterion and max; c; ý 
and min; a; ý are the maximum and minimum values of RCO; with respect to criterion 
Crib for each criterion in the fuzzy decision matrix respectively. 
(g). Step 7- Construct a weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix for the RCOs. 
The weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix is constructed by multiplying the 
normalised fuzzy decision matrix by the importance weights of the criteria obtained from 
Equation 6.3. The relationship is illustrated in Equation 7.8. 
V=[vrý],,, i=1,2,..., m and j=1,2,..., s. (7.8) 
where 
vii = r; ý x Wj 
where wj is the importance weight of criterion Crib. 
(h). Step 8- Determine the Fuzzy Positive Ideal Solution (FPIS) and Fuzzy Negative 
Ideal Solution (FNIS). 
The V, elements are normalised positive triangular fuzzy numbers and include ranges to 
the closed interval [0,11i Thus, the FPIS A+ and FNIS A7 can be illustrated as in 
Equations 7.9 and 7.10 respectively. 
A+ _ (Vi +, v2+, vl+,..., vs+} (7.9) 
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Ei={ V1'q V2'9 Vj 
,..., Vs ! 
where vj+=(1,1,1) and Vi =(0,0,0), j= 1,2,..., s. 
(7. i 0) 
(i). Step 9- Computation of separation measures using the m-dimensional Euclidean 
distance. 
The separation of each alternative RCO from the FPIS (Si') and FNIS (Si') is computed 
using Equations 7.11 and 7.12 respectively. Equation 7.13 is used to compute the 
distance between two triangular fuzzy numbers using the vertex method (Chen, 2000). 
s 
S; += (v; ý - vj) where i=1,2,..., m and j=1,2,..., s. (7.11) 
j=1 
s 
S; _1 (vjý-vj) where i= 1,2,..., mandj= 1,2,..., s. (7.12) 
j=1 
where S; + is the separation of the ith RCO from FPIS, Sf is the separation of the ith RCO 
from FNIS, and v; ý, vj' and Vi denote triangular fuzzy numbers from the weighted 
normalised fuzzy decision matrix. 
d (NA =3 [(a, - b1)2 + (a2 - b2)2+ (a3 - b3)2] (7.13) 
where, N and Ü as two triangular fuzzy numbers expressed as (al, a2, a3) and (bl, b2, b3) 
respectively and d is the distance between N and U. 
(j). Step 10 - Computation of the relative closeness (C; ) to the ideal solution and ranking 
of each alternative RCO. 
The C; values are obtained by using Equation 7.14. 
Si- 
C; = where i=1,2,..., m 
( S; ++S, ) 
(7.14) 
Finally, the ranking of RCOs is determined by comparing the obtained C; values and the 
preference order ranked according to the descending values of C. The performance of a 
RCO is better as the value of its C; increases. 
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7.5 Case Study of `Carina' 
The case study of `Carina' is used to demonstrate the proposed integrated AHP and 
fuzzy TOPSIS model to determine an appropriate selection of RCO in CREAM. The 
case study can be presented as a MCDM problem in which the alternatives are the 
RCOs and the criteria are those attributes which relate to the CBA elements from the 
listed RCOs. 
(a). Step 1-A tabulated list of the established criteria of CBA elements from the listed 
RCOs provided by decision makers. Such a list of criteria and RCOs is obtained from 
expert judgment of a detailed qualitative analysis of CREAM on the `Carina' incident 
elaborated in Chapter 4 and is presented in Table 7.2. Additionally, a decision hierarchy 
of RCO selection in CREAM of the `Carina' incident is illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
Table 7.2 The Criteria of CBA Elements for the RCO Selection of the `Carina' Incident 
Criteria Description 
CF Cost to implement the selected RCO 
TE Time taken to complete the selected RCO 
Ec Efforts required to implement the selected RCO 
LF Lifespan of the selected RCO 
HPFPR Human Performance Failure Probability reduction 
With reference to Table 7.2, criterion CF, TE and Ec are categorised as cost criteria, 
whereas criterion LF and HPFPR are categorised as benefit criteria. 
CF 
(Criterion 1) 
Pcv 
(RCO 1) 
Selection of RCO in CREAM 
TE Ec LF 
(Criterion 2) (Criterion 3) (Criterion 4) 
D, Tf Gd 
(RCO 2) (RCO 3) (RCO 4) 
HPFPR 
(Criterion 5) 
Figure 7.4 The Decision Hierarchy of RCO Selection in CREAM 
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The abbreviations used in Figure 7.4 are as follows: 
i). CF - Cost to implement the selected RCO. 
ii). TE - Time taken to complete the selected RCO. 
iii). Ec - Efforts required to implement the selected RCO. 
iv). LF - Lifespan of the selected RCO. 
v). HPFPR - Human Performance Failure Probability reduction. 
vi). Pcv - Periodical checking of the cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves. 
vii). Dv - Dismantling of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves during vessel's 
drydocking. 
viii). Tf - Continuous training and familiarisation of crew onboard oil tankers to be 
conducted to emphasise the significance of proper use of cargo tanks' inert gas 
branch valves. 
ix). Gd -A good structural design at shipbuilding phase, along with a reliable locking 
arrangement of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves and an appropriate warning system 
such as an audible alarm, visual light warning signals, or a combination of the two, 
which could be provided in the cargo control room to show the status of the cargo tanks' 
inert gas branch valves. 
(b). Step 2- Carry out pairwise comparisons of the listed criteria to determine the 
relative importance weights among the criteria using an AHP by expert judgment. 
A human-reliability specialist from a classification society, two officials from two flag 
state administrations with accident investigation backgrounds, and a master mariner 
with more than ten years of oil tanker sailing experience were used to provide expert 
judgment of pairwise comparison of criteria. The individual expert evaluations are 
provided in Appendix V. The average scales used for the pairwise comparison of 
criteria are obtained by using Equation 6.1. Table 7.3 illustrates the result of expert 
judgment pairwise comparison of the criteria. 
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From Equation 6.1, an example of calculation to obtain judgment matrix for pairwise 
comparison of criteria value of TE to Ec by row is shown as follows: 
The pairwise comparison of criterion TE to Ec value, 
r(aJ(x)+a2(x)+a3(x)+a4(x)1 
L41 
[(1.000 + 2.000 + 2.000 + 2.000)] 
L4 
= 1.750 
where, aj(x), a2(x), a3(x) and a4(x) are the values on the pairwise comparison of criteria 
TE to Ec by row obtained from expert evaluations. 
Table 7.3 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of Criteria 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
CF 1.000 0.778 1.028 1.028 1.000 
TE 1.285 1.000 1.750 2.625 1.000 
Ec 0.973 0.571 1.000 2.583 1.000 
LF 0.973 0.381 0.387 1.000 1.000 
HPFPR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(c). Step 3- Compute the weights of the established criteria. 
The computation of weights of the established criteria is carried out using an AHP 
method similar to the computation of CPCs' relative importance weights for `Prestige' 
using Equations 6.2 to 6.6 from Chapter 6. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of criteria of CF, TE, Ec LF and 
HPFPR are 5.231,3.730,5.165,8.236 and 5.000 respectively. The normalised relative 
importance of each criterion is computed using Equation 6.2 and shown in Table 7.4. 
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From Equation 6.2, an example of calculation to obtain the normalised relative 
importance of TE to Ec by row is illustrated as follows: 
11 
Normalised relative importance value of TE to Ec _ R5.165) " 1.750] 
= 0.339 
Table 7.4 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Importance of Criteria 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
CF 0.191 0.209 0.199 0.125 0.200 
TE 0.246 0.268 0.339 0.319 0.200 
Ec 0.186 0.153 0.194 0.314 0.200 
LF 0.186 0.102 0.075 0.121 0.200 
HPFPR 0.191 0.268 0.194 0.121 0.200 
Upon having a normalised comparison criteria matrix, five priority eigenvectors 
representing each criterion importance are computed using Equation 6.3. The priority 
vectors show relative weights among the criteria compared. 
From Equation 6.3, an example of calculation to obtain relative weight of criterion TE is 
illustrated as follows: 
[(0.246 + 0.268 + 0.339 + 0.319 + 0.200)1 
Relative weight of criterion TE =L5 
= 0.274 
Using a similar method, the relative weights of the remaining criteria are computed. The 
relative weights of criteria CF, TE, Ec, LF and HPFPR are computed as 0.185,0.274, 
0.209,0.137 and 0.195 respectively. 
A principal eigenvalue, %max is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
), max=5 X 
{ [(0.185 x 
1.000)+(0.274 x 0.778)+(0.209 x 1.028)+(0.137 x 1.028)+(0.195 x 1.000)1+ 
1 0.185 1 
[(0.185 x 1.285) +(0.274 x 1.000) + (0.209 x 1.750) + (0.137 x 
I. 0.274 
5x1.000)1 
+ +(0.19 
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[(0.185 x 0.973) +(0.274 x 0.571)+(0.209 x 1.000)+(0.137 x 2.583)+(0.195 x 1.000)1 + I. 0.209 
(0.185 x 0.973) +(0.274 x 0.381) + (0.209 x 0.387)+(0.137 x 1.000)+(0.195 x 1.000)1 + L 0.137 
((0.185 x 1.000) +(0.274 x 1.000) + (0.209 x 1.000) + (0.137 x 1.000) + (0.195 X 1.000)1} 
L 0.195 
= 5.162 
From Equation 6.5 with s=5, CI = 
[(5.162 - 5)1 
(5-1) J 
= 0.040 
1(0.040) 
From Equation 6.6 and RI value taken from Table 6.2, CR = 1(1.110)) 
= 0.036 
The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Thus, the expert judgment on the criteria is 
consistent. 
(d). Step 4- Evaluation of RCOs with respect to each criterion. 
With reference to the HPFP computation for `Prestige' in Chapter 6, the HPFP value for 
the `Carina' incident is computed using Equations 6.2 to 6.8 from Chapter 6. Detailed 
computation of obtaining the HPFPCar; na is provided in Appendix VI. In a similar 
method, the HPFPs on implementation of RCOs can be obtained and are provided in 
Appendix VI and listed as follows: 
HPFP Carina = 0.623, HPFP Dv = 0.603, HPFP Pcv = 0.607, HPFP Tf = 0.612, and 
HPFP Gd = 0.484 
The following are the HPFP reduction for each RCO: 
HPFPR Dv = (0.623 - 0.603) = 0.020 
HPFPR Pcv = (0.623 - 0.607) = 0.016 
HPFPR Tf = (0.623 - 0.612) = 0.011 
HPFPR Gd = (0.623 - 0.484) = 0.139 
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The HPFPR of each RCO is converted to the linguistic variables using a similar method 
as described in Section 7.3. 
The HPFPR Tf and HPFPR Gd of 0.011 and 0.139 would be the VP and VG RCO 
linguistic variables respectively due to its minimum and maximum HPFPR values. The 
interpolations to obtain the linguistic variables for the HPFPR Pc,, and HPFPR Tf are 
provided as follows: 
x(0.139 - 0.011)1 Distance between two neighbouring HPFPR linguistic variables =L6 
= 0.021 
Since the VP rating was 0.011 hence, the next RCO rating of P will be, 
=(0.011+0.021) 
= 0.032 
The HPFPR Pcv and HPFPR Dv ratings fall between VP and P. The interpolation to obtain 
the HPFPR Pc, and HPFPR D,, ratings are illustrated as follows: 
HPFPR Pcv =E 
(0.032-0.016 
VP, 
[(0.016-0.011)1 
(0.032-0.011) (0.032-0.011) 
= 0.8 VP and 0.2 P 
Using the fuzzy numbers for the linguistic terms VP and P in Table 7.1, the final HPFPR 
Pcv is obtained as follows: 
HPFPR Pcv = [(0.8 x (0,0,0.2)) + (0.2 x (0.05,0.20,0.35))] 
= [(0,0,0.16)+(0.01,0.04,0.07)] 
=(0.01,0.04,0.23) 
(0.032 - 0.020) (0.020 - 0.011) HPFPR DV = 1(0.032-0.01 1) VP' (0.032 - 0.011) 
P 
= 0.6 VP and 0.4 P 
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Using Table 7.1, the final HPFPR D, is obtained as follows: 
HPFPR DV = [(0.6 x (0,0,0.2)) + (0.4 x (0.05,0.20,0.35))] 
= [(0.00,0.00,0.12) + (0.02,0.08,0.14)] 
= (0.02,0.08,0.26) 
(e). Step 5- Construct a fuzzy decision matrix for the listed RCOs with respect to each 
established criterion of the CBA elements. 
Similar method of averaging four experts evaluation values using Equation 6.1 as 
mentioned in Step 2 and Table 7.1 were used to obtain the final judgment matrix for 
fuzzy decision matrix of RCOs/criteria. The individual expert evaluations are provided 
in Appendix V. The fuzzy decision matrix for the listed RCOs compared with each 
established criterion of the CBA elements is illustrated in Table 7.5. 
From Equation 6.1, an example of calculation to obtain the fuzzy decision matrix is 
illustrated as follows: 
The value of RCO Dv with respect to Ec of the fuzzy decision matrix of RCOs/criteria, 
_ 
((QJ(x)+a2(x)+a3(x)+a4(x))1 
4J 1 
[(G+G+G+F)] 
L4 
0.65,0.80,0.95) + (0.65,0.80,0.95) + 0.80,0.95) + (0.35,0.50, 
[(2.30,2.90, 
l43.50)] 
= (0.58,0.73,0.88) 
where ai (x), a2 (x), a3 (x) and a4 (x) are the values of RCO Dv with respect to Ea 
obtained from expert evaluations. 
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Table 7.5 The Judgment Matrix for Fuzzy Decision Matrix of RCOs/Criteria 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
RCOs 
Pc,, (0.54,0.70, (0.20,0.35, (0.28,0.43, (0.20,0.35, (0.01,0.04, 
0.81) 0.50) 0.58) 0.50) 0.23) 
D, (0.13,0.28, (0.65,0.80, (0.58,0.73, (0.14,0.21, (0.02,0.08, 
0.43) 0.95) 0.88) 0.39) 0.26) 
Tf (0.39,0.54, (0.20,0.35, (0.13,0.28, (0.13,0.28, (0,0,0.20) 
0.69) 0.50) 0.43) 0.43) 
Gd (0.16,0.31, (0.39,0.55, (0.65,0.84, (0.80,1.00, (0.80,1.00, 
0.46) 0.66) 0.88) 1.00) 1.00) 
(f). Step 6- Construct a normalised fuzzy decision matrix. 
All the criteria have been converted into benefit element and therefore, only Equation 
7.7 for the benefit criteria is used in this case study. The normalised fuzzy decision 
matrix is constructed by using Equation 7.7 and is presented in Table 7.6. From 
Equation 7.7, an example of calculation to obtain the normalised relative performance 
value of RCO Dv with respect to Ec is illustrated as follows: 
0.58 0.73 0.88 
The normalised value of Dv to Ec = 
KU 
88) ' 
(0.88)' C0.88)i 
= (0.66,0.83,1.00) 
Table 7.6 The Judgment Matrix for Normalised Fuzzy 
Decision Matrix of RCOs/Criteria 
"-, Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
RCOs 
Pc,, (0.66, 0.86, (0.21, 0.37, (0.31, 0.49, (0.20, 0.35, (0.01,0.04, 
1.00) 0.53) 0.66) 0.50) 0.23) 
D, (0.15, 0.34, (0.68, 0.84, (0.66, 0.83, (0.14, 0.21, (0.02,0.08, 
0.52) 1.00) 1.00) 0.39) 0.26) 
Tf (0.48, 0.66, (0.21, 0.37, (0.14, 0.31, (0.13, 0.28, (0,0,0.20) 
0.85) 0.53) 0.49) 0.43) 
Gd (0.20, 0.38, (0.41, 0.58, (0.74, 0.96, (0.80, 1.00, (0.80,1.00, 
0.57) 0.70) 1.00) 1.00) 1.00) 
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(g). Step 7- Construct a weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix for the RCOs 
compared with the criteria of the CBA elements. 
Equation 7.8 is used to develop the weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix. The 
relative weight of each criterion obtained through AHP is multiplied by the triangular 
fuzzy numbers of the evaluated judgment matrix of the fuzzy decision matrix of 
RCOs/criteria. The weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix for the RCOs compared 
with the criteria of the CBA elements is shown in Table 7.7. 
From Equation 7.8, an example of calculation to obtain the weighted normalised fuzzy 
decision matrix value of RCO Dv to Ec by row is illustrated as follows: 
The weighted normalised value of D, to Ec = (0.66,0.83,1.00) x 0.209 
= (0.138,0.173,0.209) 
Table 7.7 The Judgment Matrix for Weighted 
Normalised Fuzzy Decision Matrix of RCOs 
'--, Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
RCOs 
Pc,. (0.122,0.159, (0.058,0.101, (0.066,0.102, (0.027,0.048, (0.002,0.008, 
0.185) 0.144) 0.138) 0.068) 0.045) 
D, (0.028,0.063, (0.188,0.231, (0.138,0.173, (0.019,0.029, (0.004,0.016, 
0.097) 0.274) 0.209) 0.053) 0.051) 
Tf (0.088,0.122, (0.058,0.101, (0.030,0.066, (0.017,0.038, (0,0,0.039) 
0.156) 0.144) 0.102) 0.058) 
Gd (0.037,0.071, (0.112,0.159, (0.155,0.200, (0.110,0.137, (0.156,0.195, 
0.105) 0.191) 0.209) 0.137) 0.195) 
(h). Step 8- Determine the FPIS and FNIS. 
The FPIS values of Pc, D, Tf and Gd are determined with reference to Equation 7.9, 
and are as follows: 
A+= [(1,1,1), (1,1,1), (1,1,1), (1,1,1)] 
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Meanwhile, the FNIS values of Pcv, Dv, Tf and Gd are established with reference to 
Equation 7.10, and are as follows: 
A' _ [(0,0,0, ), (0,0,0, ), (0,0,0, ), (0,0,0, )] 
(i). Step 9- Computation of separation measures using the m-dimensional Euclidean 
distance. 
The separation of each alternative of Pcv, Dv, Tf, and Gd from the FPIS and FNIS are 
obtained by using Equations 7.11 and 7.12 respectively along with Equation 7.13, and 
are as follows: 
Sj+ = 4.578,4.478,4.662,4.279 
S; = 0.447,0.545,0.368,0.735 
An example of calculation to obtain the S; + value of RCO Dv is illustrated as follows: 
Si' of Dv value 
1={3x 
[(0.028 - 1.000)2 + (0.063- 1.000)2+ (0.097- 1.000)2] + 
3x [(0.188 - 1.000)2 + (0.231- 1.000)2 + (0.274 - 1.000)2] + 
3x [(0.138 - 1.000)2 + (0.173 - 1.000)2 + (0.209 - 1.000)2] + 
3X[(0.019 
- 1.000)2 + (0.029 - 1.000)2 + (0.053 - 1.000)2] + 
3X [(0.004 - 1.000)2 + (0.016 - 1.000)2 + (0.051- 1.000)2] 
} 
= 4.478 
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(j). Step 10 - Computation of the C; to the ideal solution and ranking of RCOs. 
The C; values of Pc,,, D,,, Tf, and Gd are obtained by using Equation 7.14 and the 
preference order ranked according to the descending values is illustrated in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8 The Preference Order of C; 
Sequence RCOs C; 
1 Gd 0.147 
2 D,, 0.109 
3 Pcv 0.089 
4 Tf 0.073 
From Equation 7.14, an example of calculation to obtain the C; value of D,, is illustrated 
as follows: 
0.545 
The C, value of Dv = 1(4.478 + 0.545) 
= 0.109 
7.6 Sensitivity Analysis of RCO Selection in CREAM 
Sensitivity analysis is a study of how the uncertainty in the output of a model can be 
apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in the model input (Saltelli et al., 2008). 
It is a method for testing the degree of sensitivity of a model's variables and considered 
by some as prerequisite for model building in diagnostic or prognostic setting (Saltelli, 
2002). The results of a sensitivity analysis can be used to validate a model, warn of 
unrealistic model behaviour, help formulate model structure, suggest new experiments, 
guide future data collection efforts, suggest accuracy for calculating parameters and 
detect critical criteria. A sensitivity analysis tells which parameters are the most 
important and most likely to affect predictions of the model (Smith et al., 2008). A 
sensitivity analysis was performed by changing the expert judgment evaluation 
associated with the performance of RCO. The performance of D,, to the criterion TE was 
changed from G to MP reducing at an interval step of one level of linguistic term. The 
simulated preference order of Cl was plotted for each linguistic level. If the model is 
reliable, then the sensitivity analysis must at least comply with an axiom that a 
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reduction of D, performance will result in the fall of its preferences. Small changes of 
the input variables would induce small changes in the output results of C; values. The 
final trend lines of resultant simulated C; values of Pc, D,., T1, and Gd are illustrated in 
Figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5 The Trend Lines of Simulated Preference Order of C; 
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Tf 
On analysing Figure 7.5, it can be illustrated that a small change in the expert judgment 
scale performance of D, with regards to the criterion TE has apparently changed the 
simulated C; values of D, gradually as anticipated. Furthermore, continuous reduction of 
D, performance has reduced the simulated C; values and resulted in the fall of D, 
ranking from second to third. Additionally, no abrupt large changes of simulated C, 
values were generated in the sensitivity analysis. 
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7.7 Results 
The case study of `Carina' has demonstrated that Gd, "a good structural design at 
shipbuilding phase, along with a reliable locking arrangement of the cargo tanks' inert 
gas branch valves and an appropriate warning system such as an audible alarm, visual 
light warning signals, or a combination of the two, which could be provided in the cargo 
control room on the status of the cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves" has been selected 
as the preferred RCO. This is followed by Dv, "Dismantling of cargo tanks' inert gas 
branch valves during vessel's dry-docking and verify its integrity" and Pci,, "Periodical 
checking of the cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves". The last RCO is Tf, "Continuous 
training and familiarisation of crew onboard oil tankers to be conducted to emphasise 
the significance of proper use of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves". The apparent 
distance between C, values of Gd and Tf, compared to Dv and Pc,, shows that 
implementation of the Gd could achieve a better result than Tf to overcome `Carina' 
incident. 
7.8 Discussions 
The proposed integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model could be applied along with the 
developed extended CREAM framework to select an appropriate RCO. The presented 
case study concentrated on a maritime incident/accident, however the proposed model 
could be easily adapted and used in other industries with appropriate modifications in 
CREAM classification schemes. Hence, application of the proposed model could 
provide a transparent tool for reducing human errors in industrial environments. An 
AHP approach of expert judgment is applied to obtain relative weights of importance of 
criteria of the CBA elements. Given the advantages of both, AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS, 
the proposed model provides a reliable means of determining an appropriate selection of 
RCOs. Additionally, the innovative proposed model has been demonstrated by a case 
study and partially validated using a sensitivity analysis. The full validation of this 
model is possible provided more time is given for the model to be used and tested 
rigorously by various stakeholders in the maritime industry and other industries. The 
significance of the proposed model is that it could assist decision makers to determine 
an ideal RCO in terms of overcoming the root cause of an incident/accident effectively. 
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As a result, actions can be taken to reduce human errors within a management system, 
efficiently preventing the risk of a similar incident/accident occurring in the future. 
7.9 Conclusion 
A novel integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model to determine an appropriate selection 
of RCO in CREAM is proposed in this chapter. An AHP method is used to determine 
the weight of each criterion of the CBA element derived from a comprehensive 
qualitative analysis of CREAM. Then a fuzzy TOPSIS method is used to determine the 
ranking of the RCOs. The integration of AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS approaches can assist 
decision makers to select an appropriate RCO when an incident/accident investigation is 
carried out. The proposed model can work together with the developed extended 
CREAM framework to select an appropriate RCO, which can be adapted and used in 
other transportation systems and industrial fields such as the chemical, gas and oil 
industries. Finally, this approach of using an integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS in 
CREAM and in selecting an RCO can assist in HRA, resulting in the reduction of 
human errors in industrial environments. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Further Research 
Summary 
This chapter summarises the results of the research. The themes for which further 
efforts are required in order to improve the developed subject matter in the research are 
outlined. The limitations of the research are elicited. 
8.1 Conclusions 
In the preceding chapters, the various technical models involved in the development of 
the CREAM have been outlined in detail. As a whole, the research has provided a 
comprehensive HRA framework supplemented with tools to support it. This chapter 
provides the main conclusions of this research study, which can be summarised as 
follows: 
i). A generic oil tanker, to provide means of risk factors to be taken into account while 
performing risk assessment for an oil tanker, is produced in Chapter 3. A similar generic 
framework can be further expanded emphasising the navigation bridge and cargo 
control room. 
ii). A newly developed HRA to facilitate a FSA framework will provide comprehensive 
fundamental information and development of the application of HRA in an 
incident/accident investigation. The innovative framework addresses the human factors, 
which are known to be the most important contributors to the causation and avoidance 
of an incident/accident. The proposed framework can be applied by principal 
stakeholders in the shipping industry in general and in the management of oil tankers in 
particular, to continuously improve the shipboard operation to prevent oil spills. In 
addition, continuous application of this approach would further refine it and, 
subsequently, would improve the decisions made by the tanker owners, leading to a 
safer oil tanker shipping community. One of the ideal ways of preventing oil spills by 
oil tankers is by immolating the system approach, by anticipating the worst and 
equipping a ship's crew members to deal with it at all levels of the organisation within a 
shipboard management. This can be further accentuated by implementing a safety 
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culture within the organisation in which the crewmembers' pursuit of safety is not so 
much about preventing isolated human failures or technical failures, but more towards 
making the organisation as robust as practicable in order to manage and minimise its 
human operational hazards. 
iii). The proposed innovative advanced CREAM framework provides a complete 
solution to HRA. It is significant for the need to find ways to analyse human error and 
to provide a good solution in order to prevent reoccurrence of an investigated 
incident/accident. This research would change the perspective of an incident/accident 
investigation from merely finding the root causes of an incident/accident to providing a 
complete solution to the investigation to prevent reoccurrence of a similar 
incident/accident in the future. The advanced CREAM can be easily assimilated into a 
simulator to be used as a third generation HRA method. Hence, the new advanced 
CREAM framework, which caters to the need to find the root causes of an 
incident/accident along with providing a solution to overcome the accident/incident, 
subsequently providing quantification of HRA, can be established as adding to the 
frontier of knowledge in a way that has not been done before. 
iv). The developed pioneer approach of using a DEMATEL model, which illustrates and 
allows for a comprehensive comprehension of relationships and interdependencies of 
CPCs, will reduce the existing gap left in CREAM research studies in terms of 
understanding of the CPCs. Furthermore, the proposed model can be tailored to 
recognise and incorporate the relationships and interdependencies among human factor 
variables involved in other transportation systems and industrial fields, such as the 
chemical, gas and oil industries. A better understanding of the relationships among the 
human factor variables involved in causing an incident/accident can facilitate a 
reduction in human error. 
v). The research has also introduced a new approach to compute human reliability, 
using a combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach, which is very much lacking in the 
maritime industry, and at the same time overcomes the existing fallacy of making the 
assumption that the CPCs are all of equal importance which is not in fact the case. 
Additionally, the proposed model also facilitates in dealing with limitation of 
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availability of data in the maritime domain and, the uncertainty and complexity that 
exist in the quantitative analysis of human reliabilities. Moreover, the proposed model 
can easily be modified to other transportation systems and industrial fields, and enhance 
HRA data in the related fields. 
vi). Finally, this research has proposed an innovative integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS 
model to select an appropriate RCO to supplement the advanced CREAM framework to 
facilitate an incident/accident investigation. Additionally, with minor modifications, the 
proposed model can also be used in the generic FSA framework to determine an ideal 
RCO. 
vii). The contribution of this research from the practical aspect of the maritime industry 
is that it would facilitate the effective investigation of an oil tanker incidentlaccident. 
Additionally, a similar advanced CREAM framework can be utilised for other industries 
by modifying classification schemes in the CREAM to suit the industry concerned. 
Most of the HRA research had been carried out in the nuclear, chemical, oil, gas and 
aviation industries. The research has added to the frontier of knowledge in a way that 
has not been done before by concentrating on the maritime domain to overcome the 
present limited nature of similar research in the maritime industry. The prime audience 
of this research is obviously maritime accident investigators however the research 
findings and conclusions are of interest to a wider audience, including maritime 
researchers, other maritime safety policy makers and regulators, and other stakeholders 
in the shipping industry at large. The entire research has made a reasonable contribution 
to pushing forward the frontier of knowledge and has provided a sensible contribution 
to the practical aspect of the maritime industry. Nevertheless, with a judicious number 
of modifications, the outcome of this research can be assimilated for use in other 
transportation systems and industrial fields, such as the chemical, gas and oil industries. 
8.2 Limitations of the Research 
The research is focused on one of the second generation HRA methods, CREAM, to 
ensure an extensive detailed coverage. The whole research is solely focused on 
maritime operations, which results in changes made in classification tables of CREAM 
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that are limited to maritime use only. The characteristic of the proposed human 
reliability quantification model using a combined AHP and fuzzy logic approach 
requires a good qualitative analysis to obtain a detailed tabulated CPC along with the 
model's utilisation of linguistic terms, which will result in the need for experienced 
HRA analysts. The integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model to determine the selection 
of an appropriate RCO by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into 
consideration in CREAM involves a complex quantification method using fuzzy 
TOPSIS. An additional feature of decision support is that all the proposed models 
require expert judgment and evaluation of data, meaning that personnel who are well 
experienced in the related field are needed. Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative 
assessment approaches were utilised in this research to attain larger means of input data 
for the technical models. The use of both quantitative and qualitative data could 
facilitate in expanding the scope of a research. In addition, it can provide means to 
offset weakness that might appear if either one approach was performed in the research. 
8.3 Further Research 
The areas that can be further developed are as follows: 
i). The advancement of shipping management resulted in an increased number of 
maritime base training and research simulators. Simulator based studies can be 
conducted to perform qualitative and quantitative analyses of HRA. Structured research 
studies specifically devised for collecting data available for use in HRA can be carried 
out. The proposed advanced CREAM framework can be designed as computer software 
and used in maritime simulators for HRA purposes, which can contribute to an increase 
in maritime failure data focusing on human error. 
ii). More research studies can be carried out to develop the present classification 
schemes of CREAM to cater specifically for the maritime domain, especially for the 
navigation bridge, cargo control room and engine room. Additionally, more work can be 
carried out to develop comprehensive classification schemes of CREAM for various 
types of vessels, including containerships, gas carriers, bulk carriers, car carriers and 
reefers. 
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iii). All the proposed models were partially validated hence the HRA validation 
exercises in this research need to undergo rigorous testing and can be further developed. 
The validation practices will further refine the methods and increase the credibility and 
applicability of HRA overall. 
iv). Further attempts to develop the proposed approach using a DEMATEL model can 
be made by incorporating an AHP technique. An AHP can be used to determine weights 
of importance of the CPCs and be applied to the DEMATEL model to ascertain 
constructively the CPCs that play important roles in causing an incident/accident. 
v). Fuzzy logic theory can facilitate addressing qualitative information in investigating a 
maritime incident/accident. Hence, the fuzzy approach can be utilised to perform a 
pairwise comparison in terms of the influence and direction among the CPCs in the 
proposed DEMATEL model, allowing for the ambiguity of expert judgment to be taken 
into consideration rationally. 
8.4 Applicability of Research to Other Industries. 
This research as a pioneer work in developing and applying advanced techniques to 
improve the generic CREAM in oil tanker operations establishes a foundation for future 
effort to improve the use of CREAM in other industries. All the proposed models in the 
research can be modified to be used for other industries. An example of the utilisation of 
the proposed DEMATEL model in business environment can be described as follows. 
The relationships and interdependencies among the departments in a company can be 
studied using the DEMATEL model to raise the productivity of the human resources. 
This can be performed by illustrating the causal diagram using the individuals in each 
department instead of the CPCs. Recommendations can be made on the selected 
individuals that are required to be sent for further management trainings based on the 
outcome of the causal diagram. 
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Elicitation of Expert Judgment (General) 
1.1 Description of Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) 
Detailed descriptions of the nine CPC functions are as follows: 
i). Adequacy of Shipboard Organisation (ASO) 
This CPC describes the characteristic and responsibilities of crew onboard ships, 
additional support, communication systems, Safety Management Systems (SMS), 
instructions and guidelines in carrying out the activities resulting in initiating events of 
an incident. 
ii). Shipboard Working Condition (SWC) 
This CPC includes the nature of the physical working conditions onboard ships 
including ambient lighting, glare on screens, noise from alarms and any interruption 
from carrying out relevant tasks, etc. 
iii). Adequacy of Man Machine Interface and Shipboard Operational Support (MMI) 
This CPC consists of the information available on control panels, navigation bridge, 
cargo control room, engine control room and shipboard operational support provided by 
specifically designed decision aids such as marine navigation equipments, cargo 
operation and engine room instruments. Furthermore, these CPC requires thorough 
analysis to be conducted due to the increased automation in shipboard operations. 
iv). Availability of Plans/Procedures (APP) 
This CPC is used to match the existing operating and emergency instructions and 
procedures in carrying out ship operations. 
v). Number of Simultaneous Goals (NSG) 
This CPC describes the number of tasks a crew is required to carry out at the same time. 
vi). Available Time (QAT) 
This CPC refers to the time available to carry out a task competently resulting in a 
reasonable outcome. 
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vii). Time of day (Circadian Rhythm) (CRT) 
This CPC relates to the time of the day or night when the task is carried out. Emphasis 
lies in how the crew can get well adapted to the current time. Examples are the nature of 
four hourly of navigation bridge and engine room watch keeping sequence. 
viii). Adequacy of Shipboard Training and Preparation (ASP) 
This CPC describes the quality of training provided to the crew in carrying out their 
routine tasks onboard ship. It includes familiarisation training and refreshers' courses to 
new joiners and experienced crew respectively within the shipboard management. 
ix). Shipboard Crew Collaboration Quality (SCQ) 
This CPC relates to the efficient manner in which crew works among them to complete 
a task efficiently onboard ship. 
1.2 Chronicle of `Prestige' 
On November 13,2002, `Prestige', a 26 years old Bahamian registered and American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) classed single hull tanker, carrying 77 000 tonnes of heavy 
oil developed a substantial starboard list. She was underway in heavy seas and high 
winds in the region of Cape Finisterre, between 25 to 30 nautical miles, off the coast of 
Galicia in the northwest of Spain (ABS, 2003). A large crack was found in the starboard 
side of the hull. Vessel lost her main propulsion due to list and began to drift. Twenty 
four out of twenty seven crewmembers were evacuated by helicopter from the Spanish 
authority. The remaining onboard, Master, Chief Engineer and Chief Officer managed 
to counter flood port side ballast tanks and reduced the list to about 3 degrees starboard 
list. The vessel, however, was still adrift. On November 14,2003, SMIT, a Dutch 
salvage company, took control of the vessel upon a request from `Prestige' owner and 
insurer. Two of the SMIT's tugs, the Rio De Vigo and Sertosa 32 with difficulty 
managed to secure towlines onboard 'Prestige'. The ship was towed out to sea into 
heavy weather away from Spanish coast. Meanwhile, discussions were going on to find 
a safe haven for the vessel to lighter its cargo to another vessel, the condition however, 
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deteriorated onboard. Consequently, `Prestige' structure gave away and collapsed; 
subsequently the vessel broke into two and sank about 133 nautical miles off the coast 
of Spain on November 19,2002. 
I. 3 Case Study of `Prestige' 
1.3.1 
Based on the `Prestige' incident, please fill the blank columns in Table I. 1 with a scale 
within one (1) to nine (9) with reference to Table 1.2. A pairwise comparison should be 
made by row. An example of ASO compared to SWC is 5, followed by ASO compared 
to MMI as 3, etc. Please ensure the consistency check results in less than 0.1. On the 
Excel spreadsheet, protected cells with formula that shows the consistency value was 
provided. 
Table I. 1 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO I 
swc - 1 
MMI - - 1 
APP - - - 1 
NSG - - - - 1 
QAT - - - - - 1 
CRT - - - - - - 1 
ASP - - - - - - - 1 
SCQ - - - - - - - - 1 
Table 1.2 The Fundamental CPC Scale for Expert Judgment 
Scale Linguistic Influence to Description 
corresponding CPC 
1 Equal Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
equally to the incident 
2 Between Equal and Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Moderate between scale 1 and 3 to the incident 
3 Moderate Experience and judgment favor more 
towards one of the CPC over another 
4 Between Moderate and Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
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Strong between scale 3 and 5 to the incident 
5 Strong Experience and judgment strongly favor one 
CPC over another 
6 Between Strong and Very Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Strong between scale 5 and 7 to the incident 
7 Very Strong A CPC is favored and dominates very 
strongly over another 
8 Between Very Strong and Both of the compared CPCs contribute 
Extreme between scale 7 and 9 to the incident 
9 Extreme An evidence of one CPC favoring at the 
highest order to another CPC appears 
1.3.2 
Based on the `Prestige' incident, please fill the blank columns in Table 1.3 with TWO 
linguistic terms AND the corresponding scales of membership degree with reference to 
the Table 1.4. A triangular membership function is adopted to simplify the 
defuzzification of each linguistic term of the nine CPCs. The membership function for 
each linguistic term of a CPC is evaluated within its limits on an arbitrary scale of 0 to 
1. Description of evaluation section was provided to assist you to recall the incident. An 
example of CPC linguistic term for an ASO can be evaluated as 0.8 Inefficient and 0.2 
Efficient. 
Table 1.3 The CPCs for `Prestige' Incident 
CPC Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms by Expert 
Judgment 
ASO Failure of getting the vessel to a safe 
haven do reflects reasonable level of 
inefficiency in management 
SWC Rough weather does not provide 
reasonably well condition to deal with 
the incident 
MMI Shipboard operation was reasonably 
carried out to overcome the 
emergency listing of the vessel 
APP Vessel had the standard contingency 
plan for quick action to alleviate the 
flooding 
NSG It is the case for any emergency 
situation in general 
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QAT Quick action to get the vessel to safe 
haven is vital due to the encountered 
rough weather 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant for the 
case 
ASP Crew onboard are qualified and had 
received standard training as required 
by STCW 1995 
SCQ Crew had not responded well under 
stress 
Table 1.4 The Parameters and Scopes of Linguistic Terms of CPCs 
CPC Linguistic Terms Membership Labels and Its Scopes (%) 
ASO Very Efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
0-25 10-60 40-90 70- 100 
SWC Advantages Compatible Incompatible 
0-30 20-80 70- 100 
MMI Supportive Adequate Tolerable Inappropriate 
0-25 10-60 40-90 75- 100 
APP Appropriate Acceptable Inappropriate 
0-30 20-80 70- 100 
NSG Less than actual 
capacity 
Matching current 
capacity 
More than actual 
capacity 
0-30 20-80 70- 100 
QAT Adequate Temporarily 
inadequate 
Continuously 
inadequate 
0-30 20-80 70- 100 
CRT Night time(unadjusted) Day time(adjusted) Night time(adjusted) 
0-30 20-80 70- 100 
ASP Adequate with vast 
experience 
Adequate with limited 
experience 
Inadequate experience 
0-30 20-80 
. 
70-100 
SCQ Very Efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
0-25 10-60 40-90 70- 100 
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I. 3.3 
Based on the `Prestige' incident, please fill the blank columns in Table 1.5 with your 
expert judgment of the relative importance and influence among the CPCs' values with 
reference to the fundamental CPC scale provided in Table 1.6. Similarly to 1.3.1, 
pairwise comparison should be made by row. 
Table 1.5 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison for 
Importance and Influence of CPCs 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
swc 0 
ASO 0 
MMI 0 
QAT 0 
CRT 0 
ASP 0 
Table 1.6 The Fundamental CPCs' Scale for Expert Judgment 
Scale Linguistic Influence to corresponding CPCs 
0 No Influence 
1 Low Influence 
2 High Influence 
3 Very High Influence 
1.4 Chronicle of `Carina' 
M. T. CARINA, an American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) classed double hull tanker of 
16 years old was discharging crude oil at one of the US Gulf of Mexico oil terminal. 
While the vessel was discharging in daytime, it was found that two branches of cargo 
tanks inert gas valves were in a closed position. The presence of inert gas inside the 
cargo tank ensures that the cargo tank atmosphere is retained at a lesser percentage of 
oxygen content to prevent any combustion that could lead to tank explosion. Therefore, 
discharging crude oil without having a positive supply of inert gas could result in cargo 
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tank to collapse and subsequently results with an explosion. It was found during routine 
deck cargo watch that both inert gas valves of four wing cargo tanks were in a closed 
position. Upon seeing the status, the deck cargo watch keepers, immediately, opened the 
valves. 
I. 5 Case Study of `Carina' 
1.5.1 
Based on the 'Carina' incident, please fill the blank columns in Table 1.7 with a 
linguistic scale within one (1) to nine (9) with reference to Table 1.8. Please ensure the 
consistency check results in less than 0.1. Extra blanks columns are provided for you to 
add new criterion. On the Excel spreadsheet, protected cells with formula that shows the 
consistency value was provided along with abbreviation definitions which can be 
accessed by bringing the cursor towards the terms. 
Table 1.7 The Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison for 
Importance among the Criteria 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF 
CF 1 
TE - 1 
Ec - - 1 
LF - - - 1 
- - - - 1 
The abbreviations used on Table 1.7 are listed as follows: 
a). CF - Cost to implement the selected RCO. 
b). TE - Time taken to complete the selected RCO. 
c). Ec - Efforts required to implement the selected RCO. 
d). LF - Life span of the selected RCO. 
210 
Appendix I 
Table 1.8 The Fundamental Criteria Scale for Expert Judgment 
Scale Linguistic influence to Description 
corresponding criteria 
1 Equal Both of the compared criteria are equally 
im ortant 
2 Between Equal and Both of the compared criteria contribute 
Moderate between scale 1 and 3 to the objective 
3 Moderate Experience and judgment favor more 
towards one of the criterion over another 
4 Between Moderate and Both of the compared criteria contribute 
Strong between scale 3 and 5 to the objective 
5 Strong Experience and judgment strongly favor one 
criteria over another 
6 Between Strong and Very Both of the compared criteria contribute 
Strong between scale 5 and 7 to the objective 
7 Very Strong A criterion is favored and dominates very 
strongly over another 
8 Between Very Strong and Both of the compared criteria contribute 
Extreme between scale 7 and 9 to the objective 
9 Extreme An evidence of one criterion favoring at the 
highest order to another criterion appears 
1.5.2 
Based on the `Carina' incident, please fill the blank columns in Table 1.9 with your 
expert judgment of the relative importance among the criteria and the RCOs with 
reference to Table 1.10. Extra blank columns are provided to allow you to add new 
criterion. 
Table 1.9 The Judgment Matrix for Decision Matrix of RCOs/Criteria 
Criteri 
RCOs 
CF TE Ec LF 
Pcv 
Dv 
T 
Gd 
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The abbreviations used on Table 1.9 are listed as follows: 
a). Pcv - Periodical checking of the cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves. 
b). D, - Dismantling of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves during vessels drydocking. 
c). Tf - Continuous training and familiarization of crew onboard oil tankers to be 
conducted to emphasize the significance of proper use of cargo tanks' inert gas branch 
valves. 
d). Gd -A good structural design at shipbuilding phase along with reliable locking 
arrangement of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves and an appropriate means of a 
warning system such as an audible alarm, visual light warning signals, or the 
combination of the two could be provided in the cargo control room on the status of the 
cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves. 
Table I. 10 The Linguistic Terms to Determine Relative 
Importance of Criteria and RCOS 
Linguistic terms Abbreviation 
Very Poor VP 
Poor P 
Medium Poor MP 
Fair F 
Medium Good MG 
Good G 
Very Good VG 
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Appendix II 
CREAM Classification Scheme 
The tables in Appendix II represent the non-hierarchical CREAM classification scheme 
organised in causes (genotypes) and symptoms (phenotypes). The purpose of presenting 
these tables is to provide an account of how erroneous action can occur by constructing 
a path of probable antecedent-consequent link, as part of an event analysis or a 
performance prediction. These tables are reproduced from CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998), 
however many of the contents are modified and added including some which have been 
newly developed to suit the characteristic of the maritime domain. 
Table AII. 1 Categories for Action at Wrong Time 
General effects Specific effects Definition/Explanation 
An action started too early, before a 
Timing Too early signal was given or the required 
conditions had been established. 
(Premature action) 
Too late An action started too late. (Delayed 
action) 
Omission An action that was not done at all. 
(Within the time interval allowed) 
An action that continued beyond the point 
Duration Too long when it should have stopped. 
An action that was stopped before it 
Too short should have been. 
Table AII. 2 Categories for Action of Wrong Type 
General 
effect 
Specific effects Definition/Explanation 
Too little Insufficient force. 
Force Too much Surplus force, too much effort. 
Too far A movement taken too far. 
Distance/ 
Magnitude 
Too short A movement not taken far enough. 
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Too fast Action performed too quickly, with too 
Speed much speed or finished too early. 
Too slow Action performed too slowly, with too 
little speed or finished too late. 
Wrong direction Movement in the wrong direction e. g. 
Direction forward instead of backward or left 
instead of right. 
Wrong movement type The wrong kind of movement, such as 
pulling a knob instead of turning it. 
Table AII. 3 Categories for Action at Wrong Object 
General effect S ecific effect Definition/Explanation 
Wrong object Neighbour An object that is in 
physical proximity to the 
object that should have 
been used. 
Similar object An object that is similar 
in appearance to the 
object that should have 
been used. 
Unrelated object An object that is used by 
mistake, even though it 
had no obvious relation 
to the object that should 
have been used. 
Table AII. 4 Categories for Action in Wrong Place 
General effect Specific effect Definition/Explanation 
Sequence Omission An action that was not 
carried out. This includes 
in particular the omission 
of the last action(s) of a 
series. 
Jump forward One or more actions in a 
sequence were skipped. 
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General effect Specific effect Definition/Explanation 
Jump backward One or more earlier 
actions that have been 
carried out are carried 
out again. 
Repetition The previous action was 
repeated. 
Reversal The order of two 
neighbouring actions is 
reversed. 
Wrong action An extraneous or 
irrelevant action is 
carried out. 
Table AII. 5 Categories for Observation 
General consequent Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent 
Observation Overlook cue/signal A signal or an event that should have 
missed been the start of an action (sequence) 
is missed. 
Overlook measurement A measurement or some information 
is missed, usually during a sequence 
of actions. 
False False reaction A response is given to an incorrect 
observation stimulus or event, e. g. starting to 
drive when the light changes to red. 
False recognition An event or some information is 
incorrectly recognised or mistaken 
for something else. 
Wrong Mistaken cue A signal or a cue is misunderstood as 
identification something else. 
Partial identification The identification of an event or 
some information is incomplete. 
Incorrect identification The identification of an event or 
some information is incorrect. 
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Table AII. 6 Categories for Interpretation 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Faulty Wrong The diagnosis of the situation or system state is 
diagnosis diagnosis incorrect. 
Incomplete The diagnosis of the situation or system state is 
diagnosis incomplete. 
Wrong Induction error Faulty reasoning involving inferences or 
reasoning generalisation (going from specific to general) 
leading to invalid results. 
Deduction Faulty reasoning involving deduction (going from 
error general to specific) leading to invalid results. 
Wrong The selection among alternatives (hypotheses, 
priorities explanations, interpretations) using incorrect 
criteria, hence leading to invalid results. 
Decision Decision Inability to make decision in a situation. 
error paralysis 
Wrong Making the wrong decision (typically about action 
decision alternatives). 
Partial Making a decision that does not completely specify 
decision what to do, hence creating a need for further 
decisions to complete the course of action. 
Delayed No Identification is not made in time (for appropriate 
interpretation identification action to be taken). 
Increased time Identification is not made fast enough, e. g. because 
pressure the reasoning involved is difficult, leading to a time 
pressure. 
Incorrect Unexpected A state change occurred which had not been 
prediction state change anticipated. 
Unexpected The event developed in the main as anticipated but 
side effects some side effects had been overlooked. 
Process speed The speed of development (of the system) has been 
misjudged misjudged so things happen either too slowly or too 
fast. 
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Table AII. 7 Categories for Planning 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Inadequate plan Incomplete plan The plan is not complete, i. e., it does not 
contain all the details needed when it is carried 
out. This can have serious consequences later 
in time. 
Wrong plan The plan is wrong, in the sense that it will not 
achieve its purpose. 
Priority error Wrong goal The goal has been wrongly selected resulting in 
selected a non-effective plan. 
Table AII. 8 Categories for Temporary Person Related Functions 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
Consequent Consequent 
Memory Forgotten An item or some information cannot be recalled 
failure when needed. 
Incorrect recall Information is incorrectly recalled. 
Incomplete Information is only recalled partially. 
recall 
Fear Random Actions do not seem to follow any plan or 
actions principle, but rather look like trial and error. 
Action freeze The person is paralysed 
Distraction Task The performance of a task is suspended because 
suspended the person's attention was caught by something 
else. 
Task not The performance of a task is not completed 
completed because of a shift in attention. 
Goal forgotten The person cannot remember why something is 
being done. This may cause a repetition of 
previous steps. 
Loss of The person cannot remember or think of what to 
orientation do next or what happened before. 
Fatigue Delayed The person's response speed (physically or 
response mentally) is reduced due to fatigue. 
Performance Lack of Reduced precision of actions, e. g. in reaching a 
variability precision target value. 
Increasing An increasing number of actions fail to achieve 
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misses their purpose. 
Inattention Signal missed A signal or an event was missed due to inattention. 
This is similar to observation missed, the 
difference being whether it is seen as a random 
event or something that can be explained by a 
cognitive function. 
Physiological Many specific A general condition caused by physiological stress. 
stress effects 
Psychological Many specific A general condition caused by psychological 
stress effects stress. 
Table AII. 9 Categories of Permanent Person Related Functions 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Functional Deafness Caused due to working environment i. e. noises in 
impairment engine machinery room. 
Bad eyesight Caused by ignorance of spectacle wearers whom 
failed to carry out continuous eye sight test to 
verify changes of power required on the spectacle 
Colour blindness lenses. 
Results in failure of mariners to identify navigation 
Dyslexia/aphasia lights correctly. 
Other disability Specific physiological disabilities may be added to 
this group if required by the analysis. 
Cognitive Simultaneous Search for data and information is accomplished 
style scanning by looking for several things at the same time such 
as radar observation during arrival and departure 
ports. 
Successive Search for data and information is accomplished 
scanning by looking for one thing at a time. 
Conservative Search for data and information starts from an 
focusing assumption of which the various aspects are 
examined one by one. 
Cognitive Focus Search for data or information changes in an 
bias gambling opportunistic way rather than systematically. 
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Cognitive Incorrect revision New information does not lead to a proper 
bias of probabilities adjustment of probabilities - either a conservative 
or a too radical effect. 
Hindsight Interpretation of past events is influenced by 
bias knowledge of the outcome. 
Attribution Events are (mistakenly) seen as being caused by 
error specific phenomena or factors. 
Illusion of Person mistakenly believes that the chosen actions 
control control the developments in the systems. 
Confirmation of Search for data or information is restricted to that 
bias which will confirm current assumptions. 
Hypothesis Search for information and action alternatives is 
fixation constrained by a strong hypothesis about what the 
current problem is. 
Table AII. 10 Categories of Equipment Failure 
General Specific Definition of explanation. 
consequent consequent 
Equipment failure 
Navigation bridge Radar joystick A radar joystick stuck and not 
functioning. 
Rudder indicator light Rudder indicator light failure. 
Cargo control Cargo valves indicator Cargo valves open/shut indicator 
room failure. 
Ullage indicator Cargo ullage monitoring indicator 
failure. 
Engine room Speed up/slow down The speed of the process changes 
significantly. 
Release Uncontrolled release or matter or 
energy that causes other equipment to 
fail. 
Software fault Performance slow The performance of the system slows 
down down. This can in particular be 
critical for command and control. 
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Software fault Information delays There are delays in the transmission 
of information, hence in the efficiency 
of communication, both within and 
between systems. 
Command queues Commands or actions are not being 
carried out because the system is 
unstable, but are (presumably) 
stacked. 
Information not Information is not available due to 
available software or other problems. 
Table All. 11 Categories for Procedures 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Inadequate Ambiguous text The text of the procedure is ambiguous and open 
procedure to interpretation. The logic of the procedure may 
be unclear. 
Incomplete text The descriptions given by the procedure are 
incomplete, and assume that the user has specific 
additional knowledge. 
Incorrect text The descriptions of the procedure are factually 
incorrect. 
Mismatch to The procedure text does not match the physical 
actual equipment reality, for example due to equipment upgrades. 
Table All. 12 Categories for Temporary Interface Problems 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Access limitations Item cannot be An item is permanently out of reach, e. g. too 
reached high, too low or too far away from the 
operators working position. 
Item cannot be An item is permanently difficult to find. 
found Infrequently used items that are 
inappropriately labelled fall into this category. 
Ambiguous Position There is a mismatch between the indicated 
information mismatch positions of an item and the actual positions, 
e. g. controls have unusual movements. 
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Coding There is a mismatch in coding, e. g. in the use 
mismatch of colour or shape. This may lead to 
difficulties in the use of equipment. 
Incomplete Poor continuity The information provided by the interface is 
information incomplete, e. g. error messages, directions, 
warnings, etc. 
Table AII. 13 Categories for Permanent Interface Problems 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Access problems Item cannot be reached An item, e. g. a control, 
cannot be reached, for 
instance because it is hidden 
by something or due to a 
change in the operator's 
workin position. 
Item cannot be found An item, information or 
control cannot be located 
when it is needed or it is 
temporarily unavailable. 
Mislabelling Incorrect information The labelling or 
identification of an item is 
not correct. 
Ambiguous The labelling or 
identification identification of an item is 
open to interpretation. 
Language error The labelling or 
identification of an item is 
incorrectly formulated, or is 
written in an unfamiliar 
foreign language. 
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Table All. 14 Categories for Communication 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Communication failure Message not received The message or the 
transmission of 
information did not reach 
the receiver. This could 
be due to incorrect 
address or failure of 
communication channels. 
Message misunderstood The message was 
received but it was 
misunderstood. The 
misunderstanding was, 
however, not deliberate. 
Missing information No information Information is not being 
given when it was 
needed or requested, e. g. 
missing feedback. 
Incorrect information Incorrect or incomplete 
information was given. 
Misunderstanding There is 
misunderstanding 
between sender and 
receiver about the 
purpose, form or 
structure of the 
communication. 
Table AII. 15 Categories for Organisation 
General 
consequent 
Specific 
consequent 
Definition/Explanation 
Maintenance failure Equipment not Equipment (controls, resources) does not 
operational function or is not available due to missing 
or inappropriate management. 
Indicators not working Indications (lights, signals) do not work 
properly due to inappropriate maintenance. 
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Inadequate quality Inadequate procedures Equipment/function is not adequate due to 
control insufficient quality control. 
Inadequate reserves Lack of resources or supplies (e. g. 
inventory, back up equipment, etc. ) 
Management Unclear roles People in organisation are not clear about 
problems their roles and duties. 
Dilution of There is not clear distribution of 
responsibility responsibility; this is particularly important 
in abnormal situations. 
Unclear line of The line of command is not well defined 
command and control of the situation may be lost. 
Design failure Anthropometric The working environment is inadequate, 
mismatch and the cause is clearly a design failure. 
Inadequate MMI The interface is inadequate, and the cause is 
clearly a design failure. 
Inadequate task Inadequate managerial The organisation of work is deficient due to 
allocation rule the lack of clear rules or principles. 
Inadequate task Task planning/scheduling is deficient. 
planning 
Inadequate work Procedures for how work should be carried 
procedures out are inadequate. 
Social pressure Group thinking The individual's situation 
understanding is guided or controlled 
by the group. 
Peer pressure Social pressure from one's peer to 
behave in a similar manner to peers in 
order to be accepted as part of a group. 
Table AII. 16 Categories for Training 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Insufficient skills Performance failure Lack of skills (practical 
experience) means that a 
task cannot be 
accomplished. 
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Insufficient skills Equipment mishandling Lack of skills (practical 
experience) means that 
equipment is incorrectly 
used. 
Insufficient knowledge Confusion The person is not quite 
certain about what to do, 
due to lack of 
knowledge. 
Loss of situation awareness The person has lost 
general situation 
awareness 
(understanding) due to 
lack of knowledge. 
Table AII. 17 Categories for Ambient Conditions 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
Temperature Too hot Uncomfortably warm. 
Too cold Uncomfortably cold. 
Sound Too loud Noise level is too high. 
Too soft Noise level is too low. 
Humidity Too dry Uncomfortably dry. 
Too humid Uncomfortably humid. 
Illumination Too bright High luminosity, glare and 
reflection. 
Too dark Low luminosity, reduced 
colour and contrast. 
Adverse ambient conditions Heavy ship movement High context dependent, may 
coincide with some of the 
CPC. 
Others Vibration Vibration dampers not in 
operation. 
Main engine running within 
the barred engine rpm. 
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Table All. 18 Categories for Working Conditions 
General Specific Definition/Explanation 
consequent consequent 
_ Excessive demand None defined Excessive task demands on 
insufficient time/resources. 
Inadequate work Narrow work space Available work space is not 
place layout large enough for the required 
activities. This is often the case 
for maintenance work. 
Dangerous space Work must be carried out in 
dangerous conditions, e. g. high 
voltage line work, radiation, 
unstable mass or energy storage, 
etc. 
Elevated work space Work must be carried out where 
there is a risk of falling down. 
Inadequate team Unclear job description The roles within the team are 
support not well defined or well 
understood. 
Inadequate The distribution of work/ 
communication responsibilities within the team 
is not mutually agreed. 
Lack of team There is little cohesiveness in 
cohesiveness the team, hence little 
collaboration. 
Irregular working Circadian rhythm effects Shift work leading to 
hours disturbances of physiological 
and psychological functions (jet 
lag, lack of sleep, etc). 
Table AII. 19 General and Specific Antecedents for Error Modes 
General Specific consequent Specific antecedent 
consequent 
Timing/ Communication failure Inadequate procedure Earlier omission 
Duration Faulty diagnosis Inattention Trapping error 
Inade uate plan Observation missed 
Sequence Access limitations Inadequate procedure Trapping error 
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Communication failure Inattention 
Faulty diagnosis Memory failure 
Inadequate plan Wrong identification 
Force Communication failure Inadequate plan Ambiguous label 
Equipment failure Inadequate procedure Convention conflict 
Faulty diagnosis Observation missed Incorrect label 
Distance/ Communication failure Inadequate plan Ambiguous label 
Magnitude Equipment failure Inadequate procedure Convention conflict 
Fault dia gnosis Observation missed Incorrect label 
Speed Communication failure Inadequate plan None defined 
Distraction Inadequate plan 
Equipment failure Observation missed 
Faulty diagnosis Performance variability 
Direction Communication failure Inadequate procedure Ambiguous label 
Faulty diagnosis Inattention Convention conflict 
Inadequate plan Observation missed Incorrect label 
Wrong Access problems Inadequate procedure Ambiguous label 
object Communication failure Inattention Incorrect label 
Wrong identification Performance variability 
Inadequate plan Observation missed 
Table AII. 20 General and Specific Antecedents for Observation 
General , General antecedent Specific antecedent 
consequent 
Observation Equipment failure Information overload Noise 
missed Faulty diagnosis Multiple signals Parallax 
Inadequate plan Lack of system Complacency 
knowledge 
Functional impairment 
Inattention 
False Fatigue Lack of interest 
observation Distraction 
Wrong Distraction Ambiguous symbol Habit, expectancy 
identification set 
Missing information Ambiguous signal Information 
overload 
Faulty diagnosis Erroneous information 
Mislabelling 
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Table AII. 21 General and Specific Antecedents for Interpretation 
General General antecedent Specific antecedent 
consequent 
Faulty Cognitive bias Confusing symptoms Multiple 
diagnosis disturbances 
Wrong identification Error in mental mode New situation 
Inadequate procedure Misleading symptoms Erroneous 
analogy 
Wrong Cognitive bias Too short planning False analogy 
reasoning Cognitive style horizon Overgeneralization 
Mode error 
Decision Fear Lack of knowledge Stimulus overload 
error Cognitive bias Mode error Workload 
Distraction Shock 
Social pressure 
Delayed Inadequate procedure Indicator failure Slow response 
interpretation Equipment failure Lack of theoretical 
knowledge 
Fatigue Multitasking 
Incorrect Cognitive bias Misinterpretation results 
prediction of reading instruments 
Ambiguous information wrongly due to wrong 
Incomplete information perception 
Table AII. 22 General and Specific Antecedents for Planning 
General 
consequent 
General 
antecedent 
Specific antecedent 
Inadequate plan Distraction Error in goal Overlook side 
consequent 
Memory failure Inadequate training Violation 
Wrong reasoning Model error Too short 
planning horizon 
Excessive demand Overlook precondition 
Insufficient knowledge 
Priority error Faulty diagnosis Justifiable higher Conflicting 
Communication failure criteria 
priority 
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Table AII. 23 General and Specific Antecedents for 
Temporary Person Related Functions 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Memory failure Excessive demand Day dreaming 
Temporary 
incapacitation 
Long time since 
learning 
Other priority 
Fear Haunting thoughts due Earlier error Uncertainty 
to past failures Possible consequences 
Distraction Equipment failure Superior/Crew Competing task 
Communication Comfort call Telephone 
failure Commotion 
Fatigue Adverse ambient Exhaustion 
conditions 
Irregular working 
hours 
Performance Equipment failure Change of system Lack of 
variability character training 
Excessive demand Over 
enthusiasm 
Insufficient skills Illness 
Inattention Adverse ambient Temporary 
conditions incapacitation 
Physiological Adverse ambient Boredom Heavy weather 
stress conditions 
Irregular working 
hours 
Psychological Mind effecting Boredom Heavy weather 
stress environment Family problems Peer conflicts 
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Table AII. 24 General and Specific Antecedents for Permanent Person Related Functions 
General General Specific antecedent 
_consequent 
antecedent 
Functional impairment Due to individual None defined 
mis erce tion on a matter 
Cognitive style Due to individual None defined 
misperception on a matter 
Cognitive bias Due to individual Bias thoughts due to 
misperception on a matter misperception 
Table AII. 25 General and Specific Antecedents for Equipment 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Equipment failure Maintenance failure Power failure tremor 
Fire external event 
Flooding impact/projectile 
Software fault Inadequate quality control Poor maintenance 
Table AII. 26 General and Specific Antecedents for Procedures 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Inadequate procedure Inadequate quality control SMS failure 
Design failure 
Table AII. 27 General and Specific Antecedents for Temporary Interface Problems 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Access limitations Equipment Distance within ladder/staircase steps 
failure Temporary incapacitation 
Design failure Localisation problem 
Obstruction 
Ambiguous information Design failure Sensor failure Incorrect 
coding scheme 
Incomplete information Design failure Indicator failure Inadequate 
Inadequate display 
procedure Display clutter hardware 
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Navigation Cargo 
Problems operation 
problems 
Table AII. 28 General and Specific Antecedents for Permanent Interface Problems 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Access problems Inadequate work place layout Provision of only one 
access 
Mislabelling Inadequate work place layout Poorly planned 
Maintenance failure maintenance system 
Table AII. 29 General and Specific Antecedents for Communication 
General 
consequent 
General 
antecedent 
Specific antecedent 
Communication failure Distraction Noise Temporary 
Functional incapacitation 
impairment Presentation failure 
Inattention 
Missing information Mislabelling Hidden information Incorrect 
Design failure language 
Inadequate Presentation failure Noise 
procedure 
Table AII. 30 General and Specific Antecedents for Organisation 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Maintenance failure Inappropriate maintenance Cost & availability of 
system spares 
Inadequate quality control Inadequate team support Ineffective audits 
Communication failure Unskilled labour 
Management problem Communication failure Irregular working hours 
Commercial pressure 
Design failure Poor research & Commercial pressure 
development Motivation failure 
Inadequate task allocation Inadequate team support None defined 
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Social pressure None defined None defined 
Table AII. 31 General and Specific Antecedents for Training 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Insufficient skills Management problem Failure in motivating 
staffs 
Insufficient ex erience Insufficient knowledge Inadequate training 
Table AII. 32 General and Specific Antecedents for Ambient Conditions 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
Temperature Fatigue Loss of concentration 
Distraction Dizziness 
Sound Distraction Discomfort 
Anxiety 
Loss of hearing 
Humidity Fatigue Loss of concentration 
Distraction Dizziness 
Faulty software 
Illumination Distraction Loss of concentration 
Visual obstruction 
Adverse ambient conditions Distraction Decision error 
Missed observation Heavy weather 
Equipment failure Poor cargo planning 
Fault interpretation 
Others Equipment failure Excessive running hours 
Table AII. 33 General and Specific Antecedents for Working Conditions 
General General Specific antecedent 
consequent antecedent 
_ Excessive demand Inadequate task allocation Unexpected tasks 
Adverse ambient Parallel tasks 
conditions Needs of officer to carry out 
too many tasks at the same 
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time for example, during final 
stages of cargo operations 
Inadequate work place Design failure Small design of cargo control 
layout Communication failure room 
Inadequate team Misunderstanding among Isolation of crew in their own 
support crew ethnic groups 
Irregular working hours None defined Shift work Time zone 
change 
Changing 
schedule 
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Appendix III 
Total Relation Matrix and Elicitation of Expert Judgment for 
DEMATEL model 
111.1 Total Relation Matrix 
The total relation matrix can be derived from the following descriptions. 
Assume the following terms: 
X is the normalised direct relation matrix, 
H is the indirect relation matrix, 
I is the identity matrix, 
0 is the null matrix, 
T is the total relation matrix, and 
m 
represents the total influence comprising the direct and the indirect influences. 
i=1 
Therefore, 
m 
I X'=X+X2+X3+... +Xm=X+H. 
i=1 
As the m -+ oo and X`" -* 0, the total relation matrix, T can be obtained by following 
equation: 
Go 
I Y=X(I-X)-l 
i=1 
(Lin and Wu, 2008; Papoulis and Pillai, 2002) 
111.2 Expert Judgment Evaluations for DEMATEL model 
The individual expert judgment evaluations of the direct relation matrix of CPCs are 
provided as follows: 
Expert 1 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
swc 0 2 3 1 1 2 
ASO 1 0 1 3 2 3 
MMI 1 1 0 1 2 1 
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QAT 1 2 1 0 2 3 
CRT 2 1 1 1 0 1 
ASP 2 2 3 2 1 0 
Expert 2 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
swc 0 1 2 1 2 2 
ASO 1 0 1 3 2 3 
MMI 1 1 0 1 2 1 
QAT 2 2 2 0 2 3 
CRT 1 1 1 1 0 1 
ASP 2 2 1 2 1 0 
Expert 3 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 0 2 2 1 1 2 
ASO 1 0 1 2 2 3 
MMI 1 1 0 1 2 1 
QAT 1 1 1 0 2 3 
CRT 1 1 1 1 0 1 
ASP 2 2 1 2 1 0 
Expert 4 
CPCs SWC ASO MMI QAT CRT ASP 
SWC 0 1 2 2 1 2 
ASO 0 0 1 0 0 2 
MMI 2 0 0 0 0 0 
QAT 0 1 2 0 0 2 
CRT 0 1 0 0 0 0 
ASP 1 2 0 1 0 0 
234 
Appendix IV 
Appendix IV 
Fuzzy Sets Representation of the Human Performance Failure 
Probability (HPFP) for the various CPCs' Input Variables Graphs 
i). Shipboard Working Condition (SWC) CPC. 
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ii). Adequacy of Man Machine Interface and Shipboard Operational Support (MMI) 
CPC. 
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iii). Availability of Plans / Procedures (APP) CPC 
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iv). Number of Simultaneous Goals (NSG) CPC 
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v). Available Time (QAT) CPC 
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vi). Time of day (Circadian Rhythm) (CRT) CPC 
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vii). Adequacy of Shipboard Training and Preparation (ASP) CPC 
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viii). Shipboard Crew Collaboration Quality (SCQ) CPC. 
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V. 1 Expert Judgment Evaluation for Integrated AHP and Fuzzy TOPSIS 
model 
V. 1.1 Pairwise Comparison of Criteria Matrix 
The individual expert judgment evaluations of the pairwise comparison of criteria 
matrix are provided as follows: 
Expert 1 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
CF 1.000 0.111 0.111 0.111 1.000 
TE 9.000 1.000 1.000 5.000 1.000 
Ec 9.000 1.000 1.000 5.000 1.000 
LF 9.000 0.200 0.200 1.000 1.000 
HPFPR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Expert 2 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
CF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TE 1.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 
Ec 1.000 0.500 1.000 2.000 1.000 
LF 1.000 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 
HPFPR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Expert 3 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
CF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TE 1.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.000 
Ec 1.000 0.500 1.000 3.000 1.000 
LF 1.000 0.333 0.333 1.000 1.000 
HPFPR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Expert 4 
Criteria CF TE Ec LF HPFPR 
CF 1.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 
TE 1.000 1.000 2.000 0.500 1.000 
Ec 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.333 1.000 
LF 0.500 2.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 
HPFPR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
The abbreviations used are as follow: 
a). CF - Cost to implement the selected RCO. 
b). TE - Time taken to complete the selected RCO. 
c). Ec - Efforts required to implement the selected RCO. 
d). LF - Lifespan of the selected RCO. 
e). HPFPR - Human Performance Failure Probability reductions 
V. 1.2 Fuzzy Decision Matrix of RCOs/Criteria 
The individual expert judgment evaluations of the pairwise comparison of criteria 
matrix are provided as follows: 
Expert 1 
Criteria 
RCOs 
CF TE Fc LF 
Pc, VG P P P 
D,, F G G VP 
Tf F MP P P 
Gd MP MP VG VG 
Expert 2 
Criteria 
RCOs 
CF TE Ec LF 
Pc, F MP F F 
D, P G G VP 
Tf F MP P P 
Gd P VG VG VG 
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Expert 3 
Criteria 
RCOs 
CF TE Ec LF 
Pc, F P F F 
D,, P G G P 
Tf F MP MP P 
Gd MP F VG VG 
Expert 4 
Criteria 
RCOs 
CF TE Ec LF 
Pc G MG F P 
D, P G F MG 
Tf MG MP MP F 
Gd MP MP MP VG 
The abbreviations used are as follow: 
a). CF - Cost to implement the selected RCO. 
b). TE - Time taken to complete the selected RCO. 
c). Ec - Efforts required to implement the selected RCO. 
d). LF - Lifespan of the selected RCO. 
e). Pc - Periodical checking of the cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves. 
f). Dv - Dismantling of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves during vessel's drydocking. 
g). Tf - Continuous training and familiarisation of crew onboard oil tankers to be 
conducted to emphasise the significance of proper use of cargo tanks' inert gas 
branch valves. 
h). Gd -A good structural design at shipbuilding phase, along with a reliable locking 
arrangement of cargo tanks' inert gas branch valves and an appropriate warning system 
such as an audible alarm, visual light warning signals, or a combination of the two, 
which could be provided in the cargo control room to show the status of the cargo tanks' 
inert gas branch valves. 
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Appendix VI 
Human Performance Failure Probability (HPFP) Estimations 
VI. 1 HPFP of `Carina' incident (HPFPCarina) 
(i). The evaluation of CPCs for the `Carina' incident is illustrated in Table VI. 1. 
Table VI. 1 The CPCs for the `Carina' Incident 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPCs Linguistic Terms by 
Ex ert Judgment 
ASO Failure of monitoring to ensure 0.80 Inefficient / 0.20 Efficient 
that all the cargo tanks inert gas 
branch valves are kept in open 
position during discharging 
cargo operations. 
SWC Cargo operations could distract 0.70 Incompatible / 0.30 
the shipboard working condition. Compatible 
MMI Manual monitoring of inert gas 0.80 Tolerable / 0.20 Adequate 
branch valves status indicating 
open/ shut position can be 
observed. 
APP Lack of procedures to monitor 0.60 Inappropriate / 0.40 
the status of inert gas branch Acceptable 
valves while cargo operation is 
in progress. 
NSG Vessel was having a vetting 0.70 More than actual capacity 
inspection along with / 0.30 Matching current capacity 
dischar ing cargo operations. 
QAT Continuous cargo operations 0.60 Continuously inadequate / 
could distract monitoring the 0.40 Adequate 
status of inert gas branch valves. 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant Not relevant 
for the case. 
ASP Lack of training and awareness 0.80 Inadequate, experience / 
on the importance of monitoring 0.20 Adequate, limited 
inert gas branch valves. experience 
SCQ Inefficient crew management 0.60 Inefficient / 0.40 Efficient 
during cargo operations in port. 
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(ii). Pairwise comparisons of the nine CPCs to determine the relative importance 
among the CPCs using AHP by expert judgment were carried out using the CPC scale 
shown in Table 6.1. Table VI. 2 illustrates the result of expert judgment pairwise 
comparison of the CPCs. 
Table VI. 2 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 1 2 4 2 3 4 5 6 8 
SWC 1/2 1 2 3 3 3 5 5 6 
MMI 1/4 1/2 1 3 3 2 3 4 7 
APP 1/2 1/3 1/3 1 3 2 3 3 4 
NSG 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 3 3 
QAT 1/4 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 3 2 3 
CRT 1/5 1/5 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 
ASP 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 2 
SCQ 1/8 1/6 1/7 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 
(iii). Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of CPCs of ASO, SWC, MMI, APP, 
NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ are 3.325,5.067,8.893,10.750,14.333,16.167, 
23.667,27.500 and 37.000 respectively. The normalised relative weights of the CPC 
matrix for the nine CPCs are produced by dividing each element in Table VI. 2 by its 
column sum. The normalised relative weight of each element in the pairwise 
comparison judgment of the CPCs is shown in Table VI. 3. 
Table VI. 3 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Weight of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 0.301 0.395 0.450 0.186 0.209 0.247 0.211 0.218 0.216 
SWC 0.150 0.197 0.225 0.279 0.209 0.186 0.211 0.182 0.162 
MMI 0.075 0.099 0.112 0.279 0.209 0.124 0.127 0.145 0.189 
APP 0.150 0.066 0.037 0.093 0.209 0.124 0.127 0.109 0.108 
NSG 0.100 0.066 0.037 0.031 0.070 0.186 0.127 0.109 0.081 
QAT 0.075 0.066 0.056 0.047 0.023 0.062 0.127 0.073 0.081 
CRT 0.060 0.039 0.037 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.042 0.109 0.081 
ASP 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.014 0.036 0.054 
SCQ 0.038 0.033 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.027 
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From the normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors representing 
each CPC are computed using Equation 6.3. The relative weights of ASO, SWC, MMI, 
APP, NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ CPCs are 0.270,0.200,0.151,0.114,0.090, 
0.068,0.049,0.034 and 0.024 respectively. 
(iv). Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
1 
Principal eigenvalue, ? ax =9x 
(0.270 x 1.000) + (0.200 x 2.000) + (0.151 x 4.000)+ (0.114 x 2.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + ( 
(0.068 x 4.000) + (0.049 X 5.000) + (0.034 x 6.000) + (0.024 x 8.00() + 
0.270 
(0.270 x 0.500) + (0.200 x 1.000) + (0.151 x 2.000)+ (0.114 x 3.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) +) ( 
(0.068 x 3.000) + (0.049 x 5.000) + (0.034 x 5.000) + (0.024 x 6.000) + 
0.200 
((0.270 x 0.250) + (0.200 x 0.500) + (0.151 x 1.000)+ (0.114 x 3.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 2.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.034 x 4.000) + (0.024 x 7.000) + 
0.151 
(0.270 x 0.500) + (0.200 x 0.333) + (0.151 x 0.333)+ (0.114 x 1.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + ( 
(0.068 x 2.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.034 x 3.000) + (0.024 x 4.000) 
0.114 
(0.270 x 0.333) + (0.200 x 0.333) + (0.151 x 0.333)+ (0.114 x 0.333)+ (0.090)( 1.000) + ( 
(0.068 x 3.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.034 x 3.000) + (0.024 x 3.000) 
0.090 
(0.270 x 0.250) + (0.200 x 0.333) + (0.151 x 0.500)+ (0.114 x 0.500)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + ( 
(0.068 x 1.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.034 x 2.000) + (0.024 x 3.000) 
0.068 
(0.270 x 0.200) + (0.200 x 0.200) + (0.151 x 0.333)+ (0.114 x 0.333)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + ( 
(0.068 x 0.333) + (0.049 x 1.000) + (0.034 x 3.000) + (0.024 x 3.000) 
0.049 
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((0.270 x 0.167) + (0.200 x 0.200) + (0.151 x 0.250)+ (0.114 x 0.333)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + )- 
(0.068 x 0.500) + (0.049 x 0.333) + (0.034 x 1.000) + (0.024 x 2.000) + 0.034 
(` ((0.270 x 0.125) + (0.200 x 0.167) + (0.151 x 0.143)+ (0.114 x 0.250)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + 
(0.068 x 0.333) + (0.049 x 0.333) + (0.034 x 0.500) + (0.024 x 1.000) 
)1 
0.024 
= 9.701 
The CI is computed using Equation 6.5 and illustrated as follows: 
CI = 
[g 9.701- 9)] 
= 0.088 
The RI value is taken from Table 6.2 to compute the CR using Equation 6.6 and 
presented as follows: 
10.088 
CR = 1.45 
= 0.060 
The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Therefore the subjective expert judgment on 
CPCs is consistent. 
(v). Convert the membership functions of the tabulated CPCs to single crisp 
values for the nine CPCs using the defuzzification method. 
The fuzzification is carried out referring to the fuzzy set representation of the HPFP for 
the CPCs input variable graph as shown in Figure 6.3 and Appendix IV. The defuzzified 
crisp values of CPCs are obtained using Equation 6.7. Finally, a list consisting of nine 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs is produced and presented in Table VI. 4. 
Table VI. 4 Defuzzified Crisp Values of CPCs 
CPC CPCL 
ASO 0.590 
Swc 0.745 
MMI 0.590 
APP 0.710 
NSG 0.745 
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QAT 0.570 
CRT 0.000 
ASP 0.780 
SCQ 0.530 
(vi). Compute a HPFP value for the `Carina' incident. 
The HPFPcanna is obtained using Equation 6.8 as illustrated as follows: 
HPFPcar n= [(0.270 x 0.590) + (0.200 x 0.745) + (0.151 x 0.590) + (0.114 x 0.710) + 
(0.090 x 0.745) + (0.068 x 0.570) + (0.049 x 0.000) + (0.034 x 0.780) + 
(0.024 x 0.530)] 
= 0.623 
VI. 2 HPFP of D, (HPFP D, ) 
(a). The evaluation of CPCs for the Dv is illustrated in Table VI. 5 
Table VI. 5 The CPCs on implementation of the D, 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms by Expert 
Judgment 
ASO Failure of monitoring to ensure 0.55 Inefficient / 0.45 Efficient 
that all the cargo tanks inert gas 
branch valves are kept in open 
position during discharging 
cargo operations 
SWC Cargo operations could distract 0.70 Incompatible / 0.30 
the shipboard working condition Compatible 
MMI Manual monitoring of inert gas 0.80 Tolerable / 0.20 Adequate 
branch valves status indicating 
open/ shut position can be 
observed 
APP Lack of procedures to monitor 0.60 Inappropriate / 0.40 
the status of inert gas branch Acceptable 
valves while cargo operation is 
in progress 
NSG Vessel was having a vetting 0.70 More than actual capacity 
inspection along with / 0.30 Matching current capacity 
dischar in cargo operations 
QAT Continuous cargo operations 0.70 Continuously inadequate / 
could distract monitoring the 0.30 Adequate 
status of inert gas branch valves 
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CRT Time of the day is not relevant 
for the case 
Not relevant 
ASP Lack of training and awareness 0.55 Inadequate, experience / 
on the importance of monitoring 0.45 Adequate, limited 
inert gas branch valves experience 
SCQ Inefficient crew management 0.30 Inefficient / 0.70 Efficient 
during cargo operations in port 
(b). Pairwise comparisons of the nine CPCs to determine the relative importance among 
the CPCs using AHP by expert judgment were carried out using the CPC scale shown in 
Table 6.1. Table VI. 6 illustrates the result of expert judgment pairwise comparison of 
the CPCs. 
Table VI. 6 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 1 2 4 2 3 4 5 6 4 
SWC 1/2 1 2 3 3 3 5 5 6 
MMI 1/4 1/2 1 3 3 2 3 4 7 
APP 1/2 1/3 1/3 1 3 2 3 3 4 
NSG 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 3 3 
QAT 1/4 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 3 2 3 
CRT 115 0.20 1/3 1/3 0.33 1/3 1 3 3 
ASP 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 2 
SCQ 1/4 1/6 in 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 
(c). Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of CPCs of ASO, SWC, MMI, APP, 
NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ are 3.450,5.067,8.893,10.750,14.333,16.167, 
23.667,27.500 and 33.000 respectively. The normalised relative weights of the CPC 
matrix for the nine CPCs are produced by dividing each element in Table VI. 6 by its 
column sum. The normalised relative weight of each element in the pairwise 
comparison judgment of the CPCs is shown in Table VI. 7. 
Table VI. 7 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Weight of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 0.290 0.395 0.450 0.186 0.209 0.247 0.211 0.218 0.121 
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SWC 0.145 0.197 0.225 0.279 0.209 0.186 0.211 0.182 0.182 
MMI 0.072 0.099 0.112 0.279 0.209 0.124 0.127 0.145 0.212 
APP 0.145 0.066 0.037 0.093 0.209 0.124 0.127 0.109 0.121 
NSG 0.097 0.066 0.037 0.031 0.070 0.186 0.127 0.109 0.091 
QAT 0.072 0.066 0.056 0.047 0.023 0.062 0.127 0.073 0.091 
CRT 0.058 0.039 0.037 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.042 0.109 0.091 
ASP 0.048 0.039 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.014 0.036 0.061 
SCQ 0.072 0.033 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.030 
From the normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors representing 
each CPC are computed using Equation 6.3. The relative weights of ASO, SWC, MMI, 
APP, NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ CPCs are 0.259,0.202,0.153,0.115,0.090, 
0.068,0.050,0.035 and 0.028 respectively. 
(d). Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
Principal eigenvalue, Xm. =X 9 
1 ((0.259 x 1.000) + (0.202 x 2.000) + (0.153 x 4.000)+ (0.115 x 2.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 4.000) + (0.050 x 5.000) + (0.035 x 6.000) + (0.028 x 4.000) 
+ 0.259 
C(0.259 x 0.500) + (0.202 x 1.000) + (0.153 x 2.000)+ (0.115 x 3.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 3.000) + (0.050 x 5.000) + (0.035 x 5.000) + (0.028 x 6.000) 
0.202 
((0.259 x 0.250) + (0.202 x 0.500) + (0.153 x 1.000)+ (0.115 x 3.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 2.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 X 4.000) + (0.028 x 7.000) + 0.153 
((0.259 x 0.500) + (0.202 x 0.333) + (0.153 x 0.333)+ (0.115 x 1.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 2.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 3.000) + (0.028 x 4.000) + 0.115 
(0.259 x 0.333) + (0.202 x 0.333) + (0.153 x 0.333)+ (0.115 x 0.333)+ (0.090X 1.000) + ( 
(0.068 x 3.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 3.000) + (0.028 x 3.000) + 0.090 
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(0.259 x 0.250) + (0.202 x 0.333) + (0.153 x 0.500)+ (0.115 x 0.500)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + ( 
(0.068 x 1.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 2.000) + (0.028 x 3.000) 
)+ 
0.068 
r(0.259 x 0.200) + (0.202 x 0.200) + (0.153 x 0.333)+ (0.115 x 0.333)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + 
` (0.068 x 0.333) + (0.050 x 1.000) + (0.035 x 3.000) + (0.028 x 3.000) 
)+ 
0.050 
(0.259 x 0.167) + (0.202 x 0.200) + (0.153 x 0.250)+ (0.115 x 0.333)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + ( 
(0.068 x 0.500) + (0.050 x 0.333) + (0.035 x 1.000) + (0.028 x 2.000) 
0.035 
"«0.259 x 0.250) + (0.202 x 0.167) + (0.153 x 0.143)+ (0.115 x 0.250)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + 
(0.068 x 0.333) + (0.050 x 0.333) + (0.035 x 0.500) + (0.028 x 1.000) 
0.028 
= 9.804 
The CI is computed using Equation 6.5 and illustrated as follows: 
CI = 
[8 (9.804 
- 9)] 
= 0.101 
The RI value is taken from Table 6.2 to compute the CR using Equation 6.6 and 
presented as follows: 
10.101 
CR = 1.45 
= 0.069 
The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Therefore the subjective expert judgment on 
CPCs is consistent. 
(e). Convert the membership functions of the tabulated CPCs to single crisp 
values for the nine CPCs using the defuzzification method. 
The fuzzification is carried out referring to the fuzzy set representation of the HPFP for 
the CPCs input variable graph as shown in Figure 6.3 and Appendix IV. The defuzzified 
crisp values of CPCs are obtained using Equation 6.7. Finally, a list consisting of nine 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs is produced and presented in Table VI. 8. 
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Table VI. 8 Defuzzified Crisp Values of CPCs 
CPC CPCL 
ASO 0.515 
SWC 0.745 
MMI 0.590 
APP 0.710 
NSG 0.745 
QAT 0.640 
CRT 0.000 
ASP 0.693 
SCQ 0.440 
(f). Compute a HPFP value for the D. 
The HPFP D, is obtained using Equation 6.8 as illustrated as follows: 
HPFP D, = [(0.259 x 0.515) + (0.202 x 0.745) + (0.153 x 0.590) + (0.115 x 0.710) + 
(0.090 x 0.745) + (0.068 x 0.640) + (0.050 x 0.000) + (0.035 x 0.693) + 
(0.028 x 0.440)] 
= 0.603 
VI. 3 HPFP of Pcv (HPFP Pc,, ) 
(a). The evaluation of CPCs for the Pcv is illustrated in Table VI. 9 
Table VI. 9 The CPCs on implementation of Pc,, 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPCs Linguistic Terms by 
Ex ert Judgment 
ASO Failure of monitoring to ensure 0.80 Inefficient / 0.20 Efficient 
that all the cargo tanks inert gas 
branch valves are kept in open 
position during discharging 
cargo operations. 
SWC Cargo operations could distract 0.70 Incompatible / 0.30 
the shipboard working condition. Compatible 
MMI Manual monitoring of inert gas 0.80 Tolerable / 0.20 Adequate 
branch valves status indicating 
open/ shut position can be 
observed. 
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APP Lack of procedures to monitor 0.60 Inappropriate / 0.40 
the status of inert gas branch Acceptable 
valves while cargo operation is 
in progress. 
NSG Vessel was having a vetting 0.70 More than actual capacity 
inspection along with / 0.30 Matching current capacity 
dischar in cargo operations. 
QAT Continuous cargo operations 0.60 Continuously inadequate / 
could distract monitoring the 0.40 Adequate 
status of inert gas branch valves. 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant Not relevant 
for the case. 
ASP Lack of training and awareness 0.80 Inadequate, experience / 
on the importance of monitoring 0.20 Adequate, limited 
inert gas branch valves. experience 
SCQ Inefficient crew management 0.60 Inefficient / 0.40 Efficient 
during cargo operations in port. 
(b). Pairwise comparisons of the nine CPCs to determine the relative importance among 
the CPCs using AHP by expert judgment were carried out using the CPC scale shown in 
Table 6.1. Table VI. 10 illustrates the result of expert judgment pairwise comparison of 
the CPCs. 
Table VI. 10 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 1 2 4 2 3 4 5 6 6 
SWC 1/2 1 2 3 3 3 5 5 6 
MMI 1/4 1/2 1 3 3 2 3 4 7 
APP 1/2 1/3 1/3 1 3 2 3 3 4 
NSG 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 2 2 
QAT 1/4 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 3 2 3 
CRT 
f 
115 1/5 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 
ASP 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 2 
SC 1/6 1/6 in 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 
(c). Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of CPCs of ASO, SWC, MMI, APP, 
NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ are 3.367,5.067,8.893,10.750,14.667,16.167, 
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23.667,26.500 and 34.000 respectively. The normalised relative weights of the CPC 
matrix for the nine CPCs are produced by dividing each element in Table VI. 10 by its 
column sum. The normalised relative weight of each element in the pairwise 
comparison judgment of the CPCs is shown in Table VI. 11. 
Table VI. 11 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Weight of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 0.297 0.395 0.450 0.186 0.205 0.247 0.211 0.226 0.176 
SWC 0.149 0.197 0.225 0.279 0.205 0.186 0.211 0.189 0.176 
MMI 0.074 0.099 0.112 0.279 0.205 0.124 0.127 0.151 0.206 
APP 0.149 0.066 0.037 0.093 0.205 0.124 0.127 0.113 0.118 
NSG 0.099 0.066 0.037 0.031 0.068 0.186 0.127 0.075 0.059 
QAT 0.074 0.066 0.056 0.047 0.023 0.062 0.127 0.075 0.088 
CRT 0.059 0.039 0.037 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.042 0.113 0.088 
ASP 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.031 0.014 0.038 0.059 
SCQ 0.050 0.033 0.016 0.023 0.034 0.021 0.014 0.019 0.029 
From the normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors representing 
each CPC are computed using Equation 6.3. The relative weights of ASO, SWC, MMI, 
APP, NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ CPCs are 0.266,0.202,0.153,0.115,0.083, 
0.069,0.050,0.036 and 0.027 respectively. 
(d). Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
1 
Principal eigenvalue, )4, ax =9x 
1 (0.266 x 1.000) + (0.202 x 2.000) + (0.153 x 4.000)+ (0.115 x 2.000)+ (0.083 x 3.000) + ( 
(0.069 x 4.000) + (0.050 x 5.000) + (0.036 x 6.000) + (0.027 x 6.000) 
0.266 
[((0.266 x 0.500) + (0.202 x 1.000) + (0.153 x 2.000)+ (0.115 x 3.000)+ (0.083 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 3.000) + (0.050 x 5.000) + (0.035 x 5.000) + (0.028 x 6.000) 
)l 
+ 
0.202 
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(0.266 X 0.250) + (0.202 x 0.500) + (0.153 x 1.000)+ (0.115 x 3.000)+ (0.083 x 3.000) +l ( 
(0.068 x 2.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 4.000) + (0.028 x 7.000) 1+ 
0.153 
((0.259 x 0.500) + (0.202 x 0.333) + (0.153 x 0.333)+ (0.115 x 1.000)+ (0.090 x 3.000) + 
(0.068 x 2.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 3.000) + (0.028 x 4.000) + 0.115 
(0.259 x 0.333) + (0.202 x 0.333) + (0.153 x 0.333)+ (0.115 x 0.333)+ (0.090x 1.000) + ( 
(0.068 x 3.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 3.000) + (0.028 x 3.000) 
)+ 
0.083 
(0.259 x 0.250) + (0.202 x 0.333) + (0.153 x 0.500)+ (0.115 x 0.500)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + C 
(0.068 x 1.000) + (0.050 x 3.000) + (0.035 x 2.000) + (0.028 x 3.000) 
)+ 
0.069 
(0.259 x 0.200) + (0.202 x 0.200) + (0.153 x 0.333)+ (0.115 x 0.333)+ (0.090 x 0.333) + ( 
(0.068 x 0.333) + (0.050 x 1.000) + (0.035 x 3.000) + (0.028 x 3.000) + 0.050 
(0.259 x 0.167) + (0.202 x 0.200) + (0.153 x 0.250)+ (0.115 x 0.333)+ (0.090 x 0.500) + ( 
(0.068 x 0.500) + (0.050 x 0.333) + (0.035 x 1.000) + (0.028 x 2.000) 
)+ 
0.036 
'«0.259 x 0.167) + (0.202 x 0.167) + (0.153 x 0.143)+ (0.115 x 0.250)+ (0.090 x 0.500) + 
(0.068 x 0.333) + (0.050 x 0.333) + (0.035 x 0.500) + (0.028 x 1.000) 
0.027 
= 9.751 
The CI is computed using Equation 6.5 and illustrated as follows: 
CI = 
[ý' (9.751 9)] 
= 0.094 
The RI value is taken from Table 6.2 to compute the CR using Equation 6.6 and 
presented as follows: 
CR = 
0.094 
1.45 
= 0.065 
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The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Therefore the subjective expert judgment on 
CPCs is consistent. 
(e). Convert the membership functions of the tabulated CPCs to single crisp 
values for the nine CPCs using the defuzzification method. 
The fuzzification is carried out referring to the fuzzy set representation of the HPFP for 
the CPCs input variable graph as shown in Figure 6.3 and Appendix IV. The defuzzified 
crisp values of CPCs are obtained using Equation 6.7. Finally, a list consisting of nine 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs is produced and presented in Table VI. 12. 
Table VI. 12 Defuzzified Crisp Values of CPCs 
CPC CPCL 
ASO 0.530 
SWC 0.745 
MMI 0.590 
APP 0.710 
NSG 0.815 
QAT 0.570 
CRT 0.000 
ASP 0.693 
SCQ 0.470 
(f). Compute a HPFP value for the Pcv. 
The HPFP Pc, is obtained using Equation 6.8 and illustrated as follows: 
HPFP Pc,, = [(0.266 x 0.530) + (0.202 x 0.745) + (0.153 x 0.590) + (0.115 x 0.7 10) + 
(0.083 x 0.815) + (0.069 x 0.570) + (0.050 x 0.000) + (0.036 x 0.693) + 
(0.027 x 0.470)] 
= 0.607 
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V1.4 HPFP of Tf (HPFP T1) 
(a). The evaluation of CPCs for the Tf is illustrated in Table VI. 13 
Table VI. 13 The CPCs on implementation of the Tf 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms by Expert 
Judgment 
ASO Failure of monitoring to ensure 0.70 Inefficient / 0.30 Efficient 
that all the cargo tanks inert gas 
branch valves are kept in open 
position during discharging 
cargo operations 
SWC Cargo operations could distract 0.70 Incompatible / 0.30 
the shipboard working condition Compatible 
MMI Manual monitoring of inert gas 0.80 Tolerable / 0.20 Adequate 
branch valves status indicating 
open/ shut position can be 
observed 
APP Lack of procedures to monitor 0.60 Inappropriate / 0.40 
the status of inert gas branch Acceptable 
valves while cargo operation is 
in progress 
NSG Vessel was having a vetting 0.70 More than actual capacity / 
inspection along with 0.30 Matching current capacity 
dischar ing cargo operations 
QAT Continuous cargo operations 0.60 Continuously inadequate / 
could distract monitoring the 0.40 Adequate 
status of inert gas branch valves 
CRT Time of the day is not relevant Not relevant 
for the case 
ASP Lack of training and awareness 0.60 Inadequate, experience / 
on the importance of monitoring 0.40 Adequate, limited experience 
inert as branch valves 
SCQ Inefficient crew management 0.55 Efficient / 0.45 Inefficient 
during cargo operations in port 
(b). Pairwise comparisons of the nine CPCs to determine the relative importance among 
the CPCs using AHP by expert judgment were carried out using the CPC scale shown in 
Table 6.1. Table VI. 14 illustrates the result of expert judgment pairwise comparison of 
the CPCs. 
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Table VI. 14 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 1 2 4 2 3 4 5 7 8 
SWC 1/2 1 2 3 3 3 5 5 6 
MMI 1/4 1/2 1 3 3 2 3 4 7 
APP 1/2 1/3 1/3 1 3 2 3 3 4 
NSG 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 3 3 
QAT 1/4 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 3 2 3 
CRT 1/5 1/5 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 3 3 
ASP in 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 3 
SCQ 1/8 1/6 in 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 
(c). Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of CPCs of ASO, SWC, MMI, APP, 
NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ are 3.301,5.067,8.893,10.750,14.333,16.167, 
23.667,28.333 and 38.000 respectively. The normalised relative weights of the CPC 
matrix for the nine CPCs are produced by dividing each element in Table VI. 14 by its 
column sum. The normalised relative weight of each element in the pairwise 
comparison judgment of the CPCs is shown in Table VI. 15. 
Table VI. 15 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Weight of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 0.303 0.395 0.450 0.186 0.209 0.247 0.211 0.247 0.211 
SWC 0.151 0.197 0.225 0.279 0.209 0.186 0.211 0.176 0.158 
MMI 0.076 0.099 0.112 0.279 0.209 0.124 0.127 0.141 0.184 
APP 0.151 0.066 0.037 0.093 0.209 0.124 0.127 0.106 0.105 
NSG 0.101 0.066 0.037 0.031 0.070 0.186 0.127 0.106 0.079 
QAT 0.076 0.066 0.056 0.047 0.023 0.062 0.127 0.071 0.079 
CRT 0.061 0.039 0.037 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.042 0.106 0.079 
ASP 0.043 0.039 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.014 0.035 0.079 
SCQ 0.038 0.033 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.014 0.012 0.026 
From the normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors representing 
each CPC are computed using Equation 6.3. The relative weights of ASO, SWC, MMI, 
APP, NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ CPCs are 0.273,0.199,0.150,0.113,0.089, 
0.067,0.049,0.036 and 0.023 respectively. 
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(d). Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
Principal eigenvalue, ?=9x 
((0.273 x 1.000) + (0.199 x 2.000) + (0.150 x 4.000)+ (0.113 x 2.000)+ (0.089 x 3.000) + 
(0.067 x 4.000) + (0.049 x 5.000) + (0.036 x 7.000) + (0.023 x 8.000) + 
0.273 
r(0.273 x 0.500) + (0.199 x 1.000) + (0.150 x 2.000)+ (0.113 x 3.000)+ (0.089 x 3.000) + 
(0.067 x 3.000) + (0.049 x 5.000) + (0.036 x 5.000) + (0.023 x 6.000) + 
0.199 
((0.273 x 0.250) + (0.199 x 0.500) + (0.150 x 1.000)+ (0.113 x 3.000)+ (0.089 x 3.000) + ) 
(0.067 x 2.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.036 x 4.000) + (0.023 x 7.000) + 
0.150 
(0.273 x 0.500) + (0.199 x 0.333) + (0.150 x 0.333)+ (0.113 x 1.000)+ (0.089 x 3.000) + ) C 
(0.067 x 2.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.036 x 3.000) + (0.023 x 4.000) + 0.113 
((0.273 x 0.333) + (0.199 x 0.333) + (0.150 x 0.333)+ (0.113 x 0.333)+ (0.089x 1.000) + 
'(0.067 x 3.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.036 x 3.000) + (0.023 x 3.000) + 0.089 
(0.273 x 0.250) + (0.199 x 0.333) + (0.150 x 0.500)+ (0.113 x 0.500)+ (0.089 x 0.333) +l 
(0.067 x 1.000) + (0.049 x 3.000) + (0.036 x 2.000) + (0.023 x 3.000) ) 
C 
+ 0.067 
((0.273 x 0.200) + (0.199 x 0.200) + (0.150 x 0.333)+ (0.113 x 0.333)+ (0.089 x 0.333) + ) 
(0.067 x 0.333) + (0.049 x 1.000) + (0.036 x 3.000) + (0.023 x 3.000) + 0.049 
((0.273 x 0.143) + (0.199 x 0.200) + (0.150 x 0.250)+ (0.113 x 0.333)+ (0.089 x 0.333) + 
(0.067 x 0.500) + (0.049 x 0.333) + (0.036 x 1.000) + (0.023 x 3.000) 
A 
+ 
0.036 
261 
Appendix VI 
((0.273 x 0.125) + (0.199 x 0.167) + (0.150 X 0.143)+ (0.113 x 0.250)+ (0.089 x 0.333) +) 
(0.067 x 0.333) + (0.049 x 0.333) + (0.036 x 0.333) + (0.023 x 1.000) 
0.023 
= 9.741 
The Cl is computed using Equation 6.5 and illustrated as follows: 
CI = 
[ý' 9.741 - 9)] 
= 0.093 
The RI value is taken from Table 6.2 to compute the CR using Equation 6.6 and 
presented as follows: 
. 093 CR = 
01.45 
= 0.064 
The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Therefore the subjective expert judgment on 
CPCs is consistent. 
(e). Convert the membership functions of the tabulated CPCs to single crisp 
values for the nine CPCs using the defuzzification method. 
The fuzzification is carried out referring to the fuzzy set representation of the HPFP for 
the CPCs input variable graph as shown in Figure 6.3 and Appendix IV. The defuzzified 
crisp values of CPCs are obtained using Equation 6.7. Finally, a list consisting of nine 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs is produced and presented in Table VI. 16. 
Table VI. 16 Defuzzified Crisp Values of CPCs 
CPC CPCL 
ASO 0.560 
SWC 0.745 
MMI 0.590 
APP 0.710 
NSG 0.745 
QAT 0.570 
CRT 0.000 
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ASP 0.710 
SCQ 0.485 
(f). Compute a HPFP value for the Tt. 
The HPFP Tf is obtained using Equation 6.8 and illustrated as follows: 
HPFP T1= [(0.273 x 0.560) + (0.199 x 0.745) + (0.150 x 0.590) + (0.113 x 0.710) + 
(0.089 x 0.745) + (0.067 x 0.570) + (0.049 x 0.000) + (0.036 x 0.710) + 
(0.023 x 0.485)] 
= 0.612 
VI. 5 HPFP of Gd (HPFP Gd) 
(a). The evaluation of CPCs for the Gd is illustrated in Table VI. 17 
Table VI. 17 The CPCs on implementation of the Gd 
CPCs Description of Evaluation CPC Linguistic Terms by 
Expert Judgment 
ASO Failure of monitoring to ensure 0.90 Efficient / 0.10 Inefficient 
that all the cargo tanks inert gas 
branch valves are kept in open 
position during discharging cargo 
o erations 
SWC Cargo operations could distract 0.60 Incompatible / 0.40 
the shipboard working condition Compatible 
MMI Manual monitoring of inert gas 0.90 Adequate / 0.10 
branch valves status indicating Tolerable 
open/ shut position can be 
observed 
APP Lack of procedures to monitor the 0.60 Inappropriate / 0.40 
status of inert gas branch valves Acceptable 
while cargo operation is in 
progress 
NSG Vessel was having a vetting 0.60 More than actual 
inspection along with discharging capacity / 0.40 Matching 
cargo operations current capacity 
QAT Continuous cargo operations 0.60 Temporarily inadequate 
could distract monitoring the / 0.40 Adequate 
status of inert gas branch valves 
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CRT Time of the day is not relevant for 
the case 
Not relevant 
ASP Lack of training and awareness on 0.80 Adequate, limited 
the importance of monitoring inert experience / 0.20 Inadequate, 
gas branch valves experience 
SCQ Inefficient crew management 0.90 Efficient / 0.10 Inefficient 
during cargo operations in port 
(b). Pairwise comparisons of the nine CPCs to determine the relative importance among 
the CPCs using AHP by expert judgment were carried out using the CPC scale shown in 
Table 6.1. Table VI. 18 illustrates the result of expert judgment pairwise comparison of 
the CPCs. 
Table VI. 18 Judgment Matrix for Pairwise Comparison of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
SWC 1/2 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 
MMI 1/3 1/2 1 3 3 3 2 4 4 
APP 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 2 3 2 2 3 
NSG 1/3 1/2 1/3 1/2 1 2 2 2 2 
QAT 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 2 2 2 
CRT 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 2 2 
ASP 1/4 1/2 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 2 
SCQ 1/4 1/3 1/4 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 
(c). Compute the weights of the nine CPCs. 
The sums of each column of the reciprocal matrix of CPCs of ASO, SWC, MMI, APP, 
NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ are 3.667,6.000,8.000,11.167,13.000,16.500, 
16.000,19.500 and 23.000 respectively. The normalised relative weights of the CPC 
matrix for the nine CPCs are produced by dividing each element in Table VI. 18 by its 
column sum. The normalised relative weight of each element in the pairwise 
comparison judgment of the CPCs is shown in Table VI. 19. 
Table VI. 19 Judgment Matrix for Normalised Relative Weight of CPCs 
CPC ASO SWC MMI APP NSG QAT CRT ASP SCQ 
ASO 0.273 0.333 0.375 0.269 0.231 0.182 0.188 0.205 0.174 
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SWC 0.136 0.167 0.250 0.179 0.154 0.182 0.188 0.103 0.130 
MMI 0.091 0.083 0.125 0.269 0.231 0.182 0.125 0.205 0.174 
APP 0.091 0.083 0.042 0.090 0.154 0.182 0.125 0.103 0.130 
NSG 0.091 0.083 0.042 0.045 0.077 0.121 0.125 0.103 0.087 
QAT 0.091 0.056 0.042 0.030 0.038 0.061 0.125 0.103 0.087 
CRT 0.091 0.056 0.063 0.045 0.038 0.030 0.063 0.103 0.087 
ASP 0.068 0.083 0.031 0.045 0.038 0.030 0.031 0.051 0.087 
SCQ 0.068 0.056 0.031 0.030 0.038 0.030 0.031 0.026 0.043 
From the normalised comparison CPC matrix, nine priority eigenvectors representing 
each CPC are computed using Equation 6.3. The relative weights of ASO, SWC, MMI, 
APP, NSG, QAT, CRT, ASP and SCQ CPCs are 0.248,0.165,0.165,0.111,0.086, 
0.070,0.064,0.052 and 0.039 respectively. 
(d). Consistency validation. 
A principal eigenvalue is obtained using Equation 6.4. 
Principal eigenvalue, a,,,,. =9x 
1(0.248 x 1.000) + (0.165 x 2.000) + (0.165 x 3.000)+ (0.111 x 3.000)+ (0.086 x 3.000) + ( 
(0.070 x 3.000) + (0.064 x 3.000) + (0.052 x 4.000) + (0.039 x 4.000) 
0.248 
r(0.248 x 0.500) + (0.165 x 1.000) + (0.165 x 2.000)+ (0.111 x 2.000)+ (0.086 x 2.000) + 
` (0.070 x 3.000) + (0.064 x 3.000) + (0.052 x 2.000) + (0.039 x 3.000) 1+ 
0.165 
((0.248 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.500) + (0.165 x 1.000)+ (0.111 x 3.000)+ (0.086 x 3.000) + 
(0.070 x 3.000) + (0.064 x 2.000) + (0.052 x 4.000) + (0.039 x 4.000) + 0.165 
(0.248 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.500) + (0.165 x 0.333)+ (0.111 x 1.000)+ (0.086 x 2.000) +l ( 
(0.070 x 3.000) + (0.064 x 2.000) + (0.052 x 2.000) + (0.039 x 3.000) J+ 
0.111 
l (0.248 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.500) + (0.165 x 0.333)+ (0.111 x 0.500)+ (0.086 X 1.000)+ C 
(0.070 x 2.000) + (0.064 x 2.000) + (0.052 x 2.000) + (0.039 x 2.000) 1+ 
0.086 
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((0.248 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.333)+ (0.111 x 0.333)+ (0.086 x 0.500) + 
(0.070 x 1.000) + (0.064 x 2.000) + (0.052 x 2.000) + (0.039 x 2.000) )+ 
0.070 
((0.248 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.500)+ (0.111 x 0.500)+ (0.086 x 0.500) + 
(0.070 x 0.500) + (0.064 x 1.000) + (0.052 x 2.000) + (0.039 x 2.000) 
0.064 
((0.248 x 0.250) + (0.165 x 0.500) + (0.165 x 0.250)+ (0.111 x 0.500)+ (0.086 x 0.500) + 
(0.070 x 0.500) + (0.064 x 0.500) + (0.052 x 1.000) + (0.039 x 2.000) 
0.052 
(0.248 x 0.250) + (0.165 x 0.333) + (0.165 x 0.250)+ (0.111 x 0.333)+ (0.086 x 0.500) + C 
(0.070 x 0.500) + (0.064 x 0.500) + (0.052 x 0.500) + (0.039 x 1.000) 
0.039 
= 9.555 
The CI is computed using Equation 6.5 and illustrated as follows: 
CI =[ (9.555 - 9)] 
= 0.069 
The RI value is taken from Table 6.2 to compute the CR using Equation 6.6 and 
presented as follows: 
10.069 
CR = 1.45 
= 0.048 
The CR value obtained is less than 0.1. Therefore the subjective expert judgment on 
CPCs is consistent. 
(e). Convert the membership functions of the tabulated CPCs to single crisp 
values for the nine CPCs using the defuzzification method. 
The fuzzification is carried out referring to the fuzzy set representation of the HPFP for 
the CPCs input variable graph as shown in Figure 6.3 and Appendix IV. The defuzzified 
crisp values of CPCs are obtained using Equation 6.7. Finally, a list consisting of nine 
defuzzified crisp values of CPCs is produced and presented in Table VI. 20. 
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Table VI. 20 Defuzzified Crisp Values of CPCs 
CPC CPCL 
ASO 0.380 
SWC 0.710 
MMI 0.380 
APP 0.710 
NSG 0.710 
QAT 0.360 
CRT 0.000 
ASP 0.570 
SCQ 0.380 
(f). Compute a HPFP value for the Gd. 
The HPFP Gd is obtained using Equation 6.8 and illustrated as follows: 
HPFP Gd = [(0.248 x 0.380) + (0.165 x 0.710) + (0.165 x 0.380) + (0.111 x 0.710) + 
(0.086 x 0.710) + (0.070 x 0.360) + (0.064 x 0.000) + (0.052 x 0.570) + 
(0.039 x 0.380)] 
= 0.484 
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